Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard? by Marcus, Richard L.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
1983
Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward
a More Disparate Standard?
Richard L. Marcus
UC Hastings College of the Law, marcusr@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 Geo. L.J. 829 (1983).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/457
Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Author: Richard L. Marcus
Title: Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?
Source: Georgetown Law Journal
Citation: 71 Geo. L.J. 829 (1983).
Posted with permission of the publisher, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL © 1983.
Marcus Richard
Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court:
Toward a More Disparate Standard?
RICHARD L. MARCUS*
In recent yearsfederal courts have with increasingfrequency considered
the fraudulent concealment doctrine as a means of tolling statutes of
limitations. Under this federal doctrine, the limitations period does not
run until theplaintff disco vers or, through the exercise of due diligence,
should have discovered a cause of action concealed by the defendant. In
this article, Professor Marcus observes that although the application of
the fraudulent concealment doctrine appears disarmingly simple, it has
confounded courts and litigants alike. Professor Marcus ident~fies in-
stances of disparate applications of thefraudulent concealment doctrine,
and then suggests how courts can consistently apply the doctrine in a
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INTRODUCTION
Prospective plaintiffs often determine that they have a claim only after the
applicable statute of limitations has run. Particularly in this post-Watergate
era, such persons are likely to suspect that the wrongdoer concealed the claim.
If they are right, they may be able to escape the bar of the statute of limitations
by relying on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which "tolls" the appli-
cation of the statute of limitations. When a defendant has concealed his mis-
conduct, the limitations period does not begin to run until after the plaintiff
discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, his claim against the
defendant. Watergate. itself provided illustrations of the tolling doctrine in op-
eration: Convicted Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt unsuccessfully raised
the fraudulent concealment doctrine in a malpractice suit against his lawyer,
who had defended him when he was prosecuted for his role in the Watergate
break-in,' and columnist Hedrick Smith successfully invoked it in a suit
against President Nixon and others for illegal wire-tapping. 2 The doctrine also
has been advanced recently in a variety of other newsworthy litigation.
3
It is in more mundane matters, however, that the fraudulent concealment
1. See Hunt v. Bittman, 482 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (D.D.C. 1980), qa'd, 652 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). Hunt alleged that his lawyer entered into a conspiracy with officials at the
White House and the Committee to Reelect the President to protect the White House at the expense of
Hunt and the other Watergate defendants. Id at 1023. Because Hunt's codefendant James McCord had
made similar charges publicly long before Hunt sued, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit barred the suit because Hunt should have known of his claim. Id at 1024-25.
See United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 351-53 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (describing McCord's allegations
of malpractice against attorneys).
2. Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). Smith
sued former President Nixon, former National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, former Attorney
General John Mitchell, and former presidential aides including H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman
for illegally tapping his phone in connection with efforts to plug leaks of information to the press. Id at
1186 & n.l. In view of the secrecy surrounding the wiretapping, the court held that Smith could avail
himself of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. Id at 191 & n.44.
3. In Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982), the plaintiffs father was the unknowing
subject of chemical warfare experiments conducted by the Army in 1953, id at 326, and had died as a
result of an injection of a mescaline derivative. The tolling claim was premised on the Army's suppre-
sion of information concerning its involvement until 1975. Id In United Klans of America v. McGov-
er, 621 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980), plaintiff Ku Klux Klan relied on concealment in a suit for injuries
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doctrine assumes its principal and substantial importance. The Supreme Court
first adopted the doctrine in 1874 as a matter of federal common law in Bailey
v. Glover.4 In 1946 the Court declared in Holmberg v. Armbrecht 5 that "[tihis
equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.' 6 Since then,
the courts have been asked to apply the federal tolling doctrine to claims under
an array of federal statutes including the Clayton Antitrust Act,7 the Recon-
struction Era Civil Rights Acts,8 sections 11 and 12,9 and 17,10 of the 1933
allegedly sustained as a result of a counterintelligence program by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in violation of the Klan's rights under the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. Id at 153.
In Fitzgerald v. Seamens, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a former Air Force employee successfully
utilized the doctrine in his claim against Alexander Butterfield, Deputy Assistant to the President. The
plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he testified before Congress about cost overruns in the Air
Force. Id at 222. The plaintiff was able to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment because he
did not become aware of his claim until Butterfield testified before the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities. Id at 229. After a number of further developments, the case resur-
faced as Fitzgerald v. Nixon, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982), the notorious "wager" case. Justice O'Connor
commented that the parties had essentially placed a wager on the Court's decision by having reached a
settlement in a limitation of liability agreement and making the remainder of the damages requested
depend on the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court. Transcript of Oral Argument before the
Supreme Court, November 30, 1981, at 38 (University Publications of America), Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
In O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1979), afd, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1124 (1981), former stockholders of a race track brought a securities action alleging that they
learned of their claim only when Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel was indicted along with others in
1975 for rigging legislative activities in order to affect the price of stock in the race track between 1969
and 1971. Id at 1163 & 1166. See also Hampton v. Hanrahan, 522 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(claims arising out of the shooting death of Black Panther Fred Hampton); Liuzzo v. United States, 485
F. Supp. 1274, 1275 (E.D. Mich 1980) (claim that FBI involved in 1965 murder of civil rights worker in
South); Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (claim arising out of activities of
Freedom Riders in South in early 1960's); American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 25
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (claim that city used covert efforts to disrupt political activists); Pollard v. United
States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (suit for injuries incurred in Tuskegee Syphilis Study in
1930's).
4. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874).
5. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
6. Id at 397.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The statute of limitations for the Clayton Act
appears in 15 U.S.C. § 15b. As the Sixth Circuit noted in Norton-Children's Hospitals, Inc. v. James E.
Smith & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1981), "IT]he cases that have applied this [tolling] principle
to antitrust cases. . . are too numerous to require citation." Id at 445. See also e.g., In re Beef Anti-
trust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1171 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); Charlotte Telecasters,
Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570, 574 (4th Cir. 1976); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); Laundry Equip.
Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1964). For an argument that fraudulent
concealment has had an undesirable effect on the application of the Clayton Act, see Kirkham,
Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497, 509-12 (1979).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1994 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Seamens, 553 F.2d 220,
228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975). Employment discrimination
claims based on title IV of the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), are equitable claims and, therefore, are subject to the doctrine of laches rather than to a statute of
limitations. See Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1980) (equitable
remedies such as laches available in title VII employment discrimination cases); see also infra note 181
and accompanying text (discussing laches).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77/ (1976). See Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3485 (1982); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Securities Litig.,
484 F.Supp. 253, 257 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Brick v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283,
291 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). As the cases cited above indicate, tolling generally is not available, however, for
claims based on § 11 or § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 because such claims are controlled by § 13 of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976), which provides in part that "[i]n no event shall any such action
be brought to enforce a liability... more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to
the public." Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976) ('[s]ection 13 specifies a statute
1983]
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Securities Act, sections 10(b) 1' and 14(a)12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, the Commodity Exchange Act, 13 the Federal Torts Claims Act, 14 the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 15 the Railway Labor Act, 16 the Death on the High
Seas Act,17 the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,' 8 the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,19 the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act,20 the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act,21 the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970,22 the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Say-
of limitations of one year from the time the violation was or should have been discovered, in no event
to exceed three years from the time of offer or sale").
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976). See Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (10th
Cir. 1980); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171-73 (10th Cir.
1974). There is, of course, an enduring debate on whether § 17 gives rise to a private cause of action.
See Comment, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: Implication of a Private Cause ofAction, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 244, 266 (1981) (concluding that private right of action should be implied from
§ 17(a)).
11. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976). See, e.g., Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041-42
(10th Cir. 1980); Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien,
Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 695 (lst. Cir. 1978); see also Comment, Plaintfifs Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 158, 175 (1978) (tolling doctrine has always applied to actions under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). See Alabama Bancorp. v. Henley, 465 F. Supp. 648, 652-53 (N.D.
Ala. 1979); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 947 (D.N.J.), rev'don other grounds, 611
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
13. Section 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976). See Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 228 (D.
Kan. 1979); Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Namm, 446 F. Supp. 692, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1273 (1982); Hammond v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See McNutt v. Airco Indus. Gases Div., 687 F.2d
539, 543 (1st Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 382-84 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979); International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907,
922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
16. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976), as amended by 45 U.S.C.A. § 159a (West Supp. 1982). See
Cato v. South Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist. of Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 489, 492-93
(S.D. Tex. 1973), af'd, 485 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1973).
17. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976). See Renner v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 587 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (9th
Cir. 1978).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Bomba v. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067,
1070-71 (7th Cir. 1978); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 407-09 (N.D. 111. 1977); Husted v.
Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 298, 305-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Before 1979 the statute of limitations for the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act provided that "in no event shall any such action be brought
by a purchaser more than three years after the sale or lease to such purchaser." 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976).
Although some courts allowed tolling, most courts interpreting this provision held that concealment
could not toll the limitations period beyond three years. Compare Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1043 (10th Cir. 1980) (section 1711 precludes tolling beyond absolute three year
limit) with Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (tolling permiss-
ible beyond three years despite limitation of § 1711). In 1979, § 1711 was amended and now allows
tolling for claims based upon fraudulent schemes and misrepresentations in the sale or lease of property
in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
19. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See
Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Nielsen v. Western Elec. Co.. 603 F.2d 741,
743-44 (8th Cir. 1979); Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 994 (1978); Small v. Signal LP Gas, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 46, 48-49 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 751-760h (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Ashland Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 567 F.2d
984, 988-89 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978).
22. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See
United States v. B & L Supply Co., 486 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
[Vol. 71:829
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ings Act, 23 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,24 the Selective
Service Act, 25 the Copyright Act,26 and claims against the United States under
the Tucker Act.27 In addition, this tolling doctrine has been raised in a suit to
recover taxes, 28 and in cases involving claims based on the Constitution.
29 It
has even been argued that fraudulent concealment sometimes forecloses appli-
cation of res judicata.30 The frequency of tolling arguments appears to have
increased substantially in the last fifteen years. The most dramatic growth be-
gan in the mid-1970's,31 notably about the time the Watergate affair left its
mark on the national consciousness.
Despite the growing importance of fraudulent concealment, it has received
little attention from the Supreme Court or legal commentators. Bailey v.
Glover did not carefully explain how the doctrine should be applied, and the
Supreme Court has provided little meaningful guidance on the subject since
that decision. Since Professor John Dawson exhaustively chronicled the his-
torical development of the tolling doctrine fifty years ago,32 academic analysis
has been sporadic and limited to the application of the tolling doctrine under
specific federal statutes.33 Left to themselves to decide an increasing number of
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2012 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Tye v. Spitzer-Dodge, 499 F. Supp. 687, 693
(S.D. Ohio 1980); Byre v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 276, 280-82 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
24. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See
Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 830, 836 (D. Hawaii 1980).
25. Selective Service Act of June 24, 1948, § 9, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604, 614-18 (1948). The same basic
provisions are now codified in the veterans' benefits title as 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976). See Bell v. Aer-
odex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1973).
26. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d
338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971).
27. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). See
Spevak v. United States, 390 F.2d 977, 980-84 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n v.
United States, 373 F.2d 356, 358-60 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971 (1969).
28. See Bruno v. United States, 547 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1976). The district court had concurrent
jurisdiction of the claim with the Court of Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). 547 F.2d at 72 & n.1.
29. See United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir. 1980) (first, fourth, and
fifth amendments); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (first,
fourth, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments); American Civil Liberties Union
v. Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (first, fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth and fourteenth
amendments).
30. See Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir.) (arguing fraudulent
concealment exception to doctrine of res judicata), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 298 (1982). Compare Ingram
Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. 1 65,241 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to invalidate
general release on basis of fraudulent concealment).
31. The dramatic increase in claims of fraudulent concealment is apparent to anyone who does re-
search in the area. A review of the footnotes in this article shows that the majority of such cases have
been decided since 1975. There is, of course, no way to know for certain how many plaintiffs have
raised fraudulent concealment claims. In an effort to verify the apparent increase, the author made a
search on LEXIS computerized research system that yielded the results set forth in the Appendix. As
indicated there, LEXIS reports indicate that there have been nearly twice as many such cases in the
federal courts of appeals and district courts since January 1, 1975, as during the 30 years before that.
32. See Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. Rav. 875 (1933)
[hereinafter Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment]; Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limita-
tion, 31 MICH. L. Rav. 591 (1933) [hereinafter Dawson, UndiscoveredFraud];see also Dawson, Estoppel
and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. Rv. 1, 23-25 (1935) (comparing tolling doctrine of fraudulent
concealment to estoppel to enforce express or implied contract in which defendant agrees not to plead
defense of statute of limitations).
33. See generally Comment, Clayton Act Statute of Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Conceal-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 600 (1963) (Clayton Act); Comment, Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling theAntitrust
1983]
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fraudulent concealment cases, lower courts rarely analyze the rules governing
the application of the doctrine and often state conclusions without explaining
them. Given the ad hoc approach of the lower courts, haphazard results have
been almost inevitable, causing some district judges to complain that they can-
not discern proper standards for application of the doctrine.
Uncertainty surrounding the tolling doctrine may be exacerbated by the
Supreme Court's decisions in two civil rights cases, Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc. 34 and Board of Regents v. Tomanlo.35 Broadly construed, these
cases arguably require the application of state tolling principles to claims
under many federal statutes, thereby adding confusion to an already unsettled
area. In both cases the trial courts had followed the well-established practice
of borrowing limitations periods from the states in which the claim arose be-
cause the federal civil rights statutes at issue did not specify a limitations pe-
riod for claims brought under the statute. Although these decisions were based
in part on statutory interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts at issue, 36 they also
were based on the general notion that tolling doctrines are an integral part of
limitations policy, and that state principles permitting or refusing tolling must
therefore be borrowed along with the limitations period.
Neither Johnson nor Tomanio dealt with fraudulent concealment or explic-
itly overruled prevailing case law. Nevertheless, some lower federal courts
have, not surprisingly, read their broad reasoning to mean that fraudulent con-
cealment principles, like other tolling matters, should be governed by state law
whenever the limitations period is borrowed from state law.37 The claims fall-
ing into that category are not unimportant. They include claims based on the
Constitution,38 all but one of the Civil Rights Acts, 39 and section 10b of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, 40 claims that are asserted hundreds of times an-
nually. The uncertainty already surrounding the application of the fraudulent
concealment doctrine before Johnson and Tomanio could thus be compounded
by the introduction of a multitude of state rules of tolling in a very significant
number of cases. Although the results may not be different under the various
state rules than under federal common law,41 it is undoubtedly a move in the
Statute ofLimitations, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 328 (1967) (same); Comment, Intent to Conceal- Tolling
the Antitrust Statute of Limitations under the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEO. L.J. 791 (1976)
(same); Comment, Plaintiff's Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 158
(1978) (1934 Securities Exchange Act); Note, Fraudulent Concealment and Section 4(b) of the Clayton
Act, 49 VA. L. REv. 276 (1963) (Clayton Act).
34. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
35. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
36. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (discussing role of statutes in Johnson and
Tomanio).
37. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' interpretations of
Tomanio).
38. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing claims based on Constitution).
39. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights claims).
40. See supra notes 11 and accompanying text (discussing securities claims).
41. Although a comprehensive survey of state law is beyond the scope of this article, a brief review
indicates that there is reason to expect differences from the federal approach. Commentators have dis-
cerned a trend in some states toward adoption of the discovery standard, under which the limitations
period begins to run from the date the plaintiff discovers his injury. See Scott, For Whom the Time
Tolls: Time of Discovery and the Statute of Limitations, 64 ILL. BAR J. 326, 332 (1976) (noting that
accepted rule in Illinois is that statute of limitations begins to run from date of discovery; advocating
that application of rule to specific causes of action depends on whether plaintiff should have known of
[Vol. 71:829
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wrong direction to introduce additional disparity into an area that already ex-
periences conflict.
The current and growing disarray in the law of fraudulent concealment has
resulted in large measure from inattention. The potential impact of Johnson
and Tomanio on the fraudulent concealment doctrine appears unintended, and
the lower courts' disparate applications of the doctrine do not seem carefully
reasoned. Given the growing importance of federal claims and the increasing
culpable conduct within statutory period); Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: Caifornia's
Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106, 124-25 (1980) (advocating adoption of
uniform discovery of injury standard for all causes of action in place of current system in which discov-
ery standards vary for each cause of action).
Because the discovery standard seems essentially the same as the federal approach, there is little
reason to be concerned about inconsistency on this particular element of limitations doctrines. Natu-
rally, the debate about the application of state or federal law that Johnson and Tomanio presents is of
little consequence unless the state discovery standard is different from the federal one.
There certainly will be situations in which litigants will assert that the federal and state tolling rules
are different. When such situations arise, Professor Bromberg notes, the federal rule usually is more
liberal than the state approach. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.5(l),
at 42 (1979). At the outset, it does not appear that any state has flatly rejected the tolling'doctrine. In
1933 Professor Dawson reported that twenty-seven states had accepted the doctrine, but that four states,
Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington, had rejected any extension of the tolling principle
beyond fraud cases. Dawson, UndiscoveredFraud, supra note 32, at 593 n.6. Since then, at least Wash-
ington has embraced the doctrine. See Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 406, 552 P.2d 1053, 1056
(1976) (statute of limitations for legal malpractice action tolled until client discovers, or in the exercise
of due diligence should discover, facts giving rise to cause of action). Kansas, however, has maintained
a hard line on the theory that any exceptions to the statute of limitations should come from the legisla-
ture, which has authorized tolling only for actions based on fraud. See Hill v. Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 457,
395 P.2d 298, 301 (1964) (enumeration by legislature of specific exceptions to statute of limitations
excludes all others by implication); Christensen Grain, Inc. v. Garden City Coop. Equity Exch., 192
Kan. 785, 788, 391 P.2d 81, 83-84 (1964) (same). Nevertheless, some recent Kansas cases suggest that
this policy has softened. See Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 516, 582 P.2d 1136, 1145
(1978) (defendant cannot take advantage of statute of limitations when his own concealment is cause of
delay). An exhaustive effort to locate divergent views seems unwarranted; the point is that the doctrine
is not nearly so venerably established in many states as in the federal common law.
Beyond the question of whether tolling is available, it appears that states apply the fraudulent con-
cealment doctrine differently. For example, despite the current federal practice, many states place sub-
stantial emphasis on affirmative acts of concealment, even in cases based on fraud. See, e.g., Zagar v.
Health & Hosp. Governing Comm'n, 83 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898, 404 N.E.2d 496, 500 (1980) (fraudulent
misrepresentations that form basis of cause of action do not constitute fraudulent concealment under
relevant statute in absence of showing that misrepresentations tended to conceal cause of action);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DiMassa, 496 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Pennsylvania
law clearly requires that to toll statute of limitations, fraud must be active, continuing, and perpetrated
by affirmative independent act of concealment); Shipp v. O'Dowd, 454 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970) (mere failure to disclose, or mere concealment, insufficient to toll statute in absence of allegations
of affirmative fraudulent concealment).
On the other hand, it has been urged in some cases that the state standard, requiring affirmative acts
of concealment, is easier to satisfy. In Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392 (1981), plaintiff sought to rely on the state rule and the defendant
advanced the federal rule. Id at 691-92. State rules also may diverge from the federal standard by
employing a different measurement of the time available to sue after the statute has been tolled. Under
the federal rule the plaintiff has the full statutory period to bring suit after the date on which he discov-
ered or should have discovered his claim. Norton's Children's Hospitals, Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons,
Inc., 658 F.2d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 1981). This approach, however, is not universal among the states. For
example, regardless of the particular limitations period for the claim, whenever a statute of limitations
is tolled in New York, "[T]he action must be commenced within two years after such actual or imputed
discovery." N.Y. Cwv. PRAc. LAW § 203(f) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1982). Thus, in Cestaro v. Mack-el, 429 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y.), af'd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977), the court dismissed a civil rights
action because it had not been brought within two years of discovery of the claim, although the bor-
rowed statute of limitations was three years. Id at 469-70. The federal courts have had enough diffi-
culty articulating and applying the federal standard without trying to employ state standards as well.
The threat of greater disparity in standards, therefore, cannot be disregarded.
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popularity of the fraudulent concealment doctrine in litigation, such inatten-
tion results in confusion that is unfair to trial judges and litigants.
This article argues that focusing on the policies underlying limitations points
the way toward greater consistency in application of fraudulent concealment.
After briefly examining the policies furthered by statutes of limitations, the
article reviews the emergence of the federal tolling doctrine since Bailey v.
Glover, demonstrating that it came to be applied to all federal claims, whether
or not the limitations period was specified by Congress. Against this back-
ground, it analyzes Johnson and Tomanio and concludes that these cases
should not be interpreted to abandon this history and introduce disparities be-
tween two arbitrary categories of federal claims.
After concluding that the tolling of federal claims should not be muddled by
the introduction of state tolling principles, the article turns to the analytical
difficulties presented by the application of the federal fraudulent concealment
doctrine. In theory, the principle is disarmingly simple-when the defendant
has concealed his wrongdoing, the statute of limitations is tolled until the date
the plaintiff would, with "due diligence," have learned of the existence of his
claim. Neither the concealment prong nor the diligence prong, however, has
proved easy to apply. With respect to concealment, for historical reasons
courts did not require plaintiffs to prove concealment at all if the claim was
based on fraud. Given their desire to avoid barring diligent plaintiffs on stat-
ute of limitations grounds, the courts over time de-emphasized concealment as
an independent requirement for tolling the statute of limitations. This article
argues, however, that despite its sometimes difficult application the conceal-
ment requirement should be disinterred because it provides important protec-
tion for defendants. With respect to plaintiffs diligence, the article first rejects
cases dispensing with proof of diligence when the defendant has been guilty of
concealment and argues that proof of diligence should be required of every
plaintiff. It then reviews a variety of factors that are important in evaluating
plaintiff's diligence, concluding that the diligence standard must remain
flexible.
Finally, the article considers the various procedural devices available for
deciding tolling issues in advance of the trial on the merits. Although deter-
mining whether actions are barred by limitations before a full trial on the mer-
its is desirable, the procedural opportunities for doing so, particularly by
summary judgment, may be more limited than the courts have recognized.
I. POLICIES FURTHERED BY STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
At the outset, it is necessary to say something about why statutes of limita-
tions exist. Although they may appear unduly draconian to plaintiffs, statutes
of limitations embody policies that have been recognized for centuries. In
1849 the Supreme Court observed that "Statutes of Limitation form a part of
the legislation of every government, and are necessary to the peace and repose
of society.' '42 Five years after the Supreme Court first applied tolling principles
in Bailey v. Glover, it expanded on the policies underlying statutes of limita-
42. Steams v. Page, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 819, 828 (1949).
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tions in another tolling case, Wood v. Carpenter:43
Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are fa-
vored in the law. They are found and approved in all systems of en-
lightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and
stability to human affairs. An important public policy lies at their
foundation. They stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While
time is constantly destroying the evidence of rights, they supply its
place by presumption which renders proof unnecessary. Mere delay,
extending to the limit proscribed, is itself a conclusive bar.
44
Since that time the Court has re-emphasized the significance of protecting de-
fendants from stale claims and protecting the courts against the burden of at-
tempting to resolve such belated suits.
45
These policies of protecting defendants and courts from stale claims are im-
portant. The interests of defendants are relatively obvious. As the Supreme
Court recently observed, a limitations period "establishes a deadline after
which the defendant may legitimately have peace of mind. '46 More impor-
tantly, the passage of time could seriously impair a defendant's ability to de-
fend himself. Coping with stale claims also poses substantial logistical
difficulties for courts. At trial, factfinders would be presented with mountains
of moldy evidence resulting from discovery relating to events that occurred,
perhaps, decades ago. In addition, it may be necessary to contrive alternatives
to live testimony when important witnesses are unavailable or cannot recall
events. These logistical difficulties are not mere inconveniences that vex
judges. To the extent that overburdened courts are entangled in such
problems, they may be unable to attend to timely claims. Thus, to safeguard
the interests of defendants and courts, the general rule is that claims automati-
cally accrue at the time of injury and are barred after a specified time has
elapsed. 47
43. 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
44. Id at 139.
45. In Glus v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), the Court observed that statutes of
limitations are primarily designed to ensure fairness to defendants. The Court rationalized that such
statutes
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed
to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on
notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.
Id at 428, quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944). See also Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (limitations periods
spare courts from litigation of stale claims and defendants from defending when events forgotten and
evidence lost); cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980) (limitations periods prevent
unfairness of requiring defendants to piece together defense after certain period of time has elapsed).
Acknowledging that statutes of limitations sometimes work harsh results, the Supreme Court recently
noted, "It goes without saying that statutes of limitations often make it impossible to enforce what were
otherwise perfectly valid claims. But that is their very purpose, and they remain as ubiquitous as the
statutory rights or other rights to which they are attached or applicable." United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
46. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. at 751.
47. See Marcus v. National Life Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1970); Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1178, 1200 (1950) (statute runs from date cause of
action accrues).
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Any tolling doctrine, obviously, is an exception to this general rule. When-
ever courts toll the limitations period, the certainty sought by the statute is
evaded and the interests of both defendants and the courts are threatened.
Tolling should be allowed, therefore, only when a sufficient showing is made
to justify disregarding the policies underlying statutes of limitations.
The remainder of this article identifies rules that should be applied to deter-
mine whether a sufficient showing has been made to justify tolling by fraudu-
lent concealment. Indeed, it is the absence of clear rules that has bred
uncertainty about the scope of this tolling doctrine, which in turn has under-
mined the policies of the statute of limitations. To bring order to this area of
uncertainty, courts should strive to apply the fraudulent concealment doctrine
consistently and to give effect to the policies underlying the statute of
limitations.
II. THE IMPACT OF JOHNSON AND TOMANIO ON THE TOLLING OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS
In creating numerous private rights of action, Congress has often failed to
specify an appropriate limitations period, leaving this detail to the courts. 48 In
1830 the Supreme Court first applied a limitations period to such a federal
claim by borrowing a limitations period from state law.49 Thereafter, the Court
regularly looked to analogous state law to select limitations periods for federal
claims when Congress did not provide for statutes of limitations, 50 and the
lower courts followed.5' In addition, to further the enforcement of federal in-
terests, the federal courts also have developed doctrines of federal common
law that apply to federal claims without reference to state law.52 The federal
doctrine of fraudulent concealment is one such doctrine.
Both Johnson and Tomanio could affect the application of the federal fraud-
ulent concealment doctrine. Both cases contain reasoning that arguably fore-
closes further application of the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine to
claims based on statutes that do not have congressionally-set limitations peri-
ods. Although neither decision expressly displaces the fraudulent concealment
doctrine, they have caused confusion about whether the federal doctrine can
48. Congress' failure to provide statutes of limitations sometimes has vexed courts. In London v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1981), for example, the court complained that Congress'
failure to provide clear statute of limitations guidelines engenders confusion for litigants, administra-
tive agencies, and courts. Id at 813.
49. See McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 276-77 (1830) (suit under federal law for failure to
record land purchase application).
50. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 610 (1895) (federal patent infringement claim). During
the fifty years following Campbell, the Court repeatedly endorsed the borrowing practice. See, e.g.,
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (suit to enforce double liability under federal law of share-
holders of insolvent national banks); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 319-20 (1914) (private suit for
damages incurred by violation of federal election criminal statute); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390, 395 (1906) (federal antitrust claim).
51. For discussions of the borrowing practice, see Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provi-
sions, 53 COLuM. L. Rav. 68 (1953) (discussing absorption of state limitations periods when Congress
silent); Special Project-Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and
State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 10 11, 1043-46 (1980).
52. See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law'" Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rulesfor Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957) (discussing judicial
generation of federal rules of decision).
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still be applied. 53 Nevertheless, the following review of the development of the
federal doctrine suggests, as at least two lower courts of appeals have held, 54
that the Supreme Court did not intend to abandon the prevailing case law as
enunciated in Holmberg v. Armbrecht and jettison this century-old equitable
doctrine sub silentio.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE FEDERAL DOCTRINE
Some historical background is necessary to put Johnson and Tomanio in
context. In 1874, the Supreme Court embraced the fraudulent concealment
doctrine in Bailey v. Glover.55 In that case, the assignee in bankruptcy sought to
set aside certain conveyances to the bankrupt's relatives on the ground that
they were made in an effort to defraud creditors.5 6 The prevailing federal
bankruptcy statute,57 however, required an assignee to assert such claims
within two years of appointment.58 When the plaintiff sued more than three
years after his appointment, he asserted that the defendant kept secret the
fraudulent conveyances giving rise to the claim. 59
The Court declined to follow the state law of limitations, which did not per-
mit tolling, because Congress had enacted a federal statute of limitations for
claims under the Bankruptcy Act.60 Instead, the Court held that defendant's
concealment allowed the plaintiff to escape the limitations bar.61 It reasoned
that "a sound and philosophical view of the principles of the statutes of limita-
tion" prohibited applying the bar of limitations in favor of one who had ob-
tained its protection "by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a
matter that it concealed itself."62 The Court concluded by stating that tolling
principles generally would apply "where the ignorance of the fraud has been
produced by affirmative acts of the guilty party in concealing the facts from the
other,. . . provided suit is brought within proper time after discovery of the
fraud." 63 It added, however, that "though there be no special circumstances or
efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the
knowledge of the other party," the statute would be tolled until discovery
when "the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any
53. See infra notes 116-22 (discussing lower courts' interpretations of Johnson and Tomanio).
54. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing courts of appeals' affirmation of Holmberg
after Johnson and Tomanio).
55. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
56. Id at 348.
57. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 517, 518, provided that actions by the assignee
should be brought "within two years from the time the cause of action accrued, for or against such
assignee." Id A similar provision has continued in effect under subsequent bankruptcy acts, and is
now codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 108 (Supp. IV 1980). Although it might be argued that this provision is
designed to encourage the settlement of estates and, therefore, is not a true statute of limitation, the
Court held that "[t]his is a statute of limitation ... precisely like other statutes of limitation. ... 88
U.S. at 346.
58. 88 U.S. at 347.
59. Id at 345, 348.
60. Id at 349-50. Although the Court noted that following applicable state law was a possibility, it
declined to do so with a right created by a federal statute. Id
61. d at 348.
62. Id at 349.
63. id at 347-48.
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fault or want of diligence or care on his part."64
From an early date the Court applied the fraudulent concealment doctrine
to all congressionally-set limitations periods. In a 1918 case involving an at-
tempt by the United States to invalidate a land patent on the ground that it
had been procured by fraud,65 the Court confronted an 1891 statute providing
that suits to annul patents "shall only be brought within six years after the date
of the issuance of such patents."'66 Despite the obvious congressional objective
to make such patents inviolate after six years, the Court had no trouble apply-
ing the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment. It reasoned that when
Congress passed the statute in 1891, Bailey v. Glover was "the established doc-
trine of this court" and Congress therefore acted "with the ruling of that case
in mind." 67 Beyond that, the Court concluded that Congress could not have
"intended to give immunity to those who for the period named in the statute
might be able to conceal their fraudulent action from the knowledge of the
agents of the Government.
'68
There remained, however, the question whether Bailey v. Glover should ap-
ply to the multitude of federal statutes that did not specify limitations periods.
That question was addressed in 1946 in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 69 a suit under
section 16 of the Federal Farm Loan Act7" to require shareholders of a defunct
bank to pay an assessment equal to the par value of their stock in the bank.
7 1
Although the bank in question had closed in 1932, plaintiffs claimed that they
did not sue until 1943 because defendant Jules S. Bache72 had concealed his
ownership of 100 shares of stock under a false name.73 Because the federal act
did not specify a limitations period, the ten year New York statute of limita-
tions applied.74 Despite the allegations of concealment, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the suit was barred because




65. Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918)
66. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 559, § 8, 26 Stat. 1093, 1093.
67. Exploration Co., 247 U.S. at 449.
68. I.d
69. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
70. Ch. 245, § 16, 39 Stat. 360, 374 (1916). Under the Act shareholders of joint stock land banks
were individually responsible, to the extent of their stockholdings, for the debts of the bank. Id
71. 327 U.S. at 393.
72. -If the name Bache looks familiar, that is because it should. Born in 1861 in New York City,
Bache began as cashier with the banking firm of Leopold Calm & Co. at the age of 19. In 1892 he
became head of the firm, which then changed its name to J.S. Bache & Co. See 15 WHO'S WHO IN
AMERICA 203 (1928-29). His firm still exists, now known as Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.
73. 327 U.S. at 393.
74. IJd
75. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 150 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1945), rey'd, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). This deci-
sion resulted from continuing uncertainty in the courts about the effect of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 394
U.S. 64 (1938). The Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), which held that a federal court passing on a state-created right in a diversity
case should not toll the state statute of limitations on federal equitable grounds. Id at 108-09. In
reversing the Second Circuit's decision, Justice Frankfurter, who also authored York, noted in a some-
what irritated tone that unlike the York case, which was concerned solely with state-created rights, the
statute in Holmberg involved a federal right. 327 U.S. at 394-95. Thus, the broad language of Holm-
berg reflects the Court's desire to emphasize the difference in treatment between state and federal
claims after Erie.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit without dissent.76 Noting
that the case involved "a federal right for which the sole remedy is in eq-
uity," 77 and that "statutes of limitations are not controlling measures of equita-
ble relief,"78 the Court readily embraced the "old chancery rule" stated in
Bailey v. Glover. It characterized limitations as a "fraudulent defense' in cases
of concealment, and asserted that "[e]quity will not lend itself to such fraud."
79
Instead, the Court asserted broadly that "[t]his equitable doctrine is read into
every federal statute of limitation." 80 It justified this broad statement as neces-
sary to avoid the "incongruous" result of applying Bailey v. Glover to statutes
with specified limitations periods, while leaving other federal claims to "the
bare terms of a State statute of limitations unrelieved by the settled federal
equitable doctrine."'
's
The remaining question whether the "settled federal equitable doctrine"
would apply to a borrowed state statute when the claim was "at law" was
answered by the Second Circuit in the leading case, Moviecolor Ltd v. Eastman
Kodak Co. ,82 an antitrust action brought before the enactment of the federal
antitrust limitations period. Defendants contended that the federal conceal-
ment rule applied to borrowed state limitations periods only when the action
was in equity.8 3 The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, re-
jected the defendants' arguments for a number of reasons.84 First, the federal
interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws suggested that Congress would
prefer a uniform federal rule.8 5 Second, Judge Friendly wrote, "[T]here is no
reason for borrowing a state doctrine when there is an established federal
one."'8 6 Third, the critical fact in Holmberg was that the right was federally
created, not that it was enforceable "in equity." 87 Fourth, drawing such dis-
tinctions between actions at law and in equity would undercut "the merger of
law and equity." 8  Finally, quoting Holmberg's concern with incongruity,
Judge Friendly concluded that "[slince Bailey v. Glover applied 'at law' as well
as 'in equity,' the incongruity would seem as great in one case as in the
76. Holmberg, 327 U.S at 397. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration of the case, and
Justice Rutledge concurred in a brief opinion expressing some reservations about York. Id at 398.
77. Id at 395.
78. Id at 396.
79. Id at 397.
80. Id
81. Id
82. 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
83. Id at 82.
84. Id at 83-86.
85. ild at 84. Judge Friendly noted that antitrust actions may be enforced only in federal court, and
reasoded as follows:
To speak of "uniformity" as between federal and state courts in such a case is somewhat of a
misnomer, and it is hard to see what policy would be served by attempting to achieve it. It
seems far more likely that Congress would have desired the federal suitor it was creating to
have the benefit of the federal rule prolonging the period of suit during concealment by the
wrongdoer. This is particularly so when, under the Clayton Act, enforcement of the right
often serves not merely private but public ends.
Id
86. Id at 84-85.
87. Id at 85.
88. Id at 85-86.
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other."89 The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 90
B. JOHNSON AND TOMANIO
Until 1975 the courts of appeals almost unanimously9t had held that the
federal tolling doctrine applied to all federal claims.92 Although it never
squarely addressed Holmberg v. Armbrecht or the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine,93 the Supreme Court cast doubt on this practice in 1975 when it decided
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 94 The plaintiff in Johnson argued that
the statute of limitation for his civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should
be tolled during the pendency of his title VII employment discrimination pro-
ceeding before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.95 The case
thus did not involve the fraudulent concealment doctrine, but rather the appli-
cation of a new tolling doctrine that had been endorsed by two circuits. 96 The
Supreme Court could have rejected this new tolling doctrine simply on its own
merits, but its approach was not so limited. Instead, the Court departed from
the prevailing practice of deciding tolling issues as a matter of federal law and
it based its decision on the absence of tolling principles under the applicable
89. Id at 85.
90. Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
91. Even before Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that
state principles of tolling should apply when the state limitations period is borrowed. See Ammlung v.
Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1974).
92. For cases in which federal courts of appeals tolled state statutes of limitations because of fraudu-
lent concealment, see Ashland Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 567 F.2d 984, 988 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1977) (claim under Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978);
Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (civil rights action); Hilton v. Mumaw, 522 F.2d
588, 602 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (securities fraud action); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1977)
(same); Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Vanderloom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
1233, 1240 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th
Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir.
1967) (same); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 879 (1965);
see also Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court that failed to apply
federal tolling doctrine); deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 n.3 (10th Cir. 1970)
(noting that district court erred in applying state doctine of tolling for concealment, but not reversing
because federal doctrine would lead to same result). In a securities case, Rochelle v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 535 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that "[a]lthough we have borrowed the California statute to fill the statutory limitations
gap, Congress has never evinced any intention to look to the states for any definition of this federally
created right [under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act]." Id at 532.
93. Holmberg was cited in connection with the case, however. In his opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Justice Marshall did cite both Holmberg and Moviecolor. See Tomanlo, 421 U.S. at
470 (Marshall, J, with Douglas & Brennan, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore,
the plaintiff-petitioner himself argued that "Judge Friendly's rationale [in Moviecolor] ... in determin-
ing the tolling effect of concealment is equally applicable to the case at bar." Reply Brief For Petitioner
at 2, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Nevertheless, in rejecting this
argument, the Court need not have rejected Judge Friendly's reasoning, but only petitioner's attempted
analogy to it. Neither Justice Marshall's opinion nor the parties made any direct reference to the con-
cealment doctrine.
94. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
95. Id at 457.
96. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994-96 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (statute
of limitations on § 1981 racial discrimination employment claim should be tolled pending disposition of
timely-filed EEOC claim); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017
n.16 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).
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state law.97 The Court justified this approach as intrinsic to the process of bor-
rowing the state limitations period:
Any period of limitation. .. is understood fully only in the context
of the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a
particular cause of action. . . In virtually all statutes of limitations
the limitation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling,
revival, and questions of application. In borrowing a state period of
limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court
is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit, and exceptions
thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim.98
Taken to its logical extreme, the Court's statement could be interpreted to pre-
clude application of any federal principle of tolling when state limitations peri-
ods are borrowed for federal claims.99
The Court limited the reach of its statement, however, and acknowledged
that "considerations of state law may be displaced where their application
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action
under consideration." 100 The Court found no such inconsistency in Johnson
because the plaintiff unquestionably could have filed his section 1981 action
during the pendency of his title VII proceeding.10' As a consequence, the
Court reasoned, "in a very real sense, petitioner has slept on § 1981 rights."'10 2
The Court went on to distinguish two of its own earlier decisions that created
federal tolling principles 0 3 on the ground that in Johnson there was no federal
policy to protect and "no relevant body of federal procedural law to guide our
97. 421 U.S. at 464. The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that toling is always a matter of
federal law, stating,
Petitioner concedes, at least implicitly, that no tolling circumstance described in the State's
statutes was present to toll the period for his § 1981 claim. He argues, however, that state law
should not be given so broad a reach. He claims that, although the duration of the limitation
period is bottomed on state law, it is federal law that governs other limitations aspects, such as
tolling, of a § 1981 cause of action.
Id at 463.
98. Id at 463-64.
99. For this reason, Johnson cannot easily be limited to the civil rights context. See infra notes 171-
77 and accompanying text (discussing application of Johnson and Tomanio outside civil rights area).
100. 421 U.S. at 465.
101. Id at 465-66.
102. Id at 466.
103. Id at 466-67. The two cases the Court distinguished were American Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965).American Pipe
was a civil antitrust action in which the Court held that the pendency of a class action tolled the statute
of limitations for unnamed members of the purported class when the district court ultimately refused to
certify the class on grounds of lack of numerosity. 414 U.S. at 553. Burnett was a Federal Employers
Liability Act action commenced in federal court after the limitations period had passed. 380 U.S. at
425. The plaintiff earlier had sued in state court within the limitations period, but that action was
dismissed because of improper venue. Id The Court held that the filing of the action in state court
tolled the running of the statute of limitations on the claim. Id at 434-35. In Johnson the Court distin-
guished both American Poe and Burnett on two grounds. First, the limitations period in each was
congressionally determined, unlike the limitations period in Johnson, which was borrowed from state
law. 421 U.S. at 466. Second, in Johnson there was no substantial pre-existing body of federal proce-
dural law as there was in American Pipe and Burnett. Id at 466-67.
As a result of Tomanio, some question has arisen about whetherAmerican Ppe determines the tolling
effect of a class action in a case when there is no federal limitations period. Two courts of appeals have
held that the federal rule continues to apply, both to achieve uniformity and because there is an existing
federal rule. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 618-19 (9th Cir. 1982),pet.for cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W.
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decision." 1O4
In 1980 the Supreme Court reiterated Johnson's approach in Board of Re-
gents v. 7omanio.105 The Court held that the pendency of the state court litiga-
tion between the parties could not toll the running of the borrowed statute of
limitations against a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.106 The district court had
invented this new ground for tolling to encourage exhaustion of state court
remedies, in part to relieve "the present overburdening of the federal courts
and the increased filings of civil rights actions."'10 7 The Second Circuit af-
firmed the decision to toll, which it justified as "advancing the goals of
federalism." 108
The Supreme Court reversed. It relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which directs
federal courts to apply federal law in civil rights actions unless it is "not
adapted to the object" or "deficient," in which case the federal court should
refer to state law "so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
or laws of the United States."' 1 9 The Court did not focus on the predicate of
section 1988 that federal law be "deficient," presumably because there was no
federal law addressing this issue until the district court's novel ruling. Instead,
it emphasized the state's interests and concluded that section 1988 makes state
tolling rules "[i]n most cases. . . binding rules of law." 110 Since the pertinent
state law did not authorize tolling under these circumstances, the federal court
could not invent a tolling doctrine because under Johnson tolling rules "are an
integral part of a complete limitations policy.""' To illustrate the concerns
that might constitute "integral parts" of a state's "complete limitations policy,"
3320 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982); Fernandez v. Chardon, 681 F.2d 42, 50 (lst Cir. 1982). This reasoning seems
correct. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
104. Tomanio, 421 U.S. at 467. The Court explained in a footnote that in American Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), it could look to the history of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id at 466-67 n.12. The Court in Johnson further explained that in Burnett v. New York
Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), it relied upon "the express federal policy liberally allowing transfer
of improper venue cases" set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 421 U.S. at 466-67 n.12. Although it might
be persuasively argued that Burnett is not so easily distinguished because it did not rely heavily on
§ 1406(a), it is clear that there was no body of federal procedural law similar to § 1406(a) available in
Johnson because the tolling doctrine in issue there was extremely new.
105. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
106. Id at 492.
107. Id at 482. It appears that the tolling doctrine the district court applied was entirely unprece-
dented. Quite clearly, in undertaking such judicial legislation the district court in Tomanio was en-
gaged in a very different activity from applying the "established doctrine" of fraudulent concealment.
108. Tomanio v. Board of Regents, 603 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 t.S. 478 (1980).
109. See 446 U.S. at 484-85. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions
of this Title. . .shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition
of the cause ....
110. 446 U.S. at 484.
111. Id at 488. The fact that the Court found Johnson controlling in Tomanio underscores the
Court's attachment to the principles enunciated there. The parties in Tomanio certainly paid no atten-
tion to these issues in their briefs filed with the Court. Indeed, the statute of limitations was only a
tertiary point made by the petitioner. Petition for Certiorari at 19-21, Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478 (1980). Neither party cited Johnson in its brief, although the case was cited in a portion of
a Third Circuit opinion quoted by the petitioner. See Brief for Petitioner at 27, quoting Ammlung v.
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the Court referred to the principle that "defendants may not, by tactics of eva-
sion, prevent the plaintiff from litigating the merits of a claim."112 This refer-
ence to the principle underlying fraudulent concealment suggests that, even
though no issue of fraudulent concealment was involved in the case, the Court
arguably intended that federal courts borrow state fraudulent concealment
rules along with a state statute of limitations. Nevertheless, the Court men-
tioned neither Holmberg nor the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine. Fi-
nally, the Court held that under the circumstances the state's failure to toll was
not inconsistent with federal law because plaintiffs could readily enforce their
civil rights claims by suing within the statutory period."13
C. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT IN THE WAKE OF JOHNSON AND TOMANIO
The Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of fraudulent conceal-
ment in its recent tolling cases, Johnson and Tomanio. 114 Nevertheless, even
before these cases were decided, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit stated that a federal court should look to state law to resolve
fraudulent concealment claims in actions based on the Civil Rights Acts.' 1
5
After Tomanio, several lower courts considering federal claims based on fed-
eral statutes lacking a congressionally-specified limitations period approached
fraudulent concealment arguments with great circumspection.1 6 For example,
Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 820 n.4 (3d Cir. 1974). One suspects that the parties were surprised at the
outcome of the case.
112. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487-88.
113. Id at 488.
114. In McGuire v. Leigh, 446 U.S. 962 (1981), the Court vacated and remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Tomanio a Second Circuit ruling that civil rights claims of unlawful firing were tolled
during state court litigation regarding the discharge. Id, citing Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir.
1979). On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court held that under Tomanlo the case would
have to be dismissed as time-barred. Leigh v. McGuire, 507 F. Supp. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Be-
cause the case involved yet another novel theory of tolling, not that of fraudulent concealment, it pro-
vides no insight into the Court's position regarding fraudulent concealment.
In another case, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982), the Court held that former President
Nixon was immune from liability for damages for his role in firing a Pentagon cost analyst who claimed
he was fired from his Air Force job in retaliation for his testimony before Congress. Id at 2706. The
Court noted, in passing, that the District of Columbia Circuit earlier had held that concealment tolled
the statute of limitations as to claims against White House personnel. Id at 2696; see Fitzgerald v.
Seamens, 553 F.2d 220,229 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Court did not comment, however, on the propriety of
that ruling. 102 S. Ct. at 2696. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982), the Court held that
presidential aides sued by Fitzgerald were entitled to only qualified immunity and remanded for a
determination whether they should be granted summary judgment on that ground. Id at 2736, 2739-
40. In passing, the Court noted that petitioner Butterfield had been sued in 1974 and that petitioner
Harlow had not been sued until 1978, id at 2732 n.9, but it did not comment on any statute of limita-
tions issues. See also infra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court opinion in
Chardon v. Fernandez).
115. Ammlung v. Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1974); accord, Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp.
600, 615 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
116. See Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982) (declining to decide whether
Tomanio applies to fraudulent concealment claims in securities fraud cases because state and federal
tolling rules coincide); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1980)
(same); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 545 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("as to the issue of tolling the
statute of limitations, the court is clearly obliged to apply Michigan law"); Whitemore v. New York,
541 F. Supp. 564, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("tolling of any limitations period is governed primarily by the
law of the state providing the limitations period"); Davidov v. Honeywell, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1358, 1361
(D. Minn. 1981) (declining to decide whether state or federal fraudulent concealment doctrine applies
in Blvens-type claim because doctrine available under both); Marrapese v. State of Rhode Island, 500
F. Supp. 1207, 1225 (D.R.I. 1980) (declining to decide whether state or federal tolling doctrines apply in
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in a civil rights case the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
cited Tomanio and observed:
[T]here has been some confusion... "whether state or federal law
determines . . . whether the statute is tolled." The Supreme Court,
however, has recently resolved that confusion in favor of the applica-
tion of state tolling law where not inconsistent with the Constitution
or other federal law.
17
Thereafter a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
stated, without deciding the issue, that Tomanio's borrowing requirement was
based on "reasons equally applicable" to fraudulent concealment claims in se-
curities fraud actions." 8
Frequently, however, lower courts have ducked the issue on the ground that
the state and federal rules involved would lead to the same result, so that the
selection of the appropriate law did not appear critical.' t9 Other courts have
sidestepped the issue on the questionable theory that the determination of
when a cause of action accrues, which is conventionally said to be a matter of
federal law, 20 is materially different from the determination whether the stat-
ute should be tolled.121 In contrast, two courts of appeals recently disregarded
civil rights cases because action not time-barred under either); Gf Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (following Tomanio by applying state fraudulent concealment doc-
trine in absence of any inconsistency with federal policy).
117. Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Jackson v.
Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1601 (1980). Accord Barrett v.
Hoffman, 521 F. Supp. 307, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Tomanio for proposition that both statute of
limitations period and tolling doctrine should be borrowed from the state in § 1983 actions) rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Vest v. Bossard,
700 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying Utah law to concealment claim under § 1983); Doyle v. Univer-
sity of Alabama, 680 F.2d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 1982) (in action under § 1983 plaintiff failed to make
allegations activating Alabama tolling provision for concealment).
118. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1980). In Ohio v. Peter-
son, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392 (1981), another
panel specifically decided not to extend Tomanio to securities fraud cases. Id at 691. Oddly enough, in
this case it was the plaintiff who was relying on state law, while the defendant urged that the federal
doctrine apply. Id at 694-95. In Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982), yet another
panel of the Tenth Circuit noted that "whether Colorado or federal law governs the tolling of the
statute is not entirely clear." Id at 1120. Thus, confusion reigns in the Tenth Circuit.
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts of appeals and
district courts declined to decide whether state or federal tolling doctrines apply after Tomanio).
120. See 2 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07[2] & n.18 (2d ed. 1982) (question of when
federal action accrues determined by reference to federal law).
121. For example, in Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
908 (1981), the Second Circuit cited Tomanio, but nevertheless asserted that "[a]lthough we must look
to state law to determine what period of limitations applies,. . . the issue as to when Leonhard's cause
of action accrued remains a question of federal law."Id at 613. Other courts simply state that federal
law determines the date of accrual without further analysis of the issue or citation to Tomanio. See,
e.g., Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982); Summer v. Land of
Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1981); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 545 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (ED.
Mich. 1982); Gf. Cline v Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1981) (not fraudulent concealment case).
The distinction between the labels "accrual" and "tolling" is tenuous at best, and hardly justifies
different results. Accrual occurs when the plaintiffhas a right to sue even though he may be ignorant of
his right. It seems undeniable that in fraudulent concealment cases plaintiffs' ignorance does not de-
prive them of the right to assert their claims; therefore the question is not one of accrual, but suspension
of the running of the statute, which is tolling.
Despite its apparent insignificance as a ground for continuing to apply federal law, the distinction
between tolling and accrual may have gotten an unintended boost from the Supreme Court's per
curiam opinion in Chardon v. Fernandez, 102 S. Ct. 28 (1981). There the trial court dismissed as time-
[Vol. 71:829
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7omanio altogether, asserting on the basis of Holmberg v. Armbrecht that toll-
ing on the ground of fraudulent concealment is a question of federal law in an
action based on a federally created right.'2 2 Although Johnson and Tomanio
may not be disregarded so easily, there are a number of factors indicating that
these two courts of appeals were correct in applying federal principles of
fraudulent concealment rather than extending the borrowing notions enunci-
ated in those cases to fraudulent concealment.
First, the Supreme Court has never indicated that it intended to overrule
Holmber, and disapprove the Second Circuit's decision in Moviecolor. Yet,
interpreting Johnson and Tomanio to apply to fraudulent concealment inevita-
bly would have that effect. Holmberg held that even when the state limitations
period was borrowed, the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine applies to
actions in equity in order to avoid "incongruous" inconsistency with statutory
claims that have federal limitations periods. 23 foviecolor similarly reasoned
that the interest in avoiding incongruity warranted applying the federal stan-
dard to actions at law.' 24 There has been no indication that the Supreme Court
intends to reject these decisions. To the contrary, in a case decided the term
before Johnson, a unanimous Court appeared to endorse Holmberg explic-
itly.12 5 Moreover, the Court has cited both Holmberg126 and foviecolor 127
with approval on numerous other occasions. It should not be presumed that a
barred the plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for illegal termination from employment. 506 F.
Supp. 229 (D.P.R. 1981). The First Circuit reversed on the ground that the limitations period did not
begin running until plaintiffs termination became effective, reasoning in part that "[w]hen the cause of
action accrues. . . is a matter of federal law." Fernandez v. Chardon, 648 F.2d 765, 767 (1st Cir. 1981).
Without citing Tomanio, the Supreme Court in turn reversed the First Circuit on the basis of Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), holding that as a matter of federal law the statute of
limitations began running when plaintiffs received their letters of termination, not on the date the ter-
mination became effective. 102 S. Ct. at 28. Thus, the Court seemed to accept the notion that federal
law applied to the accrual issue, a view that has been urged by at least one lower court. See Salgado v.
Piedmont Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 938, 947-48 n.10 (D.P.R. 1981).
122. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1126 (6th Cir. 1982) (claim based on fraudulent
inducement to merger agreement); Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1982) (securities fraud
case); see also Small v. Signal LP Gas, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 46,49 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("though a state statute
of limitations is employed when a federal statute has none, the complementary principles of accrual
and tolling remain the province of federal common law"); Appelbaum v. Ceres Land Co., 546 F. Supp.
17, 21 (D. Minn. 1981) (action brought under federal law, even if subject to state statute of limitations,
subject to federal tolling doctrine).
123. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (quoting Holmberg).
124. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing M1oviecolor).
125. In American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the court stated: "[I]n cases
where the plaintiff has refrained from commencing suit ... because of fraudulent concealment [citing
Holmberg] this Court has not hesitated to find the statutory period tolled or suspended by the conduct
of the defendant." Id at 559.
126. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 n.20 (1979) (citing Holmberg for
proposition that federal courts may fill in interstices of federal statutes); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (citing Holmberg for proposition that federal courts may absorb state
statute of limitations when federal substantive statute silent); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185
(1976) (citing Holmberg for proposition that as to actions at law, congressional silence has been inter-
preted to mean that federal policy is to adopt state statute of limitations); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 702 n.12 (1973) (citing Holmberg for the proposition that federal court may look to state
law or fashion single federal rule to fill in interstices of federal statute); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 104 (1971) (citing Holmberg for proposition that federal statute of limitations should be fash-
ioned only when need for uniformity great or nature of federal right demands particular statute of
limitation).
127. In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), Moviecolor was cited with approval by
both the majority, id at 708 n.10, and the dissent, id at 711 n.2 (White, J., with Douglas & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
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century of case law developing the doctrine, and the lower courts' near una-
nimity in applying it to all federal claims, was meant to be abandoned sub
silentio by the general pronouncements of Johnson and Tomanio. 128
Second, by their own terms, Johnson and Tomanio do not apply when estab-
lished federal procedural doctrines are available. Although the Court in John-
son applied state law, it specifically noted that "[i]n the present case there is no
relevant body of federal procedural law to guide our decision." 129 Tomanio
also applied state law, but relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act,
which calls for application of "the laws of the United States" and directs refer-
ence to state law only when federal doctrines "are deficient."' 130 In Johnson
and Tomanio there arguably were no federal procedural doctrines to apply
because the tolling principles under review did not exist until the lower courts
invented them. Indeed, in Tomanio it appears that the district court relied on
little more than perceived federal convenience when it devised a tolling doc-
trine designed to induce civil rights plaintiffs to take their grievances to state
court first. 13 1 Fraudulent concealment is materially different from the tolling
principles at issue in Johnson and Tomanio because it represents an existing
body of federal procedural law that makes reference to state law unnecessary.
The Supreme Court recognized in 1918 that fraudulent concealment was "the
128. The Court's disposition of Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322 (1978), adds
credence to this argument. In that case the plaintiff sought to utilize the tolling provisions of § 5(i) of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976), which tolls the antitrust statute of limitations during any
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) proceeding instituted by the Government. 437 U.S. at 324.
The Government had not initiated the ICC proceeding, but had intervened in a proceeding brought by
the plaintiff. Id at 327. The Court held that statutory tolling was not possible because the proceeding
was not initiated by the government, but it remanded for further consideration of the possibility that
the statute of limitations should be tolled on "equitable principles." Id at 337 n.21. Chief Justice
Burger concurred, emphasizing the district court's broad discretion to employ such tolling: "The au-
thority of a federal court, sitting as a chancellor, to toll a statute of limitations on equitable grounds, is a
well-established part of our jurisprudence." Id at 338 n.*.
Because fraudulent concealment could not bridge the tolling gap plaintiff solved by relying on § 5(i),
the Court seemed to be inviting the lower court on remand to toll the statute based on general equitable
principles other than fraudulent concealment. In light of this attitude of extreme flexibility with respect
to tolling a congressionally-established limitations period, it would surely be odd to suggest that two
years later in Tomanio the Court intended to eliminate the established doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment when the limitations period is borrowed from a state.
129. 421 U.S. at 466-67.
130. 446 U.S. at 484-85. See supra note 109 (quoting § 1988 in part). One commentator recently
argued that § 1988's predicate that federal law be deficient refers only to federal statutory law, not to
federal common law. Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section
1988, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 508-15 (1980). Professor Eisenberg argues in part that reference to fed-
eral common law will cause § 1988's choice of law provisions to vanish into nonsense because some
thread of federal authority can be found for almost any proposition, thereby demonstrating that federal
law is not deficient. See id at 513-14.
Although it is doubtful that even a thread of authority could be found for the tolling doctrine in-
vented by the district court in Tomanio, one must admit the logic of Professor Eisenberg's position. The
courts, however, do not appear to have embraced it. To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Johnson
stressed the absence of federal case law and distinguished other cases on the ground that substantial
pre-existing federal procedural law existed. 421 U.S. at 466-67 (citing Burnett v. New York Central
R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965)). At least one lower court has continued to look to federal common law when
assessing the deficiency of federal law. See Smith v. Jordan, 527 F. Supp. 167, 171-72 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(refusing to apply state law of respondeat superior to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because federal
case law on subject exists). Whether or not Professor Eisenberg's logic ultimately carries the day with
respect to § 1988, the long history of the federal common law doctrine of fraudulent 'concealment
clearly is relevant to deciding whether Johnson and Tomanio were meant to require the application of
state law, a concern that carries beyond the civil rights area. See infra text accompanying notes 171-77.
131. See supra text accompanying note 107 (quoting the district court's reasoning).
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established doctrine of this court"'132 and later in Holmberg that it was a "set-
tled federal equitable doctrine."' 133 As Judge Friendly said in Moviecolor,
"[Tihere is no reason for borrowing a state doctrine when there is an estab-
lished federal one."'
134
Third, interpreting Johnson and Tomanio to apply to fraudulent conceal-
ment would lead to the very incongruity that caused the Court in Holmberg to
announce that the doctrine should apply to every federal statute of limita-
tions.' 35 It is quite possible that the newly-minted tolling notions rejected in
Johnson and Tomanio will never again be applied. It is certainly questionable
whether the Supreme Court would uphold such doctrines on their merits if
applied to federal statutes that do have limitation periods. 136 But there can be
no question that the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine will continue to
be applied to claims under a variety of federal acts that incorporate statutes of
limitations, including the Clayton Act, certain Civil Rights Acts, and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Indeed, it appears that plaintiffs are using it more
and more frequently.' 37 To the extent that the applicable state law of fraudu-
lent concealment differs from the federal doctrine, claims based on statutes
without federal limitations periods would be treated differently from claims
founded on statutes with federal limitations periods, and incongruity would
result.
It could be argued that such incongruity is not significant in contrast to the
greater incongruity of having claims under the same statute subject to different
132. Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 449 (1918).
133. 327 U.S. at 397.
134. 288 F.2d at 84-85.
135. See supra text accompanying note 81.
136. Clearly courts may apply new federal common law principles of tolling to claims based on
federal statutes that have their own limitations periods. Indeed, in Johnson the Court distinguished
Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), and American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974), which both established new tolling doctrines for statutes with congressionally-set limi-
tations periods. 421 U.S. at 466-67. The development of other such doctrines, however, must proceed
with caution, and the doctrines involved in Johnson and Tomanio seem unlikely to survive. In addition
to pointing out that the limitation periods involved in Burnett and American Pipe derived directly from
the federal statutes themselves, the Court in Johnson cited three other considerations to justify tolling
doctrines developed as federal common law: (1) that there was a substantial body of federal procedural
law to which to refer, (2) that there was a federal policy that would have conflicted with a decision not
to toll the statute; and (3) that the prior filings in the earlier cases involved exactly the same cause of
action as subsequently asserted. Id at 466-67.
It is unclear whether all the above criteria need to be satisfied to justify creation of a new tolling
doctrine applicable to a federal limitations period. The Supreme Court provided some insight into this
question in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976), when it held that the new tolling principle could not be applied to a
congressionally-set limitations period established under title VII. Id at 236. The plaintiff there argued
that the time for filing her title VII charge should be tolled while she was pursuing her grievance under
the machinery of the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 231. The Court rejected her argument,
stating that because the plaintiff was asserting a contract right in the grievance proceeding, she had not
raised the same cause of action in the later proceeding in which she asserted a statutory claim under
title VII. Id at 238. Accordingly, tolling was not justified under the third criterion in Johnson, which
requires that the same cause of action be asserted in both proceedings. Id
Whatever the ultimate resolution of such issues, the tolling doctrines rejected in Johnson and
Tomanio when the statutes of limitations were borrowed from the state probably also would be rejected
when the statute of limitations was provided by the federal statute. In both situations, there is no pre-
existing body of procedural law to justify application of new tolling doctrines. Cf. Thermtron Prods.,
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351-52 (1976) (Court granted writ of mandate to overturn remand
of removed civil action that was justified on grounds of crowding of federal docket; concerns similar to
those used to justify the tolling doctrine in romanio).
137. See Appendix (discussing increasing frequency of fraudulent concealment claims).
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limitation periods in different states.' 38 The logical conclusion of the incon-
gruity argument could thus be that the Court should also declare a uniform
limitations period for those federal statutes that lack a congressionally-speci-
fied period. This approach has appeal, particularly in connection with judi-
cially implied causes of action, but the Court understandably has been
reluctant to take such a step. In 1966 the Court rejected similar reasoning
when urged to establish a uniform statute of limitations for claims under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,139 which created a right of
action but specified no limitations period.140 Characterizing this argument as
seeking a "drastic sort of judicial legislation,"' 4 1 the Court refused to indulge
in "so bald a form ofjudicial innovation."'142 Nevertheless, although courts are
peculiarly unsuited to perform the legislative function of setting limitation pe-
riods, they still are highly qualified to develop equitable tolling principles, as
indeed has been done with fraudulent concealment.
Thus, the possibility of incongruity cannot be easily disregarded. Not only
would borrowing state tolling law for some statutes but not others create seem-
ingly unwarranted differences in treatment between statutory schemes, 43 but
it also could result in different doctrines of fraudulent concealment being ap-
plied to different provisions of the same statutory scheme. For example, al-
though most of the civil rights acts lack federal limitations periods, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1986 specifies that suit should be brought within one year. 44 Such incon-
gruity is no less disturbing now than it was in 1946, when it motivated the
Holmberg Court to state that the federal doctrine applies to all federal statutes
of limitations. 1
45
Fourth, in view of the long history of the federal doctrine, to abandon it now
with respect to statutes without limitations periods would be inconsistent with
the implied expectations of Congress. In Bailey v. Glover the Court specifically
declined to follow state law regarding tolling. 46 In 1918 the Court held that
because "the rule of Bailey v. Glover was the established rule of this court" in
1891, a statute passed that year "was presumably enacted with the ruling of
that case in mind."'147 Notably, except for claims based on the Civil Rights
Acts, all of the statutory claims in which fraudulent concealment has been as-
138. For example, securities claims under rule lOb-5 have been subject to borrowed limitations peri-
ods ranging from one to ten years. See Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b.5,
1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1144 (1972). The authors argue for the adoption of a uniform federal limitations
period. See id at 1148-50.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
140. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 698 (1966).
141. Id at 703.
142. Id at 701.
143. That is, why is a claim under the federal antitrust law, which has a statutory limitations period,
treated differently from a claim based on an alleged violation of the securities acts, which does not?
144. Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
145. Another incongruity that would result is that in cases involving conduct alleged to injure parties
across the nation, the tolling principles would vary when the applicable statute of limitations depends
upon residence of the victims. Such state-by-state determinations of tolling would burden the courts
and limit the utility of class actions by creating new and somewhat individualized questions of fact.
Even with different borrowed limitations periods, uniform tolling principles could still be efficient be-
cause the court could determine the date on which plaintiffs in general should have been aware of their
claim and then, by simple arithmetic, determine whether the statute had expired in given instances,
146. See 88 U.S. at 349-50.
147. Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 449 (1918). See supra notes 65-68 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Exploration Co. v. United States). Cf. Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315
F.2d 306, 311 (10th Cir.) (enactment by Congress of specific tolling provision shows no intention to
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serted have involved statutes Congress passed after 1891. It seems more rea-
sonable now to assume, as the Court did in 1918, that Congress expected that
the "established doctrine" of fraudulent concealment would be available to
claimants relying on these statutes. 148 Indeed, there is some indication that
Congress expressly relied on the existence of the doctrine when it enacted an
antitrust statute of limitations in 1955.149 Since Holmberg was decided in 1946,
Congress has had an explicit case law basis for believing the doctrine would
apply regardless of whether the statute specified a limitations period.
Congress could well be surprised to learn that after Johnson and Tomanio
state law, and not the federal doctrine, would be applied to a large body of
federal claims. Congress could, of course, rectify the situation by enacting fed-
eral limitations periods for every statute, but ninety years of congressional ex-
pectations should not be lightly disregarded. Because the tolling rules before
the Court in Johnson and Tomanio were so novel that Congress could not have
reasonably expected their availability to claimants, neither case directly ad-
dressed this issue. At a minimum, courts should squarely address the issue
before federal principles are abandoned wholesale in favor of state law.
Fifth, even if Johnson and Tomanio were applied to fraudulent concealment,
it is likely that the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine nevertheless will be
employed unless the result under state law is the same because a different re-
sult is likely to be held to be inconsistent with federal policy. Johnson explicitly
acknowledged that "[a]lthough state law is our primary guide in this area, it is
not, to be sure, our exclusive guide. . . . [Considerations of state law may be
displaced where their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy
underlying the cause of action under consideration."150 The Court in lomanio
echoed the same sentiments by considering whether the state rule was inconsis-
tent with federal law.15' In both cases the Court concluded that application of
state tolling rules was not inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the
cause of action, partly because the plaintiff could simply have filed suit
sooner. 1
52
No such situation prevails with respect to the victim of fraudulent conceal-
reject Holmberg principle, which does not require action by Congress to be applicable), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 809 (1963).
148. Some confirmation of this conclusion is provided by Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380
U.S. 424 (1965). There the Court decided that the Federal Employers Liability Act, § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), should be tolled by the filing of a state court action later dismissed for im-
proper venue. Id at 431-32. The Court noted that statutes of 44 states provided mechanisms for pre-
serving such claims when dismissed for improper venue. Id Accordingly, the Court reasoned that
Congress intended that a similar tolling doctrine be applied in the federal courts. Id If Congress is
assumed to intend to use state doctrines, surely it is equally reasonable to assume that Congress would
expect an "established rule" of federal doctrine to apply. _
149. See Comment, Clayton Act Statute of Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, 72
YALE L.J. 600, 610 (1963) (proponents of express tolling provisions did not insist on such a provision
for this statute, which implies they assumed a tolling provision would be read in); see also Public Serv.
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310 (10th Cir.) (when considering desirability of addition of
federal statutes of limitations to Clayton Act, Congress must have been aware of fraudulent conceal-
ment principle), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
150. 421 U.S. at 465.
151. 446 U.S. at 486-92.
152. In Tomanio the Court concluded that "plaintiffs can still readily enforce their claims." Id at
488. The Johnson Court concluded that in light of the plaintiffs concession that he could have filed his
§ 1981 claim any time after his cause of action accrued, "in a very real sense petitioner has slept on his
§ 1981 rights." 421 U.S. at 466.
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ment, however, creating a risk of compromising the federal policy underlying
the statute at issue. Indeed, the doctrine was created precisely because without
it plaintiffs with otherwise meritorious claims would have no effective redress
in court. As Judge Friendly noted in Moviecolor, when federal statutes are
involved, "federal interests transcend those of the states."15 3 Several of the fed-
eral claims that lack congressionally-set limitations periods are based on stat-
utes enacted to deal with such transcendent national interests. For example,
the Securities Acts were passed, partly in response to the 1929 Stock Exchange
crash, to protect the public against deceptive practices in connection with se-
curities. 154 Claims under the Securities Acts, in particular, are highly suscepti-
ble to concealment. The Civil Rights Acts initially were designed to achieve
the national objective of granting freedmen legal weapons with which to pro-
tect their newly-acquired rights. 55 The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is
therefore important to furthering these statutes' objectives, which might be
frustrated by substitution of more restrictive state rules.
The Supreme Court is not blind to the potential for mischief to federal pol-
icy that could result from an unthinking adoption of state law on limitations.
Thus in Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,5 6 the Court refused in 1977 to
apply a state statute of limitation because doing so would have conflicted with
national policy. 157 In that case the EEOC filed an action against Occidental
after conciliation efforts had failed.158 Under title VII, the EEOC could not sue
until completing its voluntary compliance endeavors. 59 Occidental neverthe-
less argued that the action was barred by a state one-year statute of limitations,
even though the EEOC could not have sued within one year because concilia-
tion efforts had not been completed. 160 Although it recognized that courts gen-
erally should borrow a state limitations period when the federal statute did not
include one, the Court refused to apply the state statute of limitation.'
6' It
reasoned that "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with
national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that
the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementa-
tion of national policies."' 62 To apply the state standard on the facts before it,
the Court concluded, would frustrate the federal goal of encouraging
conciliation.
63
A victim of fraudulent concealment of a federal cause of action is in a posi-
tion somewhat similar to that of the EEOC in Occidental Lfe. Just as the
153. 288 F.2d at 84.
154. See generally Hanna & Turlington, Protection ofthe Public Under the Securities Exchange Act,
21 VA. L. REv. 251 (1935) (discussing history of Securities Acts).
155. See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1332-36 (1952) (discussing history of civil rights acts); cf Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 234 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (purpose of Civil Rights Act "to
stamp out widespread violation of constitutional rights at virtually any cost").
156. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
157. Id at 367.
158. Id at 357-58.
159. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976).
160. 432 U.S. at 366-67.
161. Id at 372-73.
162. Id at 367. The Court observed that the "State's wisdom" in establishing a general limitation
period could not have taken into account the decision of Congress to delay judicial action while the
EEOC performs its administrative responsibilities. 1d at 368.
163. Id at 367-72.
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EEOC could not sue until after the statute had run because it had to complete
conciliation efforts first, the victim of concealment cannot sue because he is
unaware of his claim. 164 Depending upon the vagaries of state law, those who
conceal their violation of federal statutes from the victim until the statutory
period has run might be immunized from suit if state law applied. In such
cases, the application of the federal doctrine of fraudulent concealment fur-
thers the national goals served by enforcement of the statute involved whether
or not the statute specifies a limitations period. 165 Accordingly, federal courts
are likely to apply federal tolling principles whenever they would preserve the
claim and state rules would not. Indeed, one district judge has already an-
nounced that he would interpret Tomanio to require the application of the
federal doctrine in civil rights cases if state law of tolling were narrower. 166 By
the same token, given the federally-recognized policies served by limita-
tions,' 67 state rules that are more generous to plaintiffs also appear to be incon-
sistent with important federal policies.168 Most lower courts that have
confronted fraudulent concealment problems since Tomanio, however, have
finessed these issues by concluding that the applicable state doctrines were es-
sentially the same as the federal rule. 169 But whenever there is a material dif-
ference between the federal and the state rules on fraudulent concealment, the
reasoning of Johnson and Tomanio probably mandates that the federal rule
should apply.
170
164. In contrast, when the plaintiff in a civil rights case, Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981), was aware of his action against New York for false
arrest, the court refused to toll the limitations period during the pendency of state criminal proceedings.
Id at 191. The court reasoned that its decision was not inconsistent with federal policy because the
defendant could have brought his civil action when the criminal action was pending. Id at 192.
165. At least one commentator has concluded that fraudulent concealment reflects a federal policy
and therefore is unaffected by Johnson. See Note, Filing of an Employment Discrimination Charge
Under Title VII as Tolling Statute of Limitations Applicable to a 1981 Action: The Unanswered Questions
of Johnson v. REA, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 889, 905-06 (1976).
166. In Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1226 (D.R.I. 1980), the district court con-
cluded that the state and federal rules would operate in the same way, but announced that it would not
apply the state rule if it were more restrictive:
This Court believes that if Rhode Island would not apply the discovery rule to the facts of the
present case, then application of the state rule would be fundamentally inconsistent with the
policies of § 1983. . . . If, however, the discovery rule were not employed, a certain class of
§ 1983 plaintiffs would never be able to enforce their claims. In cases of latent injury, the
limitations period could run before even the most diligent person realized that he had been
wronged, and the salutory goals of compensation and deterrence would be completely
frustrated.
Id at 1226. In Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982), the court took a similar tack with respect
to state law interpreting the meaning of discovery of the claim: "[S]hould the state law defining discov-
ery be more stringent than the comparable federal tolling doctrines, the latter would govern by opera-
tion of the Supremacy Clause." Id at 706 n.7.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
168. Since Tomano at least one court has refused to apply a state tolling doctrine on the ground that
to allow the limitations period to be tolled would be inconsistent with federal law. London v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 1981). In that case, the plaintiff sought to toll the state limita-
tions period for her claim based on section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act on the ground that she had
initiated administrative proceedings during the limitations period. Id at 814-15. California law pro-
vided for such tolling, but the Ninth Circuit nevertheless held that to apply the state tolling rule would
be inconsistent with Johnson, which held that § 1981 and title VII provided separate and independent
remedies. Id at 815.
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
170. Notably, the Tomanio Court quoted the following passage from Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584, 593 (1978):
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Finally, it should be noted that even if Johnson and Tomanlo were intended
to preclude application of the federal fraudulent concealment doctrine, it could
be argued that their reach is limited to claims based on the Civil Rights Acts
because in both cases the Court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which applies only
to civil rights claims. 171 In Tomanio the Court reasoned that section 1988 man-
dated that state law should provide "binding rules" for such claims, 172 and
described the claim in Johnson as "another [claim] subject to § 1988."173 A
panel of the Tenth Circuit has recently held that Johnson and Tomanio are
limited to civil rights claims, 174 and although the argument has some force,
careful scrutiny shows that it is not persuasive.
The problem with attempting to limit Johnson to civil rights cases is that the
decision, although premised in part on section 1988, was bottomed on more
general principles. The Court in Johnson relied principally on the theory that
a state's tolling doctrine should be borrowed along with the statutory period of
limitation. 75 The Court referred to section 1988 almost as an afterthought:
There is nothing anomalous or novel about ... [borrowing state
tolling doctrines]. State law has been followed in a variety of cases
that raised questions concerning the overtones and details of applica-
tion of the state limitation period to the federal cause of action ...
Nor is there anything peculiar to a federal civil rights action that
would justify special reluctance in applying state law. Indeed, the
express terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 suggest that the contrary is true. 176
Far from reasoning that section 1988 compelled the result reached, then, John-
son treated the statute merely as confirming that civil rights claims should be
treated the same as others. Moreover, the examples the Court cited in the pas-
sage quoted above 177 are not civil rights cases, further indicating that its gen-
A state statute cannot be considered "inconsistent" with federal law merely because the statute
causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the only bench-
mark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would
always be one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would then be essentially irrelevant.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488.
The prediction that courts will apply federal tolling principles when necessary to protect federal
claims is different from the point the Court was addressing in the above passage. With respect to fraud-
ulent concealment, the point is not merely that state rules might cause plaintiffs to lose, but that such
rules could undermine the federal statute sought to be enforced by exonerating a party that has con-
cealed the existence of the claim. The question is not whether the state rule causes the plaintiff to lose,
but whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine serves important federal objectives by protecting fed-
eral suitors against the effects of concealment.
171. See Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 484-85; Johnson, 421 U.S. at 464.
172. 446 U.S. at 484.
173. Id at 485.
174. In Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 392 (1981), the court stated:
Section 1988 applies only to the civil rights provisions of Title 18 and Title 42, United States
Code. To apply the Tomanfo rule by analogy to cases where federal courts borrow a state
limitations period as a matter of judicial convenience would in effect overrule Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, a decision whose continuing vitality is attested by the many cases relying upon it
in § 10(b) private actions.
Id at 691 (citations omitted).
175. 421 U.S. at 462-64.
176. Id at 464.
177. The cases Johnson cited as examples of reliance on state law for the details of applying a bor-
rowed state limitations period were UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (action under
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eral reasoning is not limited to such cases. The argument that Tomanio and
Johnson are limited to civil rights cases, therefore, appears weak.
In summary, Johnson and Tomanio do not forbid applying federal principles
of fraudulent concealment to claims based on federal statutes that lack federal
limitations periods. Neither case involved a claim of fraudulent concealment.
The Court has neither overruled nor questioned the vitality of Holmberg, and
Johnson suggests instead that when there is a "relevant body of federal proce-
dural law," the federal courts may continue to employ it rather than borrow
state law. To abandon the federal doctrine would result in incongruities in
treatment between statutes, would undermine congressional expectations, and
probably would force the courts to readopt federal principles whenever the
state law is materially different from the federal approach. The federal doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment should continue to be applied to all federal
claims; the lower courts that have disregarded Johnson and [omanio in con-
cealment cases are reaching the right result.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL DOCTRINE
In view of the conclusion in section II that the federal fraudulent conceal-
ment doctrine should continue to apply to all federal claims, it would be com-
forting to be able to report that such application will prove relatively
straightforward. Unfortunately, the decisions make that impossible. The ele-
ments of fraudulent concealment can be stated rather simply: the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant concealed the wrong and that as a result the plaintiff
could not, with due diligence, have discovered his claim sooner.178 Neverthe-
less, as Judge Devitt and Professor Blackmar have noted, "The case law is not
well developed as to the precise proof which must be made in order to estab-
lish tolling of the statute of limitations through fraudulent concealment." 179 As
a result, the application of these superficially simple concepts has left some
courts groping with seemingly contradictory rules and empty concepts. 180 The
the Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Cope v. Ander-
son, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (action under National Bank Act, tit. 62, ch. 1, 18 Stat. 95 (1878) (repealed
1959; formerly codified at 12 U.S.C. § 63) and under National Bank Act, ch. 6, § 23, 38 Stat. 273 (1913)
(repealed 1959; formerly codified at 12 U.S.C. § 64)); Barney v. Oeichs, 138 U.S. 529 (1891) (action to
recover money illegally exacted by the Port of New York). Thus, Johnson appears to have relied on
principles generally applicable to all actions in which a federal court borrows a state limitations period,
not on some special rules applicable to civil rights actions.
178. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing concealment) and notes 289-99 and
accompanying text (discussing diligence).
179. 3 E. DEVtr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 196 (3d ed. 1977);
see also Susman, Prosecuting the Antitrust Class Action, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1513, 1520 (1980) (law
unclear on how plaintiff must prove fraudulent concealment in antitrust class action); Comment, Intent
to Conceal- Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations Under the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine, 64
GEo. .J. 791, 791-92 (1976) (although courts have applied doctrine of fraudulent concealment in pri-
vate antitrust litigation, application has been neither uniform nor free of confusion or difficulty).
180. The most thorough review of apparent conflicts is contained in the thoughtful opinion in Long
v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1978), a securities action decided by Judge Jon
Newman while he was still on the district court. Judge Newman focused on inconsistent approaches of
courts determining whether proof of concealment is necessary:
[A]s to the "concealment" element there appears to be a conflict between the Supreme Court's
formulation and the formulation utilized by the Second Circuit.... [In Bailey the Court]
held that the period of limitations did not begin until plaintiff discovered his cause of action
when "the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character to conceal itself...." According
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following review of tolling decisions provides a framework for analysis in the
future. It also demonstrates that deviant rules adopted by some courts should
be rejected, and that the principal theoretical question that remains to be con-
clusively answered is the importance attached to proof of concealment.
A. CONCEALMENT
The fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine originated at equity, which had
no statute of limitations. Instead, the English courts of chancery applied the
equitable concept of laches, which bars a plaintiff who has delayed an unrea-
sonable length of time in bringing his claim.' 81 When the claim was based on
fraud, the chancery courts applied laches by looking not to the date the wrong-
doing occurred, but to the date on which the plaintiff should have learned of
his claim.' 82 At equity, then, diligence was the sole criterion. Bailey v. Glover
adopted this rule for fraud actions at law, even when there were "no special
circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to con-
ceal it from the knowledge of the other party." 8 3 Thus, in fraud cases conceal-
ment is usually said to be unnecessary to tolling.
From the perspective of the policies underlying the statute of limitations,
however, this single-minded focus on diligence is troubling. Ordinarily de-
fendants are entitled to the protection of limitations when they have done
nothing more than commit the substantive wrong. Defendants who go beyond
the substantive wrong and conceal their wrongdoing, on the other hand, can-
not claim that it is unfair to suspend the running of limitations until the effects
of that concealment have worn off. Thus, the concealment prong serves as an
important protection for defendants' rights. The Supreme Court itself gave
voice to this concern in Wood v. Carpenter, decided five years after Bailey v.
Glover, stating that "[c]oncealment by mere silence is not enough. There must
be some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent in-
quiry."' 84 In cases not involving fraud claims, therefore, proof of concealment
was required. Thus arose the often-cited distinction between tolling require-
ments for fraud (in which concealment need not be proved) and fraudulent
concealment (in which it was required), a supposed dichotomy 85 that has had
to Bailey, therefore, the concealment element is satisfied not only by affirmative acts of con-
cealment but by mere "unknowability." By contrast, the Second Circuit, although concurring
with Bailey as to the plaintiff's obligation of "diligence," appears to view "concealment" as
requiring affirmative acts by the defendant.
Id at 117. Further, Judge Newman complained that there was no case law "explaining what it means
for a fraud to 'conceal itself.'" Id at 120; see infra text accompanying note 271. He also noted that he
could find no cases discussing the content of the reasonableness standard with respect to the plaintiff's
diligence, id at 117 n.5, and that a further ambiguity existed concerning whether either concealment or
diligence, standing alone, was sufficient to prevent the running of the statute. ld at 118 n.7. As a
consequence of this uncertainty, Judge Newman determined it necessary to decide which of a number
of variant approaches to the fraudulent concealment doctrine to apply in order to address the issues
raised under conflicting approaches. Id at 117 (question of diligence); id at 119-20 (question of affirm-
ative concealment); id at 120 (question of concealment that is inherently self-concealing).
181. 1 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 72 (4th ed. 1846).
182. Booth v. Lord Warrington, 2 Eng. Rep. 111 (1714) (although case was brought after statute of
limitations expired, court held for plaintiff in claim based on fraud).
183. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874).
184. 101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879).
185. Courts and commentators have emphasized the distinction between tolling in fraud cases and
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an uneasy life.
Using the label "fraud" to determine whether proof of concealment is re-
quired created problems. Indeed, this approach may have been flawed from
the very outset because Wood v. Carpenter, in which the Supreme Court articu-
lated the concealment requirement, was in essence a fraud case. 186 The dispa-
rate treatment of fraud and nonfraud cases tended to undercut the
concealment requirement in nonfraud cases. The plaintiff with a claim not
based on traditional fraud might have been equally as diligent as the fraud
victim, but have failed to discover the wrong despite the absence of affirmative
concealment. The courts were loathe to shut the courthouse door in the face of
such a plaintiff, and the concealment prong underwent a continuing erosion as
courts struggled to avoid it.
This section reviews the federal tolling cases and concludes that, as a practi-
cal matter, concealment has not been an independent requirement for tolling.
Looking to the types of proof that have been held sufficient to satisfy the con-
cealment prong, it finds that courts have accepted a showing either of acts to
cover up the wrongdoing or representations by the defendant, including deni-
als of wrongdoing. Even when the defendant has been guilty of nothing more
than mere silence, courts bar only plaintiffs who have not been diligent. With
diligent plaintiffs, the courts may sidestep the concealment issue by labeling
the claim "constructive fraud," thereby eliminating the need to prove conceal-
ment. In other cases, particularly civil rights claims, they have disregarded it
altogether. Thus, it seems that the distinction between concealed fraud and
fraudulent concealment is generally more a matter of form than substance, and
that defendants will have to rely on the requirement that plaintiffs act dili-
gently for protection of their statute of limitations interests. The issue that
remains is whether the courts should disinter concealment as a genuine re-
quirement for tolling, a question that depends on the importance attached to
the policies underlying limitations.
1. Affirmative Acts
The clearest case of concealment occurs when the defendant has not only
committed the substantive wrong, but has taken affirmative action to conceal
it. In such a situation, there is no risk of tolling the statute for conduct that is
nothing more than the substantive wrong. The problem, however, is to deter-
mine whether the alleged acts of concealment are actually independent of the
substantive wrong. One approach suggested by early Supreme Court reason-
other cases, sometimes saying that there are really two separate rules. See, e.g., Prather v. Neva Paper-
backs, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 341 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971) (doctrine of fraudulent concealment, applicable to any
cause of action, but should not be confused with different doctrine of undiscovered fraud); Byrne v.
Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 276, 280 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (doctrine of fraudulent concealment
should be distinguished from rule that statutes of limitation for fraud actions do not begin to run until
date of discovery); see generall, Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 32, at 877-82 (when un-
discovered fraud is basis of liability, courts have now said that no new concealment is necessary pro-
vided plaintiff has opportunity to discover fraud; in contrast, when deciding fraudulent concealment
claim, court must look beyond original cause of action and examine means by which defendant ob-
structed discovery).
186. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879), was a suit to set aside transfers of defendant's property
in fraud of creditors, seemingly a traditional fraud claim.
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ingl87 is to ask whether the alleged acts of concealment occurred after the
wrong was committed. This approach appears to be a simple device to ensure
that there have in fact been independent acts of concealment. For example, in
Smith v. Nixon, 8 8 New York Times columnist Hedrick Smith sued to recover
damages from federal officials and the telephone company for allegedly plac-
ing illegal wiretaps on his telephone. 8 9 Smith's concealment claim was based
on allegations that the defendants concealed records of the wiretapping from
him and falsely denied press reports of the surveillance program. 190 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that the the denials and concealment of wrong-
doing, clearly separate from the surveillance itself, justified the application of
the tolling doctrine. 191 Similarly, in a securities case the Second Circuit found
concealment in an accounting firm's destruction of records and alteration of
accounting entries.192 In these situations it was easy to conclude that the de-
fendants' actions served to conceal the wrong after it was committed.
Although chronology is a useful method for isolating acts of concealment, it
has proved unsatisfactory in many cases. When the wrongdoing takes place
over a period of time, the acts of concealment, although independent of the
wrongdoing, still may occur simultaneously with the wrongdoing. In one case,
for example, the plaintiff alleged that the Atomic Energy Commission had ap-
propriated without notice or compensation a scientific process he had devel-
oped.193 Because the operation had been kept secret, the plaintiff learned of
the defendant's activities only after certain classified materials were made pub-
lic.' 94 The court held that the defendant's secret operations, although legal,
resulted in concealment of the claim. 195 Similar simultaneous activity designed
187. In Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. at 142, the Court cited an "instructive" Indiana case, Stanley .
Stanton, 36 Ind. 445 (1871). The Indiana court had required that such acts of concealment must occur
after the wrong is committed. 36 Ind. at 449. The plaintiff in Stanley v. Stanton claimed that the
defendant had obtained money from the plaintiff by representing himself to be the agent of one of
plaintiff's creditors, and that the defendant had thereafter concealed his deceit for twenty years. Id. at
450-51. The Indiana court held that such concealment was inadequate to toll the statute because "[t]he
facts, and only the facts, necessary to show the existence of it, are relied upon to show a concealment of
the cause of action. It seems to us to be a contradiction in terms to talk of concealing a cause of action
before the same has any existence." Id. at 449. Thus, not only did the court require proof of conceal-
ment to justify tolling in a fraud action, it also required that the acts of concealment postdate the fraud.
This requirement appeared satisfied in Wood v. Carpenter itself. The plaintiff did not have to rely on
the challenged fraudulent transfers themselves to establish concealment because the defendant thereaf-
ter "falsely pretended to plaintiff and his other creditors that he was poor" and falsely claimed poverty
in a debtor's oath. 101 U.S. at 136. The Court decided for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff
had not alleged due diligence, but also appeared satisfied with the allegation of concealment.
188. 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
189. Id at 1185-86.
190. Id at 1191 & n.44.
191. Id at 1191 n.44. For another recent example, see Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.
1982), in which the court held that a claim that plaintiff's decedent died as a result of having been
subjected to a secret chemical warfare experiment did not accrue for over twenty years. Id at 333. The
court stressed the following factors as proof of concealment: the Army's use of classification of materi-
als to keep the testing program secret; its campaign to prevent disclosure by threatening prosecution
under the Espionage Act; and its efforts to put incriminating documentary evidence "beyond the sub-
poena power." Id at 328.
192. Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979).
193. Spevack v. United States, 390 F.2d 977, 980-81 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
194. Id at 981.
195. Id
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to conceal other federal claims has been held to show concealment. 196 Thus, it
is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the concealment occurred after
the wrong was committed or that the acts of concealment were intrinsically
wrongful. At most, some action taken by the defendant independent of the
wrongdoing, but tending to conceal it, is required.
Isolating acts of concealment that are separate from the wrongful conduct is
more difficult when the act of concealment is inherent in the wrongful conduct.
Perhaps the best illustrations of this problem are price fixing conspiracies,
which require secrecy to be successful. As Judge Weinstein stated in rejecting
a tolling argument in an antitrust case:
It is in the nature of a conspiracy that there be secrecy; mere nondis-
closure or denial of the existence of a conspiracy does not constitute
fraud or deceit for tolling purposes. If it did, the tolling exception to
the statute of limitations would eclipse the basic statute itself.
197
As a general principle, then, to toll the statute antitrust plaintiffs must show
more than the wrongful conduct that underlies the substantive cause of action.
Nonetheless, courts have been quite willing to find acts of concealment in
antitrust conspiracy cases. Perhaps the most famous examples of tolling in
antitrust cases were the electrical equipment price fixing cases of the late 1950's
and early 1960's, in which the conspirators hid their misdeeds by meeting
secretly, using pay telephones, calling from home rather than from the office,
using plain envelopes without return addresses, and destroying records. 98 It
has been said that the underlings who actually fixed prices were so successful
in concealing their actions that even the chief executive officer of General
Electric was unaware of the conspiracy. 99 Such behavior, although an integral
part of the substantive wrong, continues to be found sufficient to toll the statute
of limitations. In a recent price fixing case, for example, the defendant's re-
gional manager maintained a "talk" and "no talk" chart on which he distin-
guished between participants in the conspiracy and outsiders in order to guard
against disclosure to outsiders. 200 He also made his price-fixing calls after nor-
mal working hours.20' The district court ruled that concealment had been es-
tablished as a matter of law and need not even be submitted to a jury.20 2 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed.203 In yet another recent case, in which it was alleged
that the conspirators submitted fictitious bids to camouflage a bid-rigging con-
spiracy, the district court held that such additional action constituted
concealment.2
o4
Such behavior undeniably should toll the statute of limitations. A theoreti-
196. See NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant fraudu-
lently concealed from union its unlawful employment of nonunion carpenters by twice assuring union
that it would no longer employ nonunion carpenters).
197. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
198. Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 272-73 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912
(1962).
199. See Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
200. King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.




204. See Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 n.5 (E.D. La. 1980).
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cal problem arises, however, because this conduct is not easily separated,
chronologically or otherwise, from the conduct that underlies the claim. Un-
doubtedly all the above-described evidence would be admissible on the sub-
stantive claim itself. In their case-by-case approach to concealment, the lower
federal courts have not explicitly addressed the theoretical problem created by
the overlap of substantive wrongs and acts of concealment. Their implicit con-
clusion is that whenever they identify specific conduct that tends to conceal the
wrong, albeit "part" of the substantive wrong itself, they will toll the statute if
the plaintiff is diligent. This conclusion seems legitimate when such conduct
clearly prevents timely commencement of the suit because it provides a justifi-
cation for depriving the defendant of the protection of limitations. Lurking in
the background, however, is the question whether this approach amounts to no
more than a determination whether the defendant's conduct was sufficiently
"aggravated" to warrant tolling. Such an approach is hazardous because it
blends the grounds for tolling and the grounds for liability, and the wrongful-
ness of the alleged offense is not itself supposed to be a ground for suspending
the running of the statute of limitations. Even decisions premised upon affirm-
ative acts of concealment suggest that, as a practical matter, the concealment
prong is no longer an independent requirement.
2. Representations to Plaintiff
In some cases, the plaintiffs evidence of concealment consists only of repre-
sentations made by the defendant. As with other acts purportedly intended to
conceal, such representations may be an integral part of the wrongful conduct
itself or entirely independent of it. Representations may closely resemble
traditional fraud and, therefore, can easily be viewed as providing grounds for
application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. In evaluating a claim that
the defendant's representations deterred or deferred investigation of the claim,
courts normally toll the statute of limitations if the plaintiffs reliance on the
defendant's representations was reasonable. This approach is consistent with
the policies underlying limitations because it identifies conduct of the defend-
ant that justifies depriving him of the protection of limitations.
Courts typically find that defendant's representations constitute concealment
when the defendant obscures its wrongful conduct by providing an innocent
explanation for unfavorable developments. For example, in Mt. Hood Stages
v. Greyhound Corp. ,205 the plaintiff, a small bus company, alleged that for
twenty years Greyhound had violated the antitrust laws by pursuing a routing
strategy that was designed to eliminate the plaintiff as a competitor.20 6 Because
the plaintiff was aware of many of the routing decisions,207 it could not prove
that the defendant surreptitiously concealed its actions. Instead, it proved that
when it complained about routing decisions, the defendant explained that the
205. 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision, see supra note 128. It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs initial success against
Greyhound gave rise to a milestone of civil procedure, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), which
was a derivative action seeking to hold the directors and officers of Greyhound liable for the judgment
against the company in Mt. Hood See 433 U.S. at 190 n.2.
206. Mt. Hood Stages v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d at 688.
207. Id at 698.
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decisions were isolated and unauthorized acts by low-level personnel.208 The
Ninth Circuit concluded 209 that these representations supported a jury finding
of concealment of a company-wide policy, determined by high-level manage-
ment, to injure plaintiff as a competitor.210 Similarly, when a former Philadel-
phia teacher asserted that she had been fired because of her opposition to
mayor Frank Rizzo, the district court indicated that tolling would be justified
by proof that the defendant falsely informed her she was laid off due to
financial constraints.21' In the same vein, the Ninth Circuit held that an em-
ployer had concealed its violation of its duty to bargain with a carpenters
union by representing to the union that it would no longer employ carpenters
when in fact it was employing them.212
When defendants volunteer an innocent and false explanation for their con-
duct, it is easy to find that independent acts of conealment have occurred. The
routing strategy in Mt. Hood Stages, the termination of the Philadelphia
teacher, and the employer's violation of its duty to bargain were separate and
distinct from the representations that concealed the wrongdoing. In other situ-
ations, however, the defendant merely denied wrongdoing without volunteer-
ing an explanation. These cases have greatly troubled the courts. On one
hand, it is difficult to argue that a defendant conceals his wrongdoing by
merely denying allegations. Surely the denial does not retroactively conceal
the wrongdoing when it comes only after the plaintiffs suspicions have been
aroused. Indeed, if such reasoning were carried to its logical extreme, a de-
fendant would engage in concealment by merely filing an answer in court de-
nying the charges of the complaint. In theory, at least, a defendant is not
required to advertise his wrongdoing to qualify for the protection of the statute
of limitations. On the other hand, a knowingly false denial of specific charges
of wrongdoing could certainly be labeled fraudulent. It seems inequitable for
a defendant to profit from his misrepresentations when plaintiffs have reason-
ably relied upon them.
Responding to such equitable concerns, courts ultimately focus on the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiffs reliance on the denial. Thus, although it is some-
times said that mere denials cannot as a matter of law suffice to show
208. Id
209. The court's observation that "Greyhound does not deny the sufficiency of the evidence to show
it attempted to conceal its conduct," 555 F.2d at 698, indicates that it did not decide the concealment
issue. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the representations were sufficient to constitute concealment
was implicit in the court's opinion.
210. Id at 698-99. Greyhound made the same representations below to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 104 I.C.C. 449, 459-63 (1968). The ICC eventually found that its
actions "were inspired by a desire to stifle competition" and "injure or destroy" the plaintiff. Id at 461.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the conduct underlying the regulatory proceedings and that under-
lying the antitrust suit are essentially the same." 555 F.2d at 691. The plaintiff was awarded damages
for the period 1953 through 1973 despite the four year antitrust statute of limitations. Id at 697. Al-
though the Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, it refused to consider Greyhound's contentions
that there was insufficient evidence of concealment to toll the statute of limitations. 437 U.S. at 329-30
n.12.
211. Boyce v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 447 F. Supp. 357, 362 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also Richards
v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to dismiss complaint when plaintiff asserted
that defendant fraudulently concealed evidence which showed that fabricated charges were knowingly
used to force plaintiff's resignation).
212. NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
1983]
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concealment, 213 in reality the rule is not so rigid. The oft-cited Ninth Circuit
case of Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. ,214 decided less than a
year after Mt. Hood, illustrates the tension between the stated rule and its ap-
plication. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had engaged in price dis-
crimination in violation of the antitrust laws.21 5 Years before, the plaintiff had
sued a number of other manufacturers on comparable claims (Rutledge 1) and
lost.215 The plaintiffs only allegation of concealment was that the defendant
denied engaging in price discrimination.217 The defendant moved to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds, and the district court granted the motion.218
Plaintiff appealed. Over a dissent concluding that "Rutledge had the right
to accept without mistrust the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by Woven
Hose,"' 219 the court of appeals affirmed on statute of limitations grounds.220
The majority stressed the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defend-
ant "actively misled" him,221 and reasoned that the plaintiff could not do so by
relying only upon the defendant's denials:
Silence or passive conduct of the defendant is not deemed fraudulent
unless the relationship of the parties imposes a duty upon the defend-
ant to make disclosure. The affirmative act of denying wrongdoing
may constitute fraudulent concealment where the circumstances
make the plaintiff's reliance upon the denial reasonable, but this is
not such a case. As early as 1965, Rutledge had expressed his suspi-
cion to attorneys for the Justice Department's antitrust division that
Woven Hose was giving a secret additional discount to one of Rut-
ledge's competitors, the Weatherhead Company, a suspicion based
on Weatherhead's low resale price. . . .He was not a man insensi-
tive to the implications of the antitrust laws, nor was he a person who
lightly disregarded his suspicions. His extensive litigation of similar
issues in Rutledge I and his continued efforts to pursue his suspicions
of other wrongdoing forbid any inference that he would be thrown
off the trail by a simple denial of wrongdoing.2
22
Given the posture of the appeal-from a motion to dismiss, not from a mo-
tion for summary judgment-the above psychological analysis of the plaintiff
is indeed a remarkable effort to justify dismissal in the face of other decisions
in which denials sufficed as concealment. The trouble with this analysis is not
that the court considered the reasonableness of the plaintiffs reliance, but that
it considered the reasonableness of the reliance to have a bearing on whether
213. See, e.g., King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 1981)
(although endorsing district court statement that denial of wrongdoing does not itself constitute con-
cealment, evidence here established fraudulent concealment), ceri. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1038 (1982);
Dayco Corp. v. Firestone Fire & Rubber Co., 386 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (stating that
active denial of illegal conduct not fraudulent concealment), afl'd, 523 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1975).
214. 576 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1978).
215. Id at 250.
216. Id
217. Id
218. Id at 249-50.
219. Id at 250-51 (Merrill, J., dissenting).
220. Id at 250.
221. Id at 249.
222. Id at 250.
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concealment occurred. Although reliance on a defendant's representations
must be reasonable to toll the statute, it is not the standard by which one deter-
mines whether there has been concealment. Rather, it is the language of due
diligence. The reasoning of Rutledge, therefore, suggests that plaintiffs need
prove only due diligence and not concealment to toll the statute, which would
be detrimental to defendants' legitimate interests.
Comparison to equitable estoppel cases indicates that elsewhere defendants'
interests receive the recognition they deserve. Equitable estoppel precludes re-
liance on limitations by a defendant who has induced the plaintiff to delay suit
by misrepresenting the plaintiffs legal rights to him223 or assuring the plaintiff
that a settlement has been reached.2 24 Obviously equitable estoppel differs
from fraudulent concealment in that it applies in favor of a plaintiff who is
undeniably on notice of his claim. 225 Nevertheless, equitable estoppel cases are
analogous to fraudulent concealment cases in which the defendant simply de-
nies allegations of wrongdoing because the "concealment" in such cases occurs
only after the plaintiffs suspicions have been sufficiently aroused to stimulate
inquiry.
The reason the comparison is informative is that in order to assert equitable
estoppel, the plaintiff must prove not only that his reliance on the defendant's
statements was reasonable, but also that the defendant was culpable for the
delay by having made a misrepresentation of material fact designed to induce
the plaintiff to delay suit.226 It is this factor that justifies depriving the defend-
ant of the protection of limitations.227 Arguably a lower degree of culpability
would be appropriate in a fraudulent concealment case in which the plaintiff is
not on notice of his claim, but defendant's interests are also more forceful
223. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 233-34 (1959) (employee entitled to trial
on merits when he alleges employer misled him regarding applicable statute of limitations); Scarbor-
ough v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 178 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1949) (same).
224. See United States v. Fidelity & Gas Co., 402 F.2d 893, 898 (4th Cir. 1968) (defendant estopped
when falsely assured plaintiff that contract dispute resolved); see also Atkins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
685 F.2d 1146, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing trial court's dismissal because defendant should be
estopped from pleading statute of limitations defense if court finds that plaintiff relied on defendant's
assurances that the claim would be settled); Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 600 F.2d 24, 34 (6th Cir. 1979)
(remanding to give plaintiff opportunity to prove that defendant should be estopped because it falsely
assured plaintiff that employment dispute resolved); Longo v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 355 F.2d
443, 445 (3d Cir. 1966) (remanding to give plaintiff opportunity to prove that defendant should be
estopped because it falsely assured plaintiff that FELA claim could be settled).
225. The Seventh Circuit has emphasized the difference between tolling and estoppel:
Equitable estoppel ... is not concerned with the running and suspension of the limitations
period, but rather comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses itself
to the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because his action has induced another into
forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period.
Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir. 1978). Although this distinction theoreti-
cally may have some weight, in practice, estoppel does closely resemble concealment by representations
or denial of wrongdoing. Indeed, in Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 600 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1979), the court
in an equitable estoppel case looked to Holmberg v. Armbrecht for the principle that equitable tolling is
read into all federal statutes. Id at 30. Thus, the two doctrines are part of a continuum of law excusing
plaintiff's failure to sue within the period of limitations.
226. See Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1980) (nature of representa-
tions and conduct of defendant have crucial significance when determining whether plaintiff may in-
voke equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 600 F.2d 24 (6th
Cir. 1979) (defendant may be equitably estopped if plaintiff can prove that defendant falsely assured
him that employment dispute resolved). .
227. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959).
1983]
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under such circumstances. In equitable estoppel cases the defendant has al-
ready been threatened with suit, so he cannot claim surprise if later sued. The
defendant who only denies wrongdoing is not similarly on notice. In fraudu-
lent concealment cases in which a defendant's misrepresentation involves a
simple denial of wrongdoing, therefore, the comparison to equitable estoppel
cases shows that plaintiffs should be required to prove some culpability perti-
nent to the tolling question-concealment. In this context, the emphasis in
Rutledge on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs reliance further suggests the
erosion of concealment as an independent requirement.
3. Mere Silence
The plaintiff who is completely ignorant of the defendant's wrongdoing may
never receive a denial of wrongdoing because he never asks. If he attempts to
avoid the bar of limitations when the defendant has never denied wrongdoing,
he is confronted by the admonition of Wood v. Carpenter that, in the absence
of a fiduciary duty to speak, mere silence will not toll the statute of limitations
because there has been no concealment. 228 If the plaintiff has been diligent,
however, he seems to be as worthy of equitable relief as the plaintiff whose
suspicions have arisen sufficiently to cause him to inquire. Nevertheless, it
appears that here, at least, the concealment requirement should have continu-
ing vitality even against a diligent plaintiff.
On the surface, recent decisions indicate that it does. The Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals rejected a tolling argument with respect to a claim that
Union Oil had overcharged the plaintiff in violation of Federal Energy Ad-
ministration (FEA) regulations. The court noted:
The fact that FEA pricing regulations involve complicated account-
ing processes and that price information resulting from those
processes is not "self-revealing" is not enough to sustain a claim of
fraudulent concealment, nor is any mere failure on Union's part to
publish information that it was not required otherwise to publish.
229
Similarly, in a Puerto Rico case the plaintiff claimed that he was fired for polit-
ical reasons in violation of his civil rights. The First Circuit rejected his argu-
ment that the statute should be tolled because he did not learn of the
defendant's wrongdoing until a friend, by "a stroke of luck," overheard an
admission in the town square.230 The court reasoned that it could "find no
suggestion that any efforts were made to hide the conspiracy."
'23'
Not far below the surface, however, the courts pay substantial attention to
whether the plaintiff was diligent even in "mere silence" cases. Thus, in the
Union Oil case, the court was careful to note that the plaintiff began an investi-
gation of Union's pricing through special counsel and was advised, within a
month, that Union had charged improper prices. Nevertheless, the plaintiff did
not sue until more than nine months later. As the court stated, "[T]hese facts
228. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879).
229. Ashland Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 567 F.2d 984, 988 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 994 (1978).
230. Hemandez-Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 1979).
231. Id
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appear contrary to any theory of due diligence. ' 232 Similarly, in the Puerto
Rico civil fights action, the court pointed out that the plaintiff did nothing to
investigate for months even though his supervisor told the plaintiff that he was
subject to political pressures. 233 Thus, even courts that rely expressly on the
mere silence rationale appear anxious to avoid barring diligent plaintiffs, sug-
gesting that iii mere silence cases the statute of limitations can be tolled as to
diligent plaintiffs.234 But tolling when the defendant's only act to conceal has
been "mere silence" effectively eliminates concealment as an independent re-
quirement of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. If the concealment require-
ment does not survive in this citadel, it is difficult to imagine where it will.235
4. Treating Fraud Claims Differently
The courts' treatment of the supposedly separate tolling doctrine for fraud
claims, which omits the concealment requirement, actually suggests that func-
tionally there is only one tolling principle. Professor Dawson has explained
the separate treatment of claims based on fraud as an historical coincidence
2 36
and urged that "any sharp distinction between the two exceptions is artifi-
cial."'237 Some courts emphasize the distinction as though it delineated a sepa-
232. Ashland Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 567 F.2d 984, 989 n.10 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
233. Hernandez-Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102 (Ist Cir. 1979).
234. For another example from the civil rights area, see Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970), in which the court held tolling inapplicable to a claim that
defendants had engaged in discrimination in the sale of residential real estate in Chicago:
Here there is no indication in the complaints that defendants concealed from plaintiffs or that
plaintiffs actually lacked knowledge of the facts disclosing the discriminatory sales practices
upon which this case rests. There is no allegation that defendants attempted to create or
perpetuate an erroneous impression in the minds of the plaintiffs that the homes were being
sold to them at the same price, on the same terms, and under the same conditions as they
would be sold to whites.
Id at 1199. Thus, although the court pointed out that there were no misleading representations, the
equivalent of mere silence, it also emphasized that there was no reason to believe plaintiffs did not in
fact know of the challenged practices. See also Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir.),
(court held that failure of government to disclose its alleged negligence in connection with polio vaccine
did not toll the statute of limitations because once the plaintiff learned of his injury, burden was on
plaintiff to ascertain its cause and identify those at fault) cert. denied, 102 U.S. 1273 (1981). Here again,
the absence of acts of concealment alone was not treated as sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of the
benefits of tolling; only the plaintiff's lack of diligence provided the necessary additional justification
for the refusal to toll.
235. In Glazer Steel Corp. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court held
that mere silence during discovery may constitute concealment of claims that truthful answers would
unearth. Id at 503. The court stated, "It is true that '[m]ere silence, where there is no duty to speak,
does not toll the statute.' However, the history of discovery in this case contains several instances in
which judges and magistrates held that the defendants were under a "duty to speak." Id The case
apparently has not been followed, but it illustrates another method for avoiding the mere silence prob-
lem when it appears that the plaintiff has been diligent.
236. As Professor Dawson has explained, after the enactment of the first statute of limitations, 21
James 1, ch. 16 (1623), "[B]ills in equity were not included in the enumeration of actions barred by the
statute of James. The Chancery was thus left free to formulate, under the cloak of its own doctrine of
laches, independent tests for equitable remedies." Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 32, at 597.
Thereafter, an analogous doctrine of tolling developed for claims not based on fraud. Dawson, Fraudu-
lent Concealment, supra note 32, at 880. Due to concern about the hazards of tolling in favor of all
ignorant plaintiffs, the notion developed that "there should be added to the suitor's ignorance some
affirmative misconduct by the opposite party, preventing discovery and excusing delay." Id Thus, the
origin of the differing doctrines appears to depend, in the first instance, upon the limits of the jurisdic-
tion of the Courts of Chancery.
237. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 32, at 878. Addressing fraud and fraudulent con-
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rate doctrine, 23 8 while others seem to believe that evidence of concealment is
necessary even though the claim is based on fraud.239 Some courts even at-
tempt to justify the distinction on policy grounds. For example, one court has
suggested that "Holmberg is based on the premise that fraud as a common law
cause of action is self-concealing by its nature. '240 But the same has been said
of conspiracy.241 It is certainly odd that the victim of a nationwide price-fixing
conspiracy that is inherently self-concealing must prove affirmative conceal-
ment to justify his delay in suing when a plaintiff alleging securities fraud
against a defendant with whom he dealt personally is relieved of that burden.
The dichotomy between fraud and fraudulent concealment was shrouded in
confusion from the outset. Despite the allegations of concealment in Bailey v.
Glover,242 the Court stated that concealment was not a necessary element for a
claim based on fraud.243 Wood v. Carpenter also involved a claim labeled
fraud, but there the Court stated that affirmative concealment had to be
proved.244 Consequently, the confusion that arose about the concealment issue
probably was inevitable, and it was compounded by the idea, volunteered in
Bailey v. Glover, that concealment would not be required in nonfraud cases
when the wrongdoing was "of such character as to conceal itself.' 245
ceaiment, Professor Dawson observed that "the distinctions between them have been unnecessary and
to some extent accidental, and in their effect on actual decision unfortunate." Dawson, Undiscovered
Fraud, supra note 32, at 593.
238. See supra note 185.
239. In Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F.Supp. 722 (W.D. Mich. 1980), a fd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir.
1982), the court stated, "The required acts of concealment cannot be found in the original fraud itself.
If they could, the statute of limitations in fraud cases would be tolled indefinitely pending the plaintiffs
actual discovery of his cause of action." Id at 728.
Similar reasoning surfaced in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934 (D.N.J.), rev'd on
other ground, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979), in which the court rejected a tolling argument in a securities
case, reasoning that "only where the substantive fraud includes active concealment directly thwarting
diligent efforts to discover wrongdoing can that substantive fraud suffice to toll the statute of limita-
tions." Id at 945.
Perhaps more remarkably, in Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402 (D.
Colo. 1979), aj'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392 (1981), the court rejected an
attempt by Ohio to toll the statute because the defendants destroyed a side agreement that allegedly
would have revealed the securities violation asserted. Id at 407-09. The court stated:
inhere simply is not concealment as to Ohio. Mr. Lowry made no affirmative misrepresenta-
tions to Ohio with respect to the side agreement.... To rise to fraudulent concealment there
must be something more, perhaps personal or face-to-face deception.
Id at 409.
This restrictive view probably reflects the judgment of the courts in these cases that the plaintiffs had
not been diligent. Indeed, the plaintiffs were attempting to utilize a deviant strain of fraudulent conceal-
ment reasoning that excuses proof of diligence in fraud cases when there is concealment. See infra text
accompanying notes 300-19. Nevertheless, the narrow view these courts endorse by requiring conceal-
ment even in fraud cases provides an interesting counterpoint to the broadening approach adopted in
cases in which concealment is still thought to be a requirement ab initio.
240. Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
241. See Hall v. E.I. duPont de Nemours, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 358, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (although
secrecy inherent in conspiracy, mere nondisclosure or denial of conspiracy does not justify exception to
statute of limitations because exception would eclipse statute itself); see also supra note 197 and accom-
panying text (discussing Hall).
242. The syllabus notes that petitioner alleged that "the bankrupt and his wife, son and father-in-law
... kept secret their said fraudulent acts, and endeavored to conceal them." 88 (21 Wall.) U.S. at 343.
243. Id at 350.
244. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing Wood v. Carpenter).
245. 88 U.S. at 349-50.
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The approach the lower courts have taken, however, has greatly reduced the
importance of the distinction between fraud and nonfraud cases. When the
claim involves traditional fraud, lower courts have treated affirmative conceal-
ment as an important factor in evaluating the plaintiff's diligence.246 A plaintiff
alleging fraud may have a difficult time showing that he was diligent if he
cannot identify some concealment. It is in cases not involving traditional
fraud, however, that the lower courts' development seems more significant. As
Professor Dawson observed nearly fifty years ago, "By judicial decision 'fraud'
has been extended far beyond the field of misrepresentation. . . and out to-
ward the open spaces of naked tort."247 Developments since that time have
not stemmed the tide.
One such development of the extension of the doctrine of fraud is the in-
creasing willingness of courts to classify statutes as being premised on fraud
for the purposes of deciding tolling issues. For example, one court has rea-
soned that for tolling purposes a claim under the Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost Savings Act 248 should be treated as fraud because it allows recovery
to private plaintiffs only upon proof of intent to defraud.249 More significantly,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934250 is intended to apply to
conduct that is fraudulent.251 Proceeding from this characterization of the stat-
ute to concealment issues, however, leads to some curious results. A prime
example is the much-cited case of Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. ,252 in which the plaintiff asserted a section 10(b) claim for churning
her securities account.253 The plaintiff could not prove concealment because
every transaction was accurately and promptly reported to her.254 Neverthe-
less, the Tenth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for defendants on the
ground that under section 10(b) churning is treated as "fraud in law" even
though it is treated differently than common law fraud255 and, therefore, con-
246. See infra notes 404-17 and accompanying text (discussing lower court opinions dealing with
concealment requirement).
247. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 32, at 875.
248. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2012 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
249. Byre v. Autohaus on Edens, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 276, 280 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Similarly, in Tye v.
Spitzer-Dodge, 499 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Ohio 1980), a suit under the same Act, the court applied the
"well established federal doctrine that where fraud is involved in the cause of action, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered by the
plaintiff." Id at 693.
250. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
251. The Court recently re-emphasized this point in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35
(1980), stating that "[s]ection 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud."
252. 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974).
253. Id at 169. "Churning" is a term in securities law "connoting excessive trading by a broker
disproportionate to the size of the account involved in order to generate commissions." Id at 170. For a
description of the consequences of churning, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION
568-70 (5th ed. 1982).
254. Id at 172.
255. Presumably, the court characterized churning as fraud in order to fit the claim under the statute.
The court acknowledged the significant differences between churning and common law fraud, however,
explaining that
[c]hurning differs from common law fraud in several respects. For example, proof of churning
does not require proof of a specific or invidious intent to defraud. Secondly, whereas a com-
plainant alleging common law fraud has the burden of proving the fraud by clear, cogent and
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cealment is not required.256 Although the decision to toll might be explained
on the ground that some sort of fiduciary relation existed between the broker
and the plaintiff, who was inexperienced in securities trading, the case illus-
trates the risks of premising the fraud distinction on the nature of the statute
allegedly violated.
When addressing claims not based on statutes premised on fraud, the courts
have been more creative in finding that the plaintiff was nevertheless the vic-
tim of fraud and therefore excused from proving concealment. In an antitrust
case, for example,, a district judge concluded that the alleged conspiracy "in-
volves a fraud" because one of the defendants had bribed a judge of the Third
Circuit to obtain a favorable ruling in prior litigation.257 Much more signifi-
cantly, numerous civil rights cases involve innovative use of the fraud concept
despite the absence in the history of the Civil Rights Acts of any suggestion
that they were designed to combat fraud. A leading example is Cox v. S/an-
ton,258 in which the plaintiff alleged that county authorities had threatened to
terminate welfare to her family unless she agreed to a temporary steriliza-
tion.259 Instead, the defendants performed an irreversible sterilization.
260
When she discovered this fact years later, the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.261 Without inquiring whether there was affirmative concealment, the
Fourth Circuit held that the statute was tolled until the plaintiff should have
discovered the facts underlying her claim.262 Similarly, in another case in
convincing evidence, a complainant alleging fraudulent churning activity carries a less strin-
gent burden of proof-one measured by the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
Id at 171 n.2 (citations omitted).
256. Id at 171.
257. Winkler-Koch Eng'g Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15,29 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). For a
description of the illicit transaction, see C. ASHMAN, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy 51 (1973).
258. 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975).
259. Id at 49.
260. Id
261. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
262. 529 F.2d at 50. The court stated that "[flederal law holds that the time of accrual is when
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id The sole
support the court cited for this proposition was Young v. Crinchfield R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.
1961), an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), to recover for
injury to the lungs caused by exposure to silica dust. Id at 503. Young relied in turn on Uric v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), which held that the time at which the plaintiff contracted silicosis is
"inherently unknowable" and, therefore, that the statutory period for a claim for injury due to silicosis
runs only from the time when it could have been diagnosed. Id at 169-70. The problem with silicosis,
and the reason that the time of its contraction is "inherently unknowable," is that the disintegration of
the lungs resulting from silicosis is not identifiable for years or even decades. Thus, the plaintiff in Urle
had been inhaling silica during his employment with defendant since 1910, but he did not become
aware of the impairment until 1940. Id at 170. To hold that the statute of limitations runs from the
date of the initial inhalation of silica would make the compensation statute a "delusive remedy," id at
169, and the Court refused to do so.
Similar problems, but of much greater magnitude, have arisen in connection with the burgeoning
asbestosis litigation that is estimated to be the largest single subject of litigation in the country at pres-
ent. See The Asbestosis Case Explosion, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 3. This limitations problem
has prompted some innovative solutions. The California legislature, for example, enacted a special
statute of limitations applicable only to asbestosis claims which provided that the limitations period run
from the date of discovery. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.2 (West 1982). In addition, under White v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982), many shipyard
workers with asbestosis claims may be able to assert admiralty claims, id at 241, thereby avoiding
limitations problems and confronting only the laches doctrine as a bar to their claims. Yet another area
in which such limitations problems might arise is in connection with claims based on disposal of haz-
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which the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had persuaded him to agree to
castration as part of a plea bargain by representing that such a practice was
customary, the Ninth Circuit applied the "established rule" that "where a
plaintiff has been injured by fraud.., the statutory period does not begin to
run until discovery of the injury.
'263
These rulings do not appear to be consistent with the fraud exception. Al-
though Dzenits stated that fraud was the gravamen of the underlying securities
statute, the actual claim of churning bears little resemblance to common law
fraud.264 The antitrust laws and civil rights acts are not even aimed at fraud.
The courts' characterization of these claims as fraud, therefore, is misplaced.
Indeed, the civil rights violations alleged above 265 would have been equally
actionable whether the defendants used force or deception. When there is
something that can be classified as deception, however, the plaintiff gains the
advantage of being able to invoke the fraud tolling rule.
Subsequent cases have not limited the expanding concept of fraud. In one
civil rights case, for example, the plaintiff alleged that state police officers had
violated his rights by applying a carcinogenic chemical to his skin in a test
performed in connection with a criminal investigation. 266 He alleged further
that he did not learn of the carcinogenic properties of the chemical until
shortly before he brought suit.267 He did not claim that the defendants made
false representations about the test, but only that they performed it.268 In deny-
ing the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court cited Cox v. Stanton for the
proposition that in claims based on section 1983, the cause of action does not
accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.269 In defer-
ence to Tomanio, the court examined the applicable state law and found that it
supported the same result that the federal accrual rule would achieve.270 The
court cautioned, however, that if state law required proof of more than dili-
gence, it would actually contravene federal policy. So far has the concealment
prong been eclipsed in civil rights cases, then, that to require proof of more
ardous wastes, in which the injury cannot be noticed for years. See generally Note, Accrual Dilemma"
Statutes of Limitations in Hazardous Waste Cases, 45 ALB. L. REv. 717 (1981).
Whatever the ultimate resolution of the limitations issue in asbestosis and silicosis cases, it is evident
that the situation in Cox v. Stanton is not analogous to such cases. Although it was impossible for the
silicosis and asbestosis victims to determine whether they were afflicted until years after exposure, the
plaintiff in Cox could have learned of her injury at any time. Thus, the attempt to enlarge the doctrine
of Urie v. Thompson to warrant tolling in civil rights cases such as Cox v. Stanton has no real support.
Nevertheless, as set forth infra in the text accompanying note 269, the rule of Cox v. Stanton that the
limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff should have discovered his injury, has achieved substantial
acceptance.
263. Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977). The problem with this reasoning, of
course, is that Briley was suing not for fraud but for violation of his civil rights.
264. See supra note 255 (distinguishing churning from common law fraud).
265. See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights cases).
266. Marapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (D.R.I. 1980).
267. Id at 1225.
268. I.d
269. Id For a similar example of application of the discovery rule to a civil rights claim, see Pollard
v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304, 307 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (defendant's summary judgment motion de-
nied because issue of fact whether plaintiffs could have discovered civil rights violation through reason-
able diligence).
270. 500 F. Supp. at 1226.
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than due diligence would, in the eyes of one court, actually contravene federal
policy.
The collateral possibility of labeling a defendant's conduct as "inherently
self-concealing," suggested in Bailey v. Glover, tends to confirm the suspicion
that diligence is presently the only real criterion. One court has attempted to
provide a definition for this notion:
A fraud "conceal[s] itself' when a plaintiff, even by the exercise of
due diligence, could not uncover it. It is distinguishable from "af-
firmative concealment" because that doctrine requires some conduct
of the defendant directed at the objective of keeping the fraud con-
cealed. By contrast, a fraud conceals itself when the defendant does
only what is necessary to perpetrate the fraud, and that alone makes
the fraud unknowable, without additional efforts at concealment. In
other words, the very essence of the fraudulent practice itself prevents
discovery.271
This definition suffers from an inherent, and probably unavoidable, tautology.
A wrong is "inherently concealed" whenever it is "unknowable" despite the
absence of affirmative concealment. Obviously it was not "unknowable" for-
ever, since the plaintiff must have discovered it at some time in order to sue
and bring the statute of limitations problem to the attention of a court in the
first place. The real question, therefore, is whether it was "unknowable" until
the discovery of the claim. What could be better proof that it was unknowable
than the fact that the plaintiff did not discover it despite due diligence? The
"inherently unknowable" wrong consequently becomes the obverse of due dil-
igence-a wrong that a plaintiff even by the exercise of due diligence, could
not uncover. When all else fails, this fallback notion apparently will obviate
proof of concealment for the diligent plaintiff.
In summary, it appears that fraud is usually treated differently mainly in
that it is easier to justify looking only at diligence in fraud cases. When tradi-
tional fraud is not involved, courts have relieved plaintiffs of the burden of
proving concealment through such devices as the notion of constructive fraud
and the concept of an "inherently self-concealing" fraud. In civil rights cases,
at least, some courts have simply discarded the distinction between fraud
claims and other claims altogether. As presaged by Professor Dawson, it ap-
pears that the distinction has, for all practical purposes, been eliminated.
5. Disinterring the Concealment Requirement
Questions about the actual importance of the concealment "requirement"
have troubled thoughtful courts and commentators.272 It cannot be said that
concealment no longer plays any role at all in the determination of whether to
toll on the ground of fraudulent concealment. When a court is content that the
271. Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 120 (D. Conn. 1978); see also supra note 180
(discussing Long).
272. Nearly fifty years ago Professor Dawson noted that in most, but not all, cases concealment was
merely an aspect of diligence. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 32, at 887. Similarly,
Judge Newman questioned whether concealment as well as diligence is needed or only diligence. See
supra note 180 (quoting Judge Newman in Long v. Abbott Mortgage Co., 459 F. Supp. 108, 117 (D.
Conn. 1978)).
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plaintiff was not diligent, the absence of concealment at least provides a conve-
nient ground for the refusal to toll. 273 At the same time, it seems that when a
court concludes that the plaintiff was diligent, it will devise a method for satis-
fying or disregarding the concealment issue.274 Under these circumstances, de-
spite some lip service paid to concealment, 275 the concealment prong does not
have independent significance.
276
The extent to which one is troubled by the erosion of the concealment re-
quirement depends upon the importance one attaches to the policies underly-
ing statutes of limitations. In the absence of an independent concealment
requirement, defendants are virtually powerless to assure themselves of the
protections of limitations. In rare cases, a defendant may protect himself by
revealing facts that would spur a diligent plaintiff to inquire. For example, in
a suit by the Ku Klux Klan against the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
illicit counterespionage activities, defendants conceded that the secrecy of the
activities tolled the limitations period.277 Nevertheless, they successfully as-
serted that the statute began running when Attorney General Saxbe held a
press conference in which he revealed the activities involved and named the
Klan as one of the organizations that had been a target.278 Although a defend-
ant need not advertise his wrongdoing, such advertisement may improve his
ability to rely on limitations. Such stratagems are rarely feasible,279 and in
273. See supra notes 228-35 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which defendants' mere
silence did not justify tolling when plaintiff not diligent).
274. See supra notes 248-71 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts analogize non-
fraud claims to fraud and relieve plaintiff of burden of proving concealment when plaintiffs act
reasonably).
275. In Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court held that a plaintiff in a
civil rights action had to prove concealment to toll the statute of limitations. Id at 1018. The plaintiff
complained that the FBI had failed to warn him that he might be subject to mob violence if he partici-
pated in Freedom Rider activities in the South in 1961. Id at 1018-19. The court held that the govern-
ment's failure to disclose the fact that it had advance notice from an informant of the plan for such a
beating did not constitute concealment. Id at 1019. The court denied the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, however, because the matters alleged were "covert" and the fact of concealment might
be disclosed by further discovery. Id Although the court did not dismiss the plaintiff's claim because
of his failure to prove concealment, it made little effort to specify what proof of concealment it would
ultimately require. In fact, the case was still pending years later. See Peck v. United States 522 F.
Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
276. An examination of the proposed jury instructions contained in the standard compilation of
federal jury instructions by Judge Devitt and Professor Blackmar illustrates the uncertainty about the
need for concealment. Section 90.41 of this compilation includes jury instructions on fraudulent con-
cealment in antitrust cases, and states that a plaintiff may invoke the doctrine "by showing by prepon-
derance of the evidence ... that the defendants took affirmative steps to conceal the existence of the
conspiracy... [and that plaintiff] could not have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence." 3 E.
D VT-r & C. BLACKMER, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 90.41, at 195 (1977). In their
1982 Supplement, however, the authors include Special Instruction 2.5 of the Fifth Circuit, which seem-
ingly applies to all cases. Id § 90.40, at 827 (Supp. 1982). The Fifth Circuit's instruction makes no
mention of concealment and states that the limitations period "began to run when the Plaintiff first
knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known" of his claim. Id Thus, it appears that
the Fifth Circuit requires only diligence. These seemingly inconsistent instructions illustrate the ambig-
uous situation that exists with respect to the concealment "requirement."
277. United Kans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 153 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980).
278. Id at 154.
279. There are few securities fraud cases involving public declarations about the defendants' conduct
that were alleged to have provided notice to plaintiffs of possible claims. In Robertson v. Seidman &
Seidman, 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979), defendant accountants wrote to their client to withdraw their
earlier reports, stating that the reports "should no longer be relied upon by you or anyone to whom they
have been furnished by you." Id at 589-90. The Second Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the
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most cases the abandonment of the concealment prong substantially under-
mines the interest in limiting the period during which a defendant may be
sued, which runs from the date of injury.
Thus, from a defendant's perspective, requiring proof of concealment serves
an important function in ensuring that the period of limitations will apply.
This concern is consistent with the origins of the tolling doctrine itself. Bailey
v. Glover justified the tolling exception to the statute of limitations on the
ground that it is inequitable to allow a defendant who has concealed his
wrongdoing to profit from his concealment,280 a judgment the Court has since
reiterated.281 Proof of some wrongful conduct by the defendant beyond the
commission of the substantive wrong was implicit in the Court's willingness to
hold that the benefits of tolling outweighed the policies underlying limitations.
Standing alone, the fact that the defendant has been accused of committing a
wrong, however heinous, should not suffice to toll the statute of limitations.
Limitations periods recognize that determinations of guilt cannot be made reli-
ably after a certain amount of time has passed, and that courts cannot fairly be
asked to resolve ancient disputes. Thus, they must protect the guilty as well as
the innocent. Before tolling limitations periods, courts should insist on a show-
ing of some wrongful behavior by the defendant that caused delay in filing suit
and therefore outweighs the policies underlying statutes of limitations.282 Re-
quiring proof of concealment performs this function.
Although the Supreme Court's stated view has remained firmly in support of
the social policies furthered by statutes of limitations, it is not clear that lower
courts share this enthusiasm. Some courts may be reluctant to bar the claim of
a diligent plaintiff unable to prove concealment because, as at least one com-
mentator has concluded,283 the statute of limitations unjustly forecloses valid
claims. Indeed, one court has suggested that the policies underlying statutes of
defendants, holding that this letter was insufficient to constitute notice to the plaintiff investor in the
client company. Id at 592. The court noted that "there is nothing in the letter itself which would lead
one to the conclusion the accounting firm was withdrawing its report because of fraudulent statements
and omissions."Jd Thus, it appears that a defendant's statement may have to be explicitly inculpatory
to start the statute running. This inference is confirmed by Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.
1977), in which the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims on statute of limitations
grounds. It held that the plaintiff should have been put on notice by a public admission in an SEC
release of willful violations of the securities laws more than three years before the suit was filed. See id
at 781-82.
280. 88 U.S. at 349. The Court stated that "[t]o hold that by concealing a fraud.., until such time
as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law
which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure." Id Profes-
sor Dawson viewed this reasoning as a "play on words, supported by the precepts of homely morality."
Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 32, at 600-01.
281. In Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959), the Court applied equitable estop-
pel against a defendant that misled the plaintiff about the statute of limitations under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). 359 U.S. at 232. The Court reasoned that "[t]o
decide the case we need look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own
wrong." Id
282. For a discussion of the problem of defining such wrongful behavior, see infra note 287.
283. One commentator has noted:
While there is an element of fairness in the notion that defendants should not be burdened
forever by potential liability, this concern for psychological well-being weakens when com-
pared to the basic principle of justice that a remedy exists for every legal wrong diligently
pursued.
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limitations are irrelevant to the decision to toll.284 This approach seems to at-
tack those policies directly.
The apparent reluctance of some lower courts to apply statutes of limitations
strictly is perhaps understandable. Admittedly, there are flaws in limitations
policies. A limitations period is necessarily arbitrary285 and does not serve the
underlying policies with absolute consistency. 286 Although disinterring the
concealment requirement may improve the extent to which the limitations doc-
trine as a whole serves its underlying policies, it may resurrect other problems.
For example, it is exceedingly difficult to define the quantum of proof needed
to show concealment in addition to the proof needed to prove the substantive
wrong.287 Moreover, revitalizing the concealment prong will raise once again
the ancient question whether fraud should be treated differently from other
claims and, if so, how it should be defined for tolling purposes.
Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: Caifornia's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 106, 119 (1980).
Despite the concern for fairness to plaintiffs and the "basic principle of justice" cited above, the
statute of limitations is not identical to the doctrine of laches, which confines the inquiry to any unwar-
ranted delay by a plaintiff. The press of the litigation boom in recent years has demonstrated that it
simply is not true that a remedy exists for every wrong. Limitations serve to winnow out stale claims so
that other persons with timely claims may obtain a hearing.
284. In Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court stated:
We are conscious of the strong policies in favor of statutes of limitations, of the interest of
defendants in being free of claims after a reasonable period of time in which no action is
brought, and of the practical difficulties inherent in any judicial attempt to reconstruct the
truth, especially the facts of a situation that existed 26 years ago. Our discomfit is not a valid
reason, however, for rearranging the statutory limits on Richards' cause of action by refusing
to employ the doctrine of tolling in a case where it clearly applies.
Id at 72. The above reasoning was not necessary to the decision in Richards because the plaintiff
alleged concealment, claiming that the defendants lied to him about their belief in charges made
against him and concealed their role in a plot to force him to resign his federal job. Id at 69. The
broad declaration that the policies of limitations are irrelevant because the tolling doctrine "clearly
applies" turns the matter on its head, however. The determination whether tolling applies should itself
be made with reference to the policies upon which it is based.
285. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463 (1975).
286. As Professor Dawson has noted, despite the underlying concern with stale evidence, statutes of
limitations arguably do not serve this goal because they are not tailored to the type of evidence in-
volved. See Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 32, at 596. Admittedly there are inconsistencies.
For example, different claims arising from a given transaction and involving the same evidence may
have different limitations periods. Similarly, allowing a claim that is barred by limitations to be as-
serted as an offset permits reliance on stale evidence. Moreover, the statute of limitations looks to the
delay between the events and the filing of suit, not the period of time between the events and trial.
Accordingly, the staleness of the evidence when it is ultimately used seems to be less than a compelling
concern.
Nevertheless, there is at least some indication in the statutes that the legislatures were aware of
variations in types of evidence. For example, statutes often provide that the limitations period in an
action for breach of a written contract is longer than the period for an oral contract. Compare CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982) (four years for breach of written contract) with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 339 (West 1982) (two years for breach of oral contract). Surely the courts should be at least as sensi-
tive as legislatures to the problems of stale evidence. No experienced lawyer would deny that the
passage of time irretrievably eliminates vital evidence. The plaintiff, who has the burden of proof, may
well be disadvantaged by such problems. But the unfairness to a defendant who is unable to defend
due to the passage of time is more significant when the defendant was not responsible for the delay.
287. The difficulties of defining the necessary quantum of proof should not be underestimated. Like
the notice concept central to the diligence analysis, the definition of concealment must remain general.
Fifty years ago, Professor Dawson observed that "the types of concealment that courts have held suffi-
cient have taken as many forms as human obliquity." Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 32
at 883. The standard must be general to permit proof of innovative concealment devices. Dawson
himself characterized the approach of the courts as looking for "some affirmative misconduct by the
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Nonetheless, such sniping does not undermine the social judgment in favor
of closing the books on past conduct after a certain period of time has passed
or satisfy the doubts about the ability of courts accurately to reconstruct an-
cient history. Particularly in light of the inherent difficulty of refining the no-
tice concept in the diligence analysis, 288 retaining concealment as an
independent requirement seems justified. Otherwise the rule that limitations
periods run from the date of injury will be entirely swallowed by the supposed
exception that it runs from date of the discovery when the wrong has been
concealed.
B. DUE DILIGENCE
Bailey v. Glover clearly stated that tolling is available "when there has been
no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming into the knowledge
of the fraud. ' 289 The due diligence rule evolved from this principle and makes
tolling available only to a plaintiff who acts reasonably to protect his own in-
terests.290 This requirement flows naturally from the underlying purpose of the
opposite party, preventing discovery and excusing delay," id at 880, and it may be difficult to be more
particular.
One commentator has argued that the solution in antitrust cases would be to focus on intent instead
of actions. Comment, Intent to Conceal- Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations Under the Fraudulent
Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEO. L.J. 791, 803-06 (1976). This comment urges that such an approach
would free a court to look beyond a defendant's specific acts to "the totality of circumstances surround-
ing the cause of action." Id at 804 n.85. Such flexibility, however, should be available under a more
conventional concealment analysis; it seems to resemble equitable estoppel analysis. See suora text
accompanying notes 223-27. Moreover, refocusing on "purpose" and "bad faith" would be likely, as
the commentator acknowledges, to "introduce new difficulties into the application of the fraudulent
concealment doctrine." Id at 806. Although this analysis indicates the need for flexibility, then, it does
not seem that labeling the inquiry as a search for intent to conceal will markedly assist the courts in
identifying concealment.
The key ingredient is that the concealment inquiry looks to something attributable to the defendant
that tended to conceal the wrong. Although the test should be flexible, it should not be simply the
converse of the diligence test, ite., a wrong that was not discovered with due diligence. The wrongful
act of the defendant should have an impact on the plaintiffs ability to sue on time. Absent a duty to
disclose, therefore, the "mere silence" cases should be decided solely on grounds of absence of
concealment.
288. See infra notes 342-460 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties of applying objective
standard to determine whether plaintiff had actual notice).
289. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874).
290. In securities cases the phrase "due diligence" is commonly used outside the limitations context,
but the principle is not precisely analogous to the principle of due diligence in the tolling doctrine.
Under the Securities Act of 1933, due diligence is a statutory defense available to anyone except the
issuer in actions for misstatements in registration statements or prospectuses. Securities Act of 1933,
§ 1 l(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). This statutory defense imposes an obligation on defendants to
perform a "reasonable investigation" and to have reasonable grounds to believe that the statements
made are true. Id It thus serves a function quite different from the diligence prong of the fraudulent
concealment test because even in the absence of indications of wrongdoing it affirmatively imposes a
duty on the defendant to investigate before registration statements are filed.
Similarly unhelpful is the due diligence defense recently developed in litigation under rule lOb-5.
This is a defense on the merits asserting that plaintiff failed to use due diligence in making his invest-
ment decisions. It applies whether or not the suit is promptly filed. See generally Wheeler, Plaintifj's
Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561
(1975) (rule lob-5 requires plaintiff to use due care when investing). Unlike the tolling doctrine, see
infra text accompanying notes 321-41, this defense is admittedly subjective, looking only to the actions
of a reasonable person with the same degree of market sophistication as the plaintiff. See, e.g., Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.) (standard by which plaintiff's conduct is measured is investor
with attributes of plaintiff, rather than average investor), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971);
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fraudulent concealment doctrine, which is to avoid unfair application of the
statute of limitations. A plaintiff who has not acted reasonably to protect his
own interests may not cry foul when his belated claim is barred.
In some cases it is easy to conclude that the plaintiff has not acted reason-
ably, as illustrated by Campbell v. Upjohn Co. 291 In that case the plaintiffs
claim arose out of a 1969 merger agreement pursuant to which Upjohn ac-
quired a small concern in which the plaintiff had been an officer and stock-
holder.292 The plaintiff claimed that the parties had agreed during the four
months of negotiations leading up to the closing that he would be employed by
the successor firm. 293 At the closing, however, Upjohn demanded and obtained
his resignation.294 Stunned by this development, plaintiff executed the merger
agreement and received Upjohn stock in exchange for his stock in the acquired
company.295 In 1975 he sued Upjohn, claiming that he had been misled about
his continued employment and other terms of the agreement. 296 Although he
had hired a lawyer in 1971 to represent him in his dealings with Upjohn,
2 97
plaintiff claimed that his suit was not time-barred because Upjohn had con-
cealed the actual provisions of the agreement and he had not read it until mid-
1975, nearly six years after he signed it.298 Not surprisingly, the court granted
summary judgment to defendants on the ground that the claim was time-
barred under a two-year statute of limitations.
299
Most cases are not so clear. Because courts decide them on a case-by-case
basis, it is difficult to identify consistent principles governing the due diligence
requirement. Nevertheless, in defining due diligence, several basic rules
emerge. First, the fact that concealment is proved does not release the plaintiff
from proving his diligence. In addition, although some courts have used a
subjective standard to define due diligence, an objective standard is appropri-
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 737 (8th Cir. 1967) (same), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). In Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must prove scienter
on the part of the defendant under § 10b and rule lOb-5 of securities law. In the wake of Ernst & Ernst,
some courts have reduced even the subjective standard for a plaintiffs conduct from negligence to
recklessness. See DuPuy v. DuPuy, 551 F.2d at 1020 (Ernst & Ernst changes plaintiff's standard be-
cause plaintiff's duty cannot be stricter than defendant's); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th
Cir. 1976) (after Ernst & Ernst, action lies unless plaintiff grossly at fault), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977).
Other courts disagree about the current status of the due diligence defense in rule 10(b)(5) cases.
Cempare Hirsch v. DuPont, 553 F.2d 750, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (because investor sophisti-
cated, should have discovered information by due diligence) with Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.) (due diligence no longer available as defense to intentional fraud
claim), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Whatever the present state of the law with regard to this
defense, it provides little illumination for the diligence standard to be applied in fraudulent conceal-
ment cases. One commentator, however, has suggested that Ernst & Ernst does not require courts to
adopt a special diligence standard of tolling in cases under rule lOb-5. Note, Piaint4f's Duty of Care
After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 158, 173-79 (1978) (not problematic to use negli-
gence standard for tolling when standard for substantive lob-5 claim is recklessness).
291. 498 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aft'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
292. Id at 724.
293. Id at 725.
294. Id
295. Id
296. Id at 724-25.
297. Id at 731.
298. Id at 726.
299. Id at 731-32.
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ate, at least when applied to plaintiffs who claim to be less sophisticated than
the ordinary person. Beyond that, however, only generalizations can charac-
terize the due diligence requirement.
1. The Duty to Investigate-Is the Plaintiff's Diligence Ever Irrelevent?
Courts generally recognize that a plaintiff has a duty to investigate if there
are indications of wrongdoing. Plaintiff's investigative efforts and the circum-
stances surrounding the discovery of the wrong must therefore be pleaded in
the complaint with particularity to claim fraudulent concealment. 300 When a
plaintiff should have known about the claim, his actual ignorance of the claim
is not excused. Although this principle obviously follows from the precepts of
the tolling doctrine, several courts have abandoned it when the defendant ac-
tively concealed his wrongdoing. It is difficult to identify the origins of this
strain of thought. It may derive in part from Bailey v. Glover, in which the
Supreme Court stated that in cases of fraud or inherently concealed wrongs,
tolling should apply even in the absence of active concealment.30 The courts
that have disregarded the plaintiffs conduct may have believed that proof of
actual concealment should give the plaintiff in such a case some additional
dispensation, and consequently decided he should not have to prove diligence.
The leading case for excusing proof of diligence is Tomera v. Galt,30 2 a rule
lOb-5 action alleging that the defendants had misrepresented various features
of a Mexican mining venture in which the plaintiff had invested.303 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that plaintiff's adequately alleged actual concealment.30 4
When other investors attempted to investigate, the defendants refused to pro-
vide information. 305 In addition, the defendants failed to keep records of vari-
ous questionable activities, thereby insulating themselves from scrutiny by
investors. 306 Because plaintiff had alleged that the defendants took positive
steps to conceal their fraud, the court concluded that due diligence was irrele-
vant.30 7 In support of this proposition, the court cited a 1901 Pennsylvania case
holding that in cases of fraud there is no tolling absent concealment, but that
300. See infra notes 467-69 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that plaintiff plead with
particularity elements of fraudulent concealment, including due diligence).
301. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874) (dictum).
302. 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1974).
303. Id at 506-07.
304. Id at 509-10.
305. Id at 507.
306. Id at 510.
307. Id The court noted:
At least two types of fraudulent behavior toll a statutory period. In the first type, the most
common, the fraud goes undiscoverd even though the defendant after commision of the wrong
does nothing to conceal it and the plaintiff has diligently inquired into its circumstances. In
the second type, the fraud goes undiscovered because the defendant has taken positive steps
after commission of the fraud to keep it concealed. This type of fraudulent concealment tolls
the limitations period until actual discovery by the plaintiff.
The court therefore labeled plaintiffs failure to inquire "unimportant" because "defendant's conduct is
reason enough to toll the limitations period." Id This approach appears inconsistent with earlier Sev-
enth Circuit authority. In Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969), the court apparently had
insisted upon diligence, stating, "The statute is tolled only for those who remained ignorant through no
fault of their own. Unawareness of facts or law, alone, does not justify suspending the operation of the
statute." Id at 997.
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the limitations period is tolled until actual discovery if there is concealment.308
Obviously the Pennsylvania case did not state the law as articulated in Bailey v.
Glover, which dispensed with proof of concealment in fraud cases.309 Al-
though it could have been argued that the court in Tomera excused the plain-
tifis lack of diligence on the ground that diligence would not have uncovered
the fraud anyway,310 the rule that diligence is irrelevant when there is actual
concealment has since been squarely adopted by the Seventh Circuit311 as well
as by the Second Circuit.
312
Tomera's rule has been rejected, however, both implicitly313 and explic-
308. The Pennsylvania case was Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173, 47 A. 985 (1901), which stated:
The cases which hold that, where fraud is concealed, or, as sometimes added, conceals itself,
the statute runs only from discovery, practically repeals the statute pro tanto. Fraud is always
concealed. If it was not no fraud would ever succeed. But, when it is accomplished and ended,
the rights of the parties are fixed. The right of action is complete. If the plaintiff bestirs
himself to inquire, he has ample time to investigate and bring his action. If both parties rest
on their oars, the statute runs its regular course. But, if the wrongdoer adds to his original act
affirmative efforts to divert or mislead or prevent discovery, then he gives to his original act a
continuing character, by virtue of which he deprives it of the protection of the statute until
discovery.
Id at 179; 47 A. at 987, quotedin Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d at 510. This reasoning is inconsistent with
Bailey v. Glover in that it disregards diligence under all circumstances and denies the benefits of tolling
to the victim of fraud who is not also the victim of concealment.
309. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874).
310. The fact that the other investors who did inquire failed to discover the defendants' fraud argua-
bly demonstrates that due diligence would not have uncovered the fraud. It is unclear whether the
others who inquired were doing so on behalf of the plaintiff in Tomera or whether they even reported
their findings to her. It is noteworthy that they sued in state court for mismanagement some three years
before the plaintiff fied her suit. 511 F.2d at 507. The other plaintiffs did not file their federal securi-
ties action until three months before Tomera sued, however. Id The court, therefore, could have con-
cluded that greater diligence by Tomera was excused because it would have been futile.
311. In Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1975), the Seventh Circuit reiterated this view:
Should active concealment be found, then the statute is tolled until actual discovery. . . . If
no active concealment is present, then the issue becomes whether knowledge of the alleged
fraud could reasonably have been acquired with the exercise of due care.
Id at 711; see also Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Tomera). In Board of
Educ. v. Admiral Heating and Ventilation, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 300 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the district court took
Tomera v. Galt a step further by applying it in a nonfraud case. The court held that in an antitrust suit
tolling lasts until actual discovery if there is concealment. Id at 302. This result was not, of course,
mandated by the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, which is limited to fraud actions. Moreover, it turns the
concealment prong of the doctrine on its head because it deprives the defendant of protection rather
than providing added protection. Under the approach inAdmiralHeating, concealment dispenses with
proof of due diligence altogether, a far cry from serving as an independent element of the tolling
showing.
312. In Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit an-
nounced that it agreed with the language from Sperry v. Barggren, quoted supra in note 311. Id at 593;
see also Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1978) (Merrill,
J., dissenting) (if defendant's misrepresentations that concealed wrongdoing were credible, plaintiff re-
lieved of further burden to investigate defendant's conduct).
313. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1170 n.27 (5th Cir. 1979) (if defendants
proved that plaintiffs knew or should have known of their cause of action, affirmative acts of conceal-
ment by defendants would have been irrelevant to tolling question), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980);
Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698 n.28 (9th Cir. 1977) (due diligence re-
quired despite active concealment), rev'don other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978); Bruno v. United States,
547 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 461 (2d Cir.
1974) (same); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 727-28 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (same); Clark v.
United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F.
Supp. 934, 945 (D.NJ. 1978) (same); cf. NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 383 (9th
Cir. 1979) (requiring due diligence after concealment ends).
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itly,
3 14 by a number of courts. As a matter of precedent and policy, these
courts are correct. The precedent begins with Bailey v. Glover, which stressed
the plaintiff's lack of negligence and directed that a diligence standard be ap-
plied.315 Five years later, in Wood v. Carpenter, the plaintiff alleged manifold
acts of concealment, 316 but the court held that his pleading was inadequate
because "[a] party seeking to avoid the bar of the statute on account of fraud
must aver and show that he used due diligence to detect it .... ,,317 The plain-
tiff in Wood v. Carpenter lost precisely because he was not diligent. In short,
the early Supreme Court cases required proof of diligence despite allegations
of concealment.
As a matter of policy, the requirement of due diligence is necessary to pro-
tect defendants' legitimate interests. Statutes of limitations serve to "stimulate
• . . activity and punish negligence. '318 Tolling the statute may require courts
to decide cases on the basis of unreliable evidence and postpone adjudication
of more timely claims, which is hardly justified when the delay resulted from
the plaintiffs inattention to his own affairs. 319 Tolling claims until "actual dis-
covery" also could introduce confusion about what that term means. As of the
date the plaintiff filed suit, he obviously had enough information to satisfy
himself that he had a claim. Even though "discovery" must have occurred
earlier, there is no easy way to define it. This area already has a sufficient
supply of ill-defined concepts, and there is no need to inject yet another.
2. The Objective Standard
Evaluating due diligence is generally said to be an objective inquiry because
it rests on a determination of when a hypothetical reasonable person would
have learned of the claim. The principal impact of the objective approach is
on plaintiffs who seek to be excused from acting reasonably. For example, the
plaintiff in Campbell v. Upjohn Co. asserted that he was so traumatized when
defendant forced him to resign that he was unable to investigate his rights
diligently.320 The court had little difficulty rejecting his argument:
Campbell's physical and mental difficulties may well have been
caused by the shock of the closing events, and may even have post-
poned the time when he should have learned of the alleged scheme,
314. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting concept that due
diligence not required when active concealment); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651
F.2d 687, 694-95 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392 (1981). For a recent criticism of the
Seventh Circuit's approach, see Note, The Seventh Circuit's Reformulation of the Equitable Tolling Doc-
trine, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 565 (1982).
315. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874).
316. 101 U.S. 135, 136 (1879).
317. Id at 141.
318. Id at 139.
319. Different issues are presented if a defendant has actively concealed his misdeeds so that investi-
gation would have been futile. Under such circumstances courts may toll the statute even though the
plaintiff did not exercise diligence, but only so long as no amount of diligence could have uncovered the
wrong. Arguably, this could have been the basis of the court's holding in Tomera v. Gait. See supra
note 310 and accompanying text (discussing possible alternative holding of case). See also Long v.
Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 118 n.7 (D. Conn. 1968); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DuKE LJ. 1125, 1143 (1972) (defendant's concealment excuses plain-
titis lack of diligence).
320. 498 F. Supp. 722, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aft'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
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but they cannot operate to require a lower level of diligence than that
expected of a reasonable person.
321
Similarly, in a suit alleging that singer Bessie Smith had been victimized in
connection with recording contracts, the court categorically rejected the claim
that her alleged lack of business sophistication tolled the statute of limitations
for forty years.
322
Such refusals to consider individual circumstances may invite injustice in
certain cases. Wrongdoers who prey on the gullible and ignorant may reap
unjust rewards if plaintiffs fail to discover the wrongdoing as a result of their
ignorance. Courts have sometimes evinced sympathy in such cases.323 Never-
theless, relaxing the standard of ordinary care would be il-advised in the ab-
sence of evidence that a defendant schemed to capitalize on a plaintiff's
incapacity.324 To the extent that delays result from such factors as incompe-
tence, infancy, or other incapacity, these issues should more properly be dealt
with in connection with tolling principles tailored to those problems. Al-
though many states do provide for tolling on such grounds, 325 federal courts
321. Id
322. See Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus &
Co., 620 F.2d 1340, 1343 (8th Cir. 1980) (although plaintiffs were elderly widow in nursing home and
her daughter, who were inexperienced in financial affairs, court refused to toll in securities case because
there was no concealment since plaintiffs received accurate monthly account statements from defend-
ant); Militsky v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 540 F. Supp. 783, 787-88 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(although statute of limitations falls harshly on naive, unsophisticated plaintiff, statute not tolled).
323. In Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff
sued for "churning" of her securities account. Id at 169-70. The court of appeals reversed a summary
judgment for the defendant, noting that the foreign-born plaintiff lacked business experience and edu-
cation and that churning "is conduct which is not common to the experience of the ordinary individ-
ual." Id at 170, 172. This suggests that the plaintiffs delay was not in any event unreasonable when
measured against the objective standard. Thus, it does not appear that the court was attempting to
retreat from the requirement of ordinary care.
Perhaps a more appropriate situation for such concern about a plaintiffs possible lack of sophistica-
tion was Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 1974), a case involving claims arising
from the Tuskeegee Syphilis Study in the 1930's. After the court denied the government's motion for
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, id at 312, the parties settled for $10 million. J.
JONEs, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 217 (1981). The settlement fund was to be
paid out to those subjects of the study who could be located, or to their heirs. The court placed respon-
sibility for locating the claimants on the plaintiffs counsel, Messrs. Gray and Carter. Their experiences
in distributing the fund underscore the continuing risk that unsophisticated people are vulnerable:
Perhaps the most distressing thing that Gray and Carter encountered was the lack of social
and economic mobility among the heirs [of the subjects of the study]. "There were more
people who had to execute documents by making marks than I'll ever see for the rest of my
life," Carter recalled. "It didn't matter whether they had gone to Cleveland or stayed right
here, so many of them were illiterate and uneducated." Many of the heirs did not even know
their family members' last names, referring to them only by nicknames such as 'Kid" and
"Coon." Carter added: "The sad thing is that it could happen all over again. These people
could just as easily be conned and taken advantage of as their fathers and grandfathers in the
syphilis study."
Id at 218-19.
324. In proper cases, it seems that courts could fashion a doctrine of fiduciary relationship to satisfy
the equitable need to toll the statute of limitations, or simply hold on equitable grounds that the statute
should be tolled. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 338-39 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) (courts may toll statutes on equitable grounds). They would not, therefore, have to
manipulate the fraudulent concealment doctrine to accomplish this end.
325. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352 (West 1982) (infancy, insanity, and imprisonment may
be grounds for tolling); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-201(a) (1974) (infancy and mental
incompetence may be grounds for tolling).
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have held that there are no parallel federal doctrines of tolling.326 If the federal
courts are not willing to allow tolling overtly on these grounds, it is hardly
appropriate to modify the fraudulent concealment doctrine to achieve the
same result indirectly. This would only invite a battery of creative excuses
from plaintiffs like Mr. Campbell who do not fall into any traditional category
of incapacity.
Different issues arise when the plaintiff is more sophisticated and know-
ledgeable than the ordinary person. Although it could be argued that the same
standard should still apply,327 such a rigid approach seems unjustified.
Clearly, a plaintiff who actually learns fortuitously of the wrong may not ex-
cuse his failure to sue promptly on the ground that a reasonable person using
due diligence would not have discovered it.328 Hence, there is a subjective
component of the test which looks to what the plaintiff actually knew as well as
to what he could discover by due diligence. Surely the plaintiffs actual knowl-
edge about complicated matters or obscure fields is relevant to this inquiry.
Most courts have so recognized. For example, in a securities case growing out
of a bank reorganization, the court implied that the plaintiff's expertise should
have alerted him to the alleged fraud even though the ordinary person would
not have recognized it.329 The plaintiff had been involved in a similar bank
reorganization and related litigation shortly before the reorganization giving
rise to the suit.330 He testified, moreover, that "he recognized the similarities or
identity of the procedures [in the two reorganizations] and realized that any
information or knowledge obtained about the legality of [the first reorganiza-
tion] would be applicable to [the second reorganization]."331 Such specialized
insight may be rare, but courts often have referred to the sophistication of the
plaintiff,332 the amount in controversy, 333 and the plaintiffs personal knowl-
326. See, e.g., Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976) (no tolling for insanity
under Federal Tort Claims Act); Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970) (no
tolling for insanity under any federal statute); Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672, 673 (9th Cir. 1968)
(no tolling for infancy under Federal Torts Claims Act); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 740
(9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965); O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (D. Md.
1979) (no tolling for mental incompetence under Securities Act of 1933); Hall v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (no tolling for infancy under Clayton Act);
Williams v. United States 133 F. Supp. 317, 318-19 (E.D. Va. 1954) (no tolling for insanity under
Admiralty Act); Shunney v. Fuller Co., 111 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1953) (no tolling for infancy
under Federal Labor Standards Act); Sgambati v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 18, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (no
tolling for infancy under Admiralty Act), aft'd, 172 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949).
327. In Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 116-17 (D. Conn. 1978), the court refused
to apply a higher standard of diligence despite a claim that the plaintiff was sophisticated. The court
found, however, that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the reasonable person standard:
In deciding if the plaintiff has met his burden of proving diligence, it appears that his conduct
should be evaluated with reference to the objective standard of a hypothetical reasonable
man, rather than the subjective standard of a reasonable man with plaintiffs characteristics.
Moreover, even if a subjective approach to reasonableness were employed, plaintiff would be
held to a higher standard than a hypothetical average investor because of his background and
expenence.
Id at 116-17.
328. In Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court described the plaintiffs discovery
of his claim as "entirely fortuitous," but there is no question that the statute began running from that
date. Id at 72-73. See also Herandez-Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 1979)
(plaintiff asserted he learned of claim by "a stroke of luck").
329. Alabama Bancorp. v. Henley, 465 F. Supp. 648, 653 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
330. Id
331. Id
332. See, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1977) (referring to investors of plaintiff's
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edge of law334 as bearing on the reasonableness of his delay. One court has
even affirmed the dismissal of a securities claim on statute of limitations
grounds because "[i]t is clear from the complaint. . . that plaintiffs were pro-
fessional market traders who surely had ready access to legal advice. .... . 335
Applying an individualized standard of diligence to sophisticated plaintiffs
may cause problems, however, in the massive litigation that is suited for class
action treatment. Tolling is often of great importance in such litigation. In-
deed, the fraudulent concealment doctrine first received major attention in the
early 1960's in hundreds of electrical equipment antitrust cases. 336 Since then,
it has been invoked in numerous class actions.337 Applying a higher diligence
standard for sophisticated plaintiffs may impede class action certification for
two reasons. First, if the would-be class representative is sophisticated, it
could be argued that he cannot represent the class because his claim is not
typical.338 Second, it may be argued that the diligence of each class member
must be determined and, therefore, the class may not be certified because com-
mon questions of fact would not predominate. Thus, the tolling doctrine could
operate as a tool for defendants seeking to defeat class certification.
In an effort to avoid such problems, courts may be tempted to hold that in
class actions the sophistication of the class representative is irrelevant to due
diligence. At least one district judge has apparently done so.339 There are sub-
experience); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979)
(referring to plaintiff's legal sophistication), affid, 651 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392
(1981); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1010
(D.D.C. 1978) (referring to plaintiff's experience and access to highly specialized personnel and consul-
tants, court imposed obligation of reasonable diligence commensurate with sophistication and standing
in financial community), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
954 (1981); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (referring to plaintiff's experi-
ence and sophistication).
333. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979), aft'd,
651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392 (1981).
334. See Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978) (referring
toplaintifi's having litigated same issues in previous suit).
335. Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1975).
336. See Comment, Clayton Act Statute of Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, 72
YALE L.J. 600, 600-01 (1963).
337. See, e.g., Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc. 627 F.2d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 1980) (land
sales); Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1979) (securities); Berry Petro-
leum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402,593 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100
(4th Cir. 1975) (same); Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1974) (antitrust);
Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 460-62 (2d Cir. 1974) (antitrust); Baker v. F & F Investment,
420 F.2d 1191, 1197-1200 (7th Cir.) (civil rights), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 871 (1970); Esplin v. Hirshi, 402
F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968) (securities and banking), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Roberts v.
Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 944-48 (D.N.J. 1979) (securities), rev'd on other grounds, 611
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); Husted v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 298, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (land sales);
Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (land sales).
338. In securities actions, two courts have held that the sophistication of the named plaintiff may bar
his acting as a representative of the class. See Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 574 F.2d 1220,
1221 (5th Cir. 1978) (refusing to certify named plaintiff as class representative in securities class action
because he would be susceptible to "sophisticated investor" defense), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1978);
Lewis v. Johnson, 92 F.R.D. 758, 760 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
339. In In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Securities Litig., 484 F. Supp. 253, 256-57
(W.D. Tex. 1979), the defendants challenged the certification of the plaintiff class on the ground that
the named plaintiff was a sophisticated investor who therefore would not be an appropriate representa-
tive of a class of ordinary investors. Id Judge Higginbotham rejected this argument, reasoning as
follows:
The standard to be applied to Stem as well as to the class is objective-whether the facts
available would have put a reasonably prudent investor on "inquiry notice" of the possibility
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stantial difficulties, however, with this approach. Plaintiffs in class actions, like
other plaintiffs, must act diligently to protect their rights or risk losing them
because of limitations. Serious problems could arise if courts were to deny a
defendant the right to prove that individual class members or the class repre-
sentative had actual knowledge of the defendant's misconduct and that, there-
fore, the statute should not be tolled as to them.340 Moreover, it may well be
that different class members had different data available to them, so that the
stimulus to inquire might vary widely throughout the class. Finally, the dili-
gence standard does not function well in a vacuum. In determining diligence,
a jury will inevitably evaluate the actions and expertise of the class representa-
tive as the personification of the plaintiff class. The sophistication of the class
representative is therefore quite important, and the above problems must be
considered in the decision whether to certify the class.
Despite these problems, a hypothetical reasonable person standard appears
preferable in class actions. The interests of both the courts and society in the
efficient resolution of class actions warrants some flexibility in the application
of tolling doctrines. The very massiveness of such cases makes individualized
insight less likely to be important because the wrong often is committed
against the public as a whole and the concealment, if any, presumably is also
practiced against the public as a whole. Not surprisingly, courts have cited the
existence of fraudulent concealment issues as a ground supporting certification
of a class.341 As with other class action certification issues, balancing in given
cases is best left to trial judges, but the subjective tinge of the tolling doctrine
rarely should present an insurmountable barrier.
3. Applying the Objective Standard
The objective standard of diligence is easy to articulate: the plaintiff is held
to be on notice of the claim if a reasonable person would have been. The
that the registration statement contained misstatements and omissions, thus triggering the
duty to act with due diligence and make reasonable inquiries. The fact that Stem managed
his own portfolio and had some degree of expertise in so doing does not render a more strin-
gent standard appropriate.
Id at 257-58 (citations omitted). Presumably, Judge Higginbotham would hold that the tolling doc-
trine would not raise issues concerning each individual's sophistication, thus making class action treat-
ment inappropriate. See also Dektro v. Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406, 416 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(abundantly clear that due diligence is objective and applied class-wide; unnecessary to evaluate mental
state of each class member).
340. For a discussion of the impact of procedural rulings under rule 23 on- the substantive rights of
defendants, see generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail andLegalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions
and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 So. CAL. L. Rav. 842 (1974). See also Blackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891, 908 n.24 (9th Cir. 1975) (asserting that court could, in rule lOb-5 class action, predicate
liability solely on materiality rather than causation without exceeding its power under Rules Enabling
Act or violating defendant's rights). In Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir.
1974), the court upheld a summary judgment for the defendants because the named plaintiff could not
represent the class when his individual claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id at 556.
In Lee v. Shield Petroleum Corp., No. 82-334 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 213 (1982), the
Sixth Circuit upheld the trial court's decertification of a class after trial on the ground that it then
appeared that the class representative's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See 51 U.S.L.W.
3269 (U.S. Oct. 5 1982) for a description of the issues raised.
341. Seeln re Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 52, 58 (D. Mass. 1981) (means and success of fraud-
ulent concealment is common question for certification of class); In re Independent Gasoline Litig., 79
F.R.D. 552, 558-59 (D. Md. 1978) (same). Compare Daniels v. Amerco, 1983-1 Trade Cas. 65,274
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (individualized issues concerning concealment "overwhelm" common proof and bar
certification).
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problem is that applying the objective standard to given cases requires a sub-
jective evaluation of the facts. Some courts have tried to introduce order by
segmenting the problem into two steps, examining first the facts the plaintiff
knew or should have known, and then the inferences therefrom. 342 Because the
issue fundamentally turns on a gestalt evaluation of the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's behavior, however, such segmenting of the subjective analysis ulti-
mately provides little assistance in determining whether the plaintiff exercised
due diligence. Instead, the cases suggest a number of factors that should be
considered to determine due diligence.
As a starting point, it is clear that although the reasonable plaintiff has no
duty to inquire into the behavior of the defendant until something stimulates
inquiry, he cannot disregard "storm warnings" of wrongdoing.343 Such storm
warnings need not themselves be sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice of the
claim, but only to prompt inquiry that would in turn put him on notice.
344
Thus, the vexing problem for the court, beyond identifying the stimulus, is to
determine whether more information is needed to constitute notice. A starting
point is the actual stimulus for the suit before the court. Something obviously
caused the plaintiff to file suit when he did. A plaintiff who cannot point to
some recent development that explains his decision to sue will have a difficult
time arguing that until recently he lacked critical information to alert him to
the claim. The plaintiff rarely, if ever, is aware from the moment of injury of
every fact that will ultimately be offered in evidence at trial. Indeed, the broad
discovery and liberal pleading prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure assume that plaintiffs will file suit even though they lack evidentiary facts
to prove their cases. But how many facts are enough to put plaintiff on notice?
The stated rule is that the plaintiff is on notice as soon as he is aware of a
potential claim, although ignorant of evidence. 345 As the Second Circuit noted
in a securities case, "[T]he statutory period. . . did not await appellant's lei-
surely discovery of the details of the alleged scheme." 346 Similarly, in a copy-
right case, the Fifth Circuit refused to toll the statute of limitations in favor of
a plaintiff who claimed that he had been unable to verify his plagiarism claim
because the defendant had refused to give him a copy of the allegedly infring-
ing book.347 That court stated:
[T]he mere fact that plaintiff was unable to procure a copy of the
342. See, e.g., Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 730-32 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (analyzing in
separate steps what plaintiff knew and should have known, and reasonable inferences therefrom), aft'd,
676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 113-17 (D. Conn.
1978) (analyzing facts surrounding plaintiff's claim and inferring what should have been apparent to
plaintiff); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (analyzing whether circum-
stances sufficient to put plaintiff on notice, and whether suspicion arose or should have arisen).
343. The "storm warnings" phrase comes from Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 697 (Ist Cir. 1978).
344. The function of storm warnings is to require that the plaintiff take reasonable steps to investi-
gate his rights. If he does take such steps, the storm warnings may be held not to put him on notice of
his claim until he garners additional information. See infra notes 370-73 and accompanying text. Fur-
ther, when the defendant has in fact been guilty of concealment, that concealment may sanitize what
would otherwise be storm warnings and excuse plaintiffs delay in discovering his claim after receiving
the storm warnings. See infra notes 403-10 and accompanying text. Thus, the fact that plaintiff has
been stimulated to inquire does not always mean that he is on notice.
345. Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1970).
346. Id
347. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1971).
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book is insufficient to show the successful concealment necessary to
toll the statute of limitations. This was merely ignorance of evidence,
not ignorance of a potential claim. The appellant knew of the alleged
infringement but did not have in his possession the precise minutiae
of the plagiarism. The bells do not toll the limitations statute while
one ferrets out the facts.
348
Although the courts agree that the plaintiff is on notice even if he is unaware
of all relevant facts, they reach inconsistent results. In a recent case decided by
the District of Columbia Circuit, for example, the plaintiff was coerced into
quitting his federal job in 1955 when confronted with a false assertion that he
was a homosexual.349 Although he knew then that the charge was false, he did
not learn that his supervisors had manufactured false evidence until he made a
Freedom of Information Act request in 1978.350 When he brought suit in 1978,
the court held that he was not previously on notice of his claim against his
superiors: "It was no mere 'detail' in 1955 that the false charges against [plain-
tiff] had been fabricated as part of a deliberate conspiracy against him, or that
his own superiors rather than an unknown informant were the source of his
misery."3' 1 In another recent civil rights case, however, a federal district court
reached the opposite conclusion on seemingly indistinguishable facts. The
plaintiffs there were arrested in 1972 and prosecuted on the basis of fabricated
evidence concocted by federal and state law enforcement officers.352 When the
plaintiffs discovered the fabrication in 1978, they brought suit against the re-
sponsible officers.353 The district court refused to toll the statute, holding that
plaintiffs were aware of the "operative facts surrounding the situation in 1972"
ecause, although ignorant of the officers' roles, they knew they were
innocent.
354
It is easy to label proffered data "operative facts" or "mere details," but
these labels in fact provide little assistance in deciding whether particular
plaintiffs are actually on notice. The following review of the decisions dis-
cusses a number of discrete concerns that are relevant to the notice issue. Ulti-
mately, however, diligence determinations appear too individualized for
decisions to be absolutely consistent. Instead, as one court has put it, "The
concept of due diligence is not imprisoned within the frame of a rigid stan-
348. Id at 341.
349. Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Judge Mikva, who wrote for the majority
in Richards v. Mileski, generally is reluctant to infer notice. For example, in Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981),
when the court reversed summary judgment for defendants on limitations grounds, he wrote, "As a
matter of law, we believe that one article challenging the accounting procedures of a reputable firm is
insufficient to impute knowledge of fraud to appellants."
350. Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d at 68.
351. Id at 69.
352. Lewis v. Clark, 534 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Md. 1982).
353. Id
354. Id at 716. The court said that "[i]t is the awareness of the facts giving rise to the cause of
action, and not the awareness that the illegality of the action is conclusively provable that begins the
running of the statute of limitations."Id at 716-17. It also noted that once plaintiff had testified before
a grand jury investigating the conduct of the officers more than three years before the suit was filed. Id
at 717 n.3. For a similar result, see Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1982) (when
plaintiff learned of police conspiracy to extract false testimony against plaintiff, he should have been
led, by exercise of due diligence, to awareness of cause of action).
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dard: it is protean in application." 355 Attempts to reformulate such a protean
standard are unlikely to assist the courts in deciding cases.
356
a. Storm warnings
It is impossible to delimit the types of stimuli that could prompt a person to
investigate another person's conduct. The label "storm warnings" is as good as
any. Consistent with the objective approach, the courts make their own evalu-
ation of the significance of such developments. At a minimum, the inquiry
looks to plaintiffs awareness that he has been harmed. Thus, the victim of an
automobile accident is immediately aware that he has been injured and that he
should consider the possibility that he has a claim against somebody. 357 In
contrast, it may be more difficult for the victim of a securities, antitrust, or civil
rights violation to discern the fact of injury. But Americans tend to be extraor-
dinarily alert to protecting their own interests, and the courts may not reason-
ably disregard the high level of suspiciousness that pervades this society.
Accordingly, anything that might pique the prospective plaintiffs curiosity de-
serves consideration when a plaintiff seeks to justify his delay beyond the stat-
utory period. An overheard comment, a newspaper story, the defendant's
reluctance to give out information, any and all of these should trigger the duty
to inquire.
355. Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 9 (5th Cir. 1967).
356. Some theories that courts rely upon are not helpful A prime example is the supposed distinc-
tion between representations of law and representations of fact, an issue that has troubled commenta-
tors for years in the fraud area. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 724-25 (4th ed.
1971) (noting courts' present tendency to eliminate distinction between misrepresentations of law and
fact). This notion has cropped up from time to time and continues to be employed in the decision
about whether to toll. See Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 622-23 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
In Goldstandt v. Bear Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975), the court held that plaintiffs were
not warranted in relying on defendant's representations concerning the legality of the proposed con-
duct. Id at 1269. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant told them that certain trading practices were, in the
opinion of defendant's legal staff, consistent with prevailing statutes and regulations. Id at 1266. The
court held that because the alleged misrepresentation involved a legal opinion, and not facts, tolling
was unavailable. Id at 1269.
Although the result in Goldstandt may have been correct in view of the apparent expertise of plain-
tiffs, see id, broad reliance on the law/fact distinction is unwise. It is certainly true that a reasonable
plaintiff should normally inquire about the applicable law, but that expectation should not give rise to
an inflexible rule. Indeed, the Supreme Court refused to apply an absolute rule when confronted with
the related question of estopping the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations when he has
misled the plaintiff about the applicable period of limitations, which is clearly a legal matter. The
Court observed: "It is no answer to say, as respondent does, that the representations alleged were of
law and not of fact and therefore could not justifiably be relied on by petitioner. Whether they could ornot depends on who made them and the circumstances in which they were made." Glus v. Brooklyn E.
Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959). Similarly in the tolling area, the analysis must look to the
circumstances of each case.
357. This notion applies similarly in other negligence cases. For example, in Davis v. United States,
642 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1273 (1982), plaintiff sued under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, claiming that the government failed to properly test the polio vaccine that injured him. He
had sued the manufacturer of polio vaccine in 1964 and had known then that the government tested the
vaccine, but alleged in his suit against the government that he did not learn until 1973 that when the
government tested the vaccine it proved to be outside normal tolerances. Id at 329-30. The court
rejected his tolling argument
With knowledge of the fact of injury and its cause the malpractice plaintiff is on the same
footing as any negligence plaintiff. The burden is then on plaintiff to ascertain the existence
and source of fault within the statutory period.
Id at 331.
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The most likely stimulus for a plaintiffs suspicion is a development that
contradicts his expectations. Many federal claims depend upon the defend-
ant's having created false expectations in the plaintiff, particularly in cases in
which the defendant has asked the plaintiff to invest money. Often those ex-
pectations do not long survive the test of time because conflicting realities in-
trude. Plaintiffs who nevertheless wait years to take their disappointment to
court may expect a cool reception. Securities cases present the best examples
of plaintiffs disappointed by an unexpected turn of events. Indeed, some courts
have indicated that it is almost a general "rule" that when securities that are
represented as being certain to increase in value actually lose value, the pur-
chaser is on notice of the possibility of wrongdoing.358 Other similar reverses
in fortune lead to the same result.
359
The contradiction of expectations analysis is not limited to the investment
situation, however. Thus, in Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. ,360
the Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiff, who was alleging that defendant had
given illegal secret discounts to his competitors, had become suspicious be-
cause his competitor's prices were lower than could reasonably be expected in
the absence of illegal discounts.361 In another antitrust case, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant terminated his distributorship without notice pursu-
ant to a conspiracy, contrary to the defendant's assurances that the
distributorship would be continued.362 In granting summary judgment to the
defendant on statute of limitations grounds, the district court noted that "the
very manner in which the termination occurred could hardly have discouraged
358. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1979) (decline in value
of stock should have alerted plaintiff to possible fraud); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996-97 (7th Cir.
1974) (investor should have realized possibility of fraud when market price fell drastically below pre-
dicted level); f Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 349-50
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (although decline in value of stock is important factor, it alone is not sufficient to put
plaintiff on notice); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1975) (when
combined with other indicators, precipitous decline of stock's price defeats plaintiffs claim that he
could not have known about alleged fraud).
359. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978), the case in which the "storm warnings" label
originated, presents a good example of plaintiffs who were inattentive to such a change in fortune. In
reliance on certain optimistic predictions by the defendant, plaintiffs purchased notes issued by defend-
ant Avien, Inc. in 1968.Id at 691. As the court stated, "[Clollectively, plaintiffs had been led to believe
that Avien had a 'rosy' future." Id at 695. The court held that plaintiffs were "charged with inquiry"
by January 1, 1970, id at 698, reasoning as follows:
Avien's serious financial difficulties, in direct conflict with what plaintiffs complain they were
led to believe, were unquestionably apparent by the end of 1969. . . .The financial data
available to the purchasers provided them with sufficient storm warnings to alert a reasonable
person to the possibility that there were either misleading statements or significant omissions
involved in the sale of the notes.
Id at 697-98. For other examples of financial setbacks that courts have held to constitute sufficient
notice of defendant's fraud, see Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 620 F.2d 1340, 1342, 1343-45 (8th Cir.
1980) ("no risk" investments repeatedly resulted in losses); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677,
682 (9th Cir. 1980) (prediction of stock split and increased dividend incorrect); Roberts v. Magnetic
Metals, Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 946 (D.N.J. 1978) (suspiciously low price offered to minority sharehold-
ers), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422
F.2d 1124, 1131 (4th Cir. 1970) (failure of wells to produce as scheduled, coupled with production
company's evasive communications, constituted sufficient notice of fraud).
360. 576 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1978) (claim under Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a
(1976)).
361. 576 F.2d at 250 & n.2.
362. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 617 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
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investigation or caused plaintiff to slumber on his rights, but more likely would
have produced the opposite effect." 363 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that a
minority employee whose dismissal was justified to him on grounds of a "last
hired, first fired" policy, was put on notice of a potential claim when others
with less seniority were not laid off.364 In short, the plaintiff whose expecta-
tions are disappointed should pursue the matter.
b. Plaintiffs investigation
Beyond hypothesizing about what plaintiffs should have done, the courts
will scrutinize what they actually did. If a plaintiff does not inquire into the
defendant's conduct despite storm warnings, it is unlikely that a court will de-
cide that he was diligent. The Supreme Court emphasized this concern in
Wood v. Carpenter, stating that "[w]ith the strongest motives to action, the
plaintiff was supine. If the underlying frauds existed, as he alleges, he did
nothing to unearth them."365 The courts regularly stress the fact that the plain-
tiff has done practically nothing in holding that he has not acted diligently. 366
This analysis of plaintiffs own conduct involves a subjective assessment of
the notice issue because the plaintiffs own vigor may demonstrate whether he
was on notice of the claim. For example, in a well-known antitrust case, the
plaintiff sued in 1947 claiming that the defendants conspired to monopolize the
borax trade pursuant to a 1929 agreement.367 The defendants moved for a
summary judgment on limitations grounds, arguing that the plaintiff was on
notice of its claim as demonstrated in various affidavits and testimony pre-
pared by the plaintiff in earlier litigation between 1930 and 1934. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the ground that it was "beyond dispute
that at all times pertinent to this inquiry appellants knew and believed that
they were being grievously damaged by [defendants]. '368 Thus, the plaintiffs
own belief that he had a claim, rather than the court's opinion that circum-
stances objectively amounted to storm warnings, should suffice to start the stat-
ute running.
A similar inquiry is possible even when the plaintiff himself has not alleged
363. Id at 622-23.
364. See Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 623 F.2d 117, 119-21 (9th Cir. 1980).
365. 101 U.S. at 140.
366. See, e.g., Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 698 (1st Cir. 1978) (despite signs that defendant
corporation was experiencing financial difficulties, plaintif's only response was to meet once with cor-
poration's president); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1977) (although one plaintiff admit-
ted knowledge about defendant stockbroker's financial difficulties within limitations period, neither
plaintiff took action); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974) (although plaintiff knew some-
thing was amiss, he did nothing); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1969) (although securi-
ties transaction failed to fulfill plaintiffs expectations, plaintiff never inquired into transaction); Long v.
Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 114 (D. Conn. 1978) (despite knowledge of defendant's
default on mortgage payments, plaintiff did nothing other than discuss default with defendant).
367. Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 185 F.2d 196, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
368. Id at 209. See also Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.
1978) (plaintiff expressed his suspicion to Department of Justice that defendant was giving secret illegal
discount as early as ten years before suit); Fitzgerald v. Seamens, 553 F.2d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff's letter appealing termination of his job showed that he was on notice of conspiracy four years
before suit); Starview Outdoor Theatre, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 254 F. Supp. 855, 857
(N.D. I11. 1966) (plaintiff had sufficient notice of antitrust claim more than six years before suit, as
shown by notifying Department of Justice of alleged monopolization by defendant).
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wrongdoing by the defendant but others similarly situated have done so. Par-
ticularly in securities or antitrust cases, it is likely that many people will have
been harmed by the allegedly wrongful conduct. In such situations, courts
have often pointed out that the dilatory plaintiff was aware of the claims as-
serted by others.369 A plaintiff's continued inactivity in the face of known pros-
ecution by others of similar claims argues powerfully that he has not acted
diligently. Even if the plaintiff was not actually aware of claims by others, the
existence of such claims undercuts his claims of diligence because others were
able to discern the existence of a claim and seek redress. Under the objective
standard, such evidence is highly probative that a diligent person would have
learned of the defendant's wrongdoing even though unaware of the claims of
others.
When the plaintiff took some steps to investigate once his suspicions were
aroused, however, a court is less likely to equate suspicion with notice. For
example, in a First Circuit case the plaintiff suspected that the defendant had
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's secret electronic processes, but was un-
able for a prolonged period to prove its suspicions. 370 Noting that the plaintiff
"continually instructed its salesmen to attempt to acquire information on de-
fendant's circuitry,"' 371 the court reversed a summary judgment granted to the
defendant on statute of limitations grounds.372 Similarly, in tolling the statute
of limitations in a securities action, the Second Circuit emphasized that once
the plaintiff began to suspect wrongdoing, he had hired an attorney and coop-
erated with an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
thus exercised due diligence.373
When plaintiff has taken some action to investigate, the court must ulti-
mately decide whether he did enough. Using hindsight, a defendant is likely
to argue that the plaintiff failed to pursue other avenues of recourse or sources
369. See, e.g., Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907, 912-14 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs aware that suit
"alleging essentially the same claims" filed more than two years before their suit); Ameil v. Ramsey,
550 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1977) (suit by other investors was "important and significant" fact that
should have put plaintiff on notice); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394
(6th Cir. 1975) (industry-wide publicity given to FTC suit against Goodyear should have put plaintiff
on notice); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff knew
about suit by SEC and private parties against defendant for same misconduct); Roberts v. Magnetic
Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 946 (D.NJ.) (plaintiff aware of dissatisfaction of other similarly situated
stockholders), rep'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D.D.C. 1978) (plaintiff knew about lawsuits
filed against codefendants before plaintiff filed suit), rev'd on other ground, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1980); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408
(D. Colo. 1979) (as creditor, plaintiff charged with knowledge of bankruptcy trustee's proceedings
against defendant on claim arising out of same circumstances), aft'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 417 F. Supp. 620, 630 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (plaintiff
knew that defendant being sued in five separate lawsuits for violations of federal securities law during
limitations period), aj'd, 576 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1978). But c. In re Beef Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148
(5th Cir. 1979) (reversing summary judgment granted to defendants on ground that plaintiff should
have been put on notice of his claim by similar suit fied seven years earlier; court of appeals held that
defendants failed to show that the plaintiff should have known about this particular claim), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 905 (1980).
370. Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97, 98 (1st Cir. 1963) (suit over trade
secret violation under Massachusetts law).
371. Id at 101.
372. Id at 102.
373. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1979).
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of information. Such arguments may have merit, but should be analyzed care-
fully. The due diligence standard requires only that the plaintiff use reason-
able care to protect his interests, not that the wrong was impossible to discover
by any means imaginable. Particularly when there has been some affirmative
concealment by the defendant, it would be inappropriate to second-guess a
plaintiff who has taken steps to investigate the defendant's conduct. As the
grounds for suspicion mount, however, the energy devoted to ferreting out the
wrong should correspondingly increase. Although a defendant's representa-
tions that all is well may defer the date on which contrary indications consti-
tute notice,374 it will often be true, as one court put it, that the "plaintiff was
obliged to do more by way of inquiry than make fruitless inquiries of the sus-
pected wrongdoer."
375
c. The scope of notice-Added claims and added wrongdoers
Assuming plaintiff is held to be on notice of some wrongdoing, the court
must still decide the precise scope of the claim. The basic rule is that the plain-
tiff will be held to be on notice of any claim that he could have discovered by
diligent investigation. Thus, the statute begins to run for all claims against
every wrongdoer who can be sued.
Additional claims. When the plaintiff suspects that the defendant has
committed the specific wrong for which he later charges the defendant, the
statute of limitations will rarely be tolled while he gathers his proof.3 76 Nor
will the statute necessarily be tolled when the plaintiff has less than specific
knowledge of the defendant's wrongdoing. Instead, the maximfalsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus applies well to the due diligence requirement: when the
plaintiff knows that the defendant has injured him in connection with a given
transaction, his failure to investigate related wrongs will not be excused. For
example, a plaintiff who had pledged certain securities as collateral discovered
that the defendants had improperly used the securities, 377 and in 1961 he sued
for the tort of conversion.378 Not until 1966, however, did he allege violations
of the securities acts. 379 He attempted to excuse his delay in bringing the secur-
ities claim by asserting that he did not discover the "full enormity" of the fraud
until 1966.380 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding that his
knowledge in 1961 of the defendants' misuse of his securities constituted "suffi-
374. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1977) (although
defendant denied responsibility and gave assurances, it does not follow as a matter of law that indica-
tions of antitrust violations put plaintiff on notice), rev'don other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978); see also
supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (discussing Mt. Hood Stages). In fact, the court in Fuls v.
Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978), held that a "continuing program of false
representations" tolls even what has otherwise been interpreted to be an absolute statute of limitations
of the Interstate Land Sales and Full Disclosure Act. Id at 987-88.
375. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 622 (W.D. Mich. 1962).
376. See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[t]he bells do not toll
the limitations statute while one ferrets the facts").
377. Klien v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1970).
378. Id
379. Id at 342.
380. Id at 343.
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cient knowledge ... to put him on notice as to any alleged fraud." s38' Other
cases similarly have emphasized the plaintiff's awareness of some wrongdoing
by the defendant.38 2 Obviously, this approach is consistent with liberal rules of
joinder of claims, which seek to have all claims tried at once.38 3
Such notice of additional claims depends on a nexus between the known
claim and the later-discovered claim that is sufficient to warrant the running of
limitations for both. The fact that a plaintiff is aware of one species of wrong-
doing by the defendant does not show that he is aware of an entirely unrelated
claim. This point is illustrated by a recent price-fixing case in which the de-
fendant argued that because the plaintiff suspected that the defendant was en-
gaged in predatory pricing, the statute of limitations should not be tolled on
the plaintiff's price-fixing claim.38 4 The court rejected this argument, distin-
guishing knowledge of predatory pricing from awareness of a conspiracy to fix
prices.385 This distinction makes sense because awareness of single-firm preda-
tory tactics is significantly different, in terms of evidence and legal grounds,
from suspicion of coordinated price-fixing activities. At a minimum, then, the
defendant must show that the plaintiff's suspicions about the defendant
pointed in the legal or evidentiary direction of the claim ultimately asserted in
order to show that investigation of the suspected claim should reasonably have
led to discovery of the belated one.
Additional wrongdoers. Consistent with the general view that the plain-
tiff should investigate all wrongdoing by a defendant whom he suspects, he
also is required to attempt to identify every person who participated in the
wrong in order that they all may be brought before the court at the same time.
This requirement is in accord with the liberal rules on joinder of parties, 386 but
often presents a challenge for the plaintiff. Many federal statutes have a wide
potential net of liability, which may be expanded even further by doctrines
attaching liability to aiders and abettors.387 As a result, even the diligent plain-
381. Id
382. See Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff had made
other allegations of infringement of copyright against defendant); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Bo-
rax Consol. Ltd., 185 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1950) (plaintiffon notice because at least suspected defend-
ant's attempts to monopolize borax industry), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951); f Glazer Steel Corp. v.
Toyomanka, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 500, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (interrogatories propounded by plaintiff to
defendant showed that plaintiff aware of additional possible claims he later asserted; defendant's re-
peated failure to answer until plaintiff moved to compel answers constituted concealment and justified
tolling for additional claims).
383. See FED. R. CIv. P. 18 (party asserting claim to relief may join all claims he has against oppos-
ing party).
384. King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1981), cert,
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1038 (1982).
385. Id at 1156.
386. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 & advisory committee note (whenever feasible, all materially interested
parties should be joined as parties).
387. Almost certainly the best example of a statute with a broad and somewhat uncertain ambit of
liability is § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). When transactions are
challenged as fraudulent in actions under this statute, there is possible liability not only on the part of
the principal actors, but also on a wide array of collateral participants such as accountants, Robertson
v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979), and attorneys, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 854 (1981).
Liability for aiding and abetting a violation of§ 10(b) remains an issue of debate among commentators.
See Fischel, Secondary Liabiliy Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 80,
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tiff who unearths a substantial store of facts may have great difficulty identify-
ing all the proper defendants by the time he does file suit. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff does have the tools of discovery available, and he is obviously on
notice of some claim worth prosecuting. Meanwhile, the unnamed potential
defendant normally can expect that the statute of limitations continues to run
despite the pendency of litigation because rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permits relation back only of claims "changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted. ' 388 Thus, refusing to extend the tolling to
additional defendants is consistent with the plaintiff's duty to protect himself
and with the legitimate expectations of nonparties.
The courts generally have been sensitive to these concerns, and have al-
lowed tolling to extend only to parties whose involvement was kept secret by
some concealment. For example, in Fitzgerald v. Seamens,389 the plaintiff was
a former Air Force employee who alleged that he was fired in retribution for
his testimony before Congress regarding cost overruns on the C-5A aircraft.
390
After the district court dismissed his civil rights action on statute of limitations
grounds, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim
against all Air Force defendants because the plaintiff should have known or
suspected their involvement. 391 It reversed the dismissal, however, of the claim
against Alexander Butterfield, special counsel to President Nixon, because the
involvement of the White House in the matter had been concealed until it
surfaced during the Senate Watergate hearings.
392
Similarly, in a recent securities case the Second Circuit allowed a plaintiff to
pursue a belated action against accountants involved in a scheme that he ear-
lier had concluded was fraudulent.393 When the plaintiff first realized that the
investment scheme was fraudulent, he cooperated with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's investigation and ultimately intervened as a plaintiff in
an action against underwriters and marketmakers. 394 Later the SEC charged
the accountants with wrongdoing, and only then did the plaintiff sue them.
395
Noting that the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant accountants had con-
89-94 (1981); Ruder, Multple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and.Abetting, Conspir-
acy), In Pari Delicto, Indemnfication and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 630-31 (1972). Under
these circumstances, plaintiffs cannot disregard claims against possible aiders and abettors. Beyond
that, § 20(a) ofthe Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), imposes liability for violation on "every person who controls
any person liable under any provision of this title," opening vistas of additional defendants based on a
statutory analogue to respondeat superior. In sum, the prospective plaintiff in a securities case has a
host of potential defendants to identify and locate.
388. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). By way of contrast, California allows the naming of fictitious or "Doe"
defendants, a device that ameliorates the statute of limitations problem with respect to added wrongdo-
ers. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (1982). See generaloi Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant Prac-
tice: .4 Fiction Stranger Than Truth, 30 STAN. L. Rnv. 51 (1977) (describing common practice in
California of naming fictitious parties to preserve opportunities to join real parties as they become
known, thereby circumventing statutes of limitations).
389. 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
390. Id at 222.
391. Id at 228-29. The court did note, however, that the case would have presented a different
situation if plaintiff had timely sued the Air Force officials whose involvement was known to him and
then later tried to add "lesser fry" he identified in the course of litigation. Id at 229.
392. Id
393. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1979).
394. I.d
395. Id at 589.
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cealed their involvement by altering work papers and destroying documentary
evidence, 396 and that he had proceeded diligently to seek legal relief .with re-
spect to the known culprits, 397 the court allowed the plaintiff to rely upon
tolling.398
Even if the additional defendant did conceal his wrongdoing, if he has been
sued by others that fact has been held to undermine a later plaintiff's claim of
diligence. In a securities case, for example, plaintiff initially sued the issuer, its
accountants, and a number of others for fraud.399 Years later, plaintiff sued the
law firm that had acted as counsel to the issuer in connection with the securi-
ties involved, arguing that the limitations period should be tolled because the
law firm had concealed its wrongdoing. 4°° Stressing the fact that eleven other
plaintiffs had sued the law firm, the court rejected this argument. 40 In a simi-
lar securities case, another court rejected the plaintiff's assertion of diligence
with respect to claims against the lawyers on the ground that there was "a
clearly marked trail. . . to the attorney-defendants."
40 2
Except in cases in which the defendant conceals his involvement and defeats
the plaintiff's actual discovery of wrongdoing, there is good reason to deny
tolling for all claims growing out of the transaction in issue once the plaintiff is
on notice that he has a claim arising from it. The plaintiff has a formidable
array of discovery tools available once he has filed suit against one wrongdoer,
and he should use them. Litigation lasts long enough without replays against a
new set of defendants.
d. Interference by defendant-Concealment revisited
Although concealment may have little enduring importance as an independ-
ent requirement for tolling, it is clearly relevant to the question of diligence.
First, as indicated above, concealment can excuse the plaintiff's failure to iden-
tify an additional defendant if that defendant's wrongdoing could not be dis-
covered by due diligence.403 If successful, concealment may camouflage events
that would otherwise be storm warnings and may excuse the failure of the
plaintiff to recognize storm warnings in information he possesses. For exam-
ple, in a labor case the employer allegedly concealed its decision to relocate its
plant in the South by representing that the decision was not made until it had
already decided to close its northern plant.404 When the National Labor Rela-
tions Board considered various matters connected with the closing of the
northern plant, the company's representative lied about the date of the deci-
396. Id at 593. The court indicated that it viewed this factor as tolling the statute of limitations until
the plaintiff actually knew about his claim. In so deciding it relied on Tomera v. Galt, id, which held
that proof of concealment is enough to toll the statute. Id ; see supra notes 302-12 and accompanying
text (discussing Tomera v. Galt).
397. Id at 588.
398. Id at 593.
399. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 895 (1981).
400. Id at 690, 694.
401. Id at 690, 695.
402. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D.D.C.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
403. See supra notes 386-402 and accompanying text (discussing additional wrongdoers).
404. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 912-14 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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sion.4°5 Among the documents entered in evidence at the NLRB hearing, how-
ever, was an agreement that showed that the company had applied for
concessions from the southern town before deciding to close the northern
plant.406 This evidence surely was a storm warning that the defendant was
violating the labor laws, but the union overlooked the significance of this item
during the administrative hearing, and did not notice it until sixteen months
after the hearing, well beyond the normal six month limitations period for
reopening the proceeding.4°7 Noting that the company was responsible for a
"flagrant distortion of the facts,"'' 4 8 the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the time limit had been tolled:
At the time of the initial hearing, the union had no reason to suspect
that [the employer's] testimony was false. Thus it would indeed have
been surprising if the union had recognized immediately the import
of an obscure phrasal reference in the 27-page, single spaced, drily
technical lease agreement which was executed long after the events in
controversy had occurred. 4°9
Because there had been concealment, the court held that the union's prompt
action once it realized the significance of the doucument satisfied the diligence
requirement.
410
Second, concealment remains an important factor in due diligence analysis
because the absence of concealment may also be used to rebut a plaintiffs
claim of diligence. Thus, in a securities case the plaintiff had sold her stock in
a family concern during a family dispute over management.411 The plaintiff
alleged that she was assured that the defendant purchaser would fire her
brother, who was running the company. 412 After acquiring the plaintiffs stock,
however, the defendant never fulfilled his promise.413 Over nine years later the
plaintiff sued.414 Stressing that there was "nothing covert" and that the defend-
ants "made no effort to conceal their actions," the Seventh Circuit barred her
claim because she failed to exercise diligence.
415
Finally, the defendant's concealment may be so obvious that it undermines
any claim of diligence. As indicated above, simple denials of wrongdoing or
refusals to provide information are often said not to satisfy the concealment
requirement because plaintiffs may not reasonably rely upon them. A plaintiff
confronted with such obstruction is not entitled to desist entirely in his investi-
gation. To the contrary, a defendant's stonewalling may itself signal that some
wrongdoing has occurred and thus call for the plaintiff to increase his efforts to
ferret out the facts.416 Every experienced litigator knows that vigorous resist-
405. Id at 914.
406. Id at 922.
407. Id
408. Id at 914.
409. Id at 922-23.
410. Id at 923.
411. Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1969).
412. Id
413. Id
414. Id at 996.
415. Id at 998.
416. Such stonewalling does not invariably trigger a duty to dig deeper or sue. In Tomera v. Gait,
511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975), the court reversed a summary judgment for the defendants although other
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ance to discovery often signifies that something damning is being hidden. The
same commonsense reasoning applies to a prelitigation investigation. The
courts are aware of this simple truth; one court noted that the plaintiffs filed
suit precisely because they were unable to get responsive information from
defendants without the aid of discovery.417 If the concealment is sufficient to
prevent discovery even despite redoubled efforts, it does not destroy a claim of
diligence, although a plaintiff who has not utilized the tools of discovery will
have a difficult time showing that he exhausted all available avenues.
e. Reliance on governmental authorities
In this pervasively regulated society there is a natural tendency to turn to the
government for assistance when one feels wronged. Certainly there are a vari-
ety of federal, state and local agencies commissioned to respond to such com-
plaints. It is difficult to imagine a form of activity that could not be of concern
to one of these agencies. Diligent potential plaintiffs should be aware of these
agencies. An effort to enlist their assistance not only is an indication of due
diligence,4 18 but also is a sign that the plaintiff suspects wrongdoing by the
defendant. If the government agency informs a potential plaintiff that it can
find no violation by the suspected defendant, the question arises whether the
plaintiff nevertheless should be held to be on notice of the defendant's
wrongdoing.
It would certainly be easy to decide that a plaintiff fulfills diligence require-
ments when he relies on advice from the government. Indeed, in many impor-
tant cases it has been the government itself, with its greater investigative
powers, that unearthed the wrongdoing and brought it to the attention of pri-
vate plaintiffs.419 Thus, one important facet of the practice of plaintiffs' anti-
trust counsel during the last two decades has consisted of keeping tabs on the
government's prosecutions.
The courts have declined the easy route of giving controlling weight to reli-
ance on the advice of government agencies, a choice that appears well-justified
because the government is not omnipotent. Although private plaintiffs often
benefit from the government's investigations, there is no reason why undiscov-
ered private causes of action should be kept alive forever because some gov-
ernmental agency has expressed a lack of immediate interest in the potential
plaintiff's suspicions. A rule permitting plaintiffs to rely on government advice
without further investigation would raise enormous proof problems about
investors had investigated, been rebuffed, and sued in state court for mismanagement more than three
years before plaintiff filed her securities action. Id at 507, 510-1 l;see supra notes 302-10 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Tomera). This result must be viewed as contrary to the weight of authority on
the subject of diligence.
417. See Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1975).
418. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1979) (upon suspecting secur-
ities fraud, plaintiff went to SEC and cooperated with its investigation of defendant's activities).
419. For recent examples of cases in which plaintiffs brought private suits following government
actions, see Norton-Children's Hospitals, Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d 440, 441-42 (6th
Cir. 1981) (indictment for violation of antitrust laws); Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583,
588-89 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC investigation); O'Hara v. Kovens, 473 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (D. Md. 1979)
(federal grand jury investigation of former Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel for conspiracy to ma-
nipulate stock prices by use of veto), aft'd, 625 F.2d 15 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Husted
v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (FTC investigation).
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what the plaintiff told the agency and the advice the agency actually gave.
Further, such a rule could cause agencies to forbid lower level representatives
to comment to complainants for fear that such statements might be taken as
the official government position. Moreover, the government's interests are
simply different from those of private plaintiffs. Although a given company
may have violated the antitrust laws to the harm of some private plaintiff, the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission may have no interest
in the matter because it must husband its resources for more important cases.
Indeed, the private attorney general principle underlying the treble damages
and attorneys fees provisions of the Clayton Act420 assumes that private parties
will be primary enforcers of the statutory scheme.421 Accordingly, particularly
in antitrust actions, the courts have held that assurances from government rep-
resentatives do not relieve a plaintiff from the duty of thoroughly investigating
potential claims. 422 The government's decision that the available information
does not warrant proceeding against the defendant does not excuse the plaintiff
from being constructively on notice of the wrongdoing.
f. The problem of publicly available information
Another aspect of the pervasive influence of government is the quantity and
variety of information it makes available to the public. Particularly since the
passage of the Freedom of Information Act,423 it has been possible for many
alert potential plaintiffs to obtain information from the federal government
about the activities of those they suspect of wrongdoing. After they are sued,
defendants may also take advantage of the vast stores of information collected
by the government by gleaning from it those facts that they claim should have
alerted plaintiffs to the existence of their claims earlier. Storm warnings of
wrongdoing can come from any source, and they are often found in the public
record.
The public availability of information is thus often fatal to plaintiffs' at-
tempts to show due diligence. As early as 1879 in Wood v. Carpenter, the
Supreme Court rejected a plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim in part be-
cause the defendant's allegedly fraudulent conduct was a matter of public rec-
ord.424 In many cases, there can be no question that the plaintiff should have
discovered the information. For example, in one case the allegedly concealed
420. Section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
421. The courts have repeatedly emphasized the important role of private plaintiffs in enforcing the
antitrust laws. See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947) (noting
congressional intent to use private self-interest as means of enforcing antitrust laws); Javelin Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Cromar Co.
v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1976) (same); Farmington Dowell
Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1970) (same).
422. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978)
(govemment assurances do not necessarily negate plaintiffs well-founded suspicion of antitrust viola-
tion); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 947 (D.N.J.) (plaintiff may not rely on SEC
letter which condoned defendant's disclosures), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979);
Starview Outdoor Theatre v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 254 F. Supp. 855, 857-58 (N.D. Ill. 1966)
(Assistant Attorney General's letter stating that defendant's actions were lawful did not negate plain-
tiffs knowledge of alleged antitrust violations). Compare Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d
583, 591 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff cooperated with SEC, but also pursued his own rights).
423. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
424. 101 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1879).
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fact had been reported in the Encyclopedia Britanica's Year Book.425 Toling
also has been denied when the plaintiff failed to consult materials as obscure as
reports of the Tariff Commission 426 and congressional hearings.427 In fact, in
one antitrust case a report to the Minister of Justice of the Canadian Govern-
ment was held to put plaintiff on notice of the existence of the conspiracy al-
leged in his suit.428
The obvious problem with such analyses is that they ignore a plaintiffs ac-
tual awareness of publicly available information and consider only his con-
structive knowledge. Few plaintiffs who exercise due diligence can be
expected to be aware of the entire mass of information the government has
available for the asking, even within their own industry. In the case of the
Canadian report noted above, there was no question about the plaintiffs
knowledge of its existence since he mentioned it in his complaint. 429 In other
cases, however, courts have been more sensitive to the problem that much
"public" information is, as a practical matter, not meaningfully available. For
example, in Smith v. Nixon,430 the court rejected the argument that the plain-
tiffs should have learned of surveillance activities against them sooner by re-
questing information pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control Act and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.431 The court stated, "We cannot impose an obligation on
all citizens to initiate a triennial request of the Government as to whether they
are under official surveillance." 432 Moreover, even if the plaintiff does request
information from the government, he is not assured of immediate results. In
another tolling case, the plaintiff alleged that after he made his FOIA request
government officials delayed nearly a year in furnishing the requested infor-
mation and then attempted to delete or falsify key portions.433 Thus, for the
ordinary citizen the mere existence of public information is no panacea for
discovering his claims. Obscure information in government records should not
be allowed to become a sword in the hands of defendants relying on
limitations.
Plaintiffs also may have difficulty disclaiming constructive knowledge of
public information emanating from sources other than government files. In a
425. See Japanese War Notes Claimants' Ass'n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 359 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971 (1969).
426. See Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton=Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
427. United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1980); Dayco Corp. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1974).
428. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
429. Id
430. 609 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
431. Id at 1191;see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976), added by Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 212,
218 (1968).
432. Id. Similarly, in Spevak v. United States, 390 F.2d 977 (Ct. Cl. 1968), the plaintiff alleged that
the Atomic Energy Commission had concealed its use of his secret heavy water process without com-
pensating him for it. Id at 980-81. Although the government acknowledged that its use of the process
was classified, it pointed out that information about it could be gleaned from some technical reports
that had been declassified. Id at 981. Indeed, the plaintiff had sued to restrain the release of informa-
tion about his process in order to protect its secrecy, thereby delaying the date of public disclosure of
the government's use of the process. Id at 982. The court held that the declassification of various
reports did not &ive plaintiff constructive notice of their contents until there was a public announcement
o their availability m a manner calculated to alert plaintiff to their existence. Id at 982-84.
433. Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 n. II (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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civil rights action, for example, the plaintiff sued the United States Govern-
ment in 1977 to recover for injuries he sustained in 1961 when he was beaten
by a mob while participating in Freedom Rider activities in the South.434 The
plaintiff claimed that even though an informant had notified the FBI in ad-
vance that there would be violence, the FBI failed to warn the plaintiff or
prevent the violence.435 The Government claimed that the plaintiff should
have learned of his claim against it in 1965 when the informant testified during
a well-publicized trial and revealed that he had been an FBI informant since
1960.436 Unquestionably, the testimony was public. Despite the publicity,
however, the court refused to hold that the 1965 trial put the plaintiff on notice
of his claim.437 Underlying the court's decision was its finding that the newspa-
per reports covering the trial showed neither that the witness had been an FBI
informant during the 1961 events nor that the Government had advance
knowledge of the planned attack.438 Such skepticism about the actual utility of
publicly available information should not be limited to claims against the
Government. 439 Other defendants may also have a far superior ability than the
average plaintiff to gather and analyze information about their own activities.
Their claims that plaintiffs are constructively on notice of reports of their
wrongdoing should therefore be closely scrutinized to evaluate whether such
information was genuinely available to the plaintiff.
g. Countervailing considerations-Avoiding groundless lawsuits
Courts tend to hold that once a plaintiff's suspicions are aroused, he should
be held to be on notice of his claim and the tolling of the limitations period
should end.440 There are countervailing considerations, however. Americans
are already too litigious; compelling them to file suit based on suspicion alone
to avoid the risk of the limitations bar could be hazardous. Although most
litigants in fact may not attend closely to the courts' development of the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment, a requirement that plaintiffs file suit merely
on the basis of suspicion may undermine the interest in limiting groundless
claims.
Putting aside the ethical problems posed by suits based on suspicion rather
than evidence,441 two federal rules of civil procedure underscore the problem.
First, rule 9(b)442 requires that a party allege with particularity claims of fraud
or fraudulent concealment.443 Some courts have injected a substantive compo-
434. Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
435. Id
436. Id at 1019. The trial arose out of the murder of civil rights worker Viola Liuzzo, which re-
ceived great attention in the national press.
437. Id at 1019-20.
438. Id at 1020.
439. For an example of restraint in holding that publicly available information puts plaintiff on
notice when the defendant is a private litigant, see Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708, 710-11 (7th Cir.
1975) (report on purchase of company in national financial publication giving overall price did not put
plaintiff on notice of price per share).
440. See supra notes 289-319 and accompanying text.
441. For a discussion of these ethical issues, see generally Cann, Frivolous Lawsuits-The Lawyer's
Duty to Say "No," 52 U. COLO. L. Rav. 367 (1981).
442. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
443. Id; see infra notes 468-79 and accompanying text (discussing rule 9(b)).
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nent into rule 9(b) to use it as a warrant to scrutinize the evidence on which the
plaintiff based his allegations in order to decide whether the plaintiff investi-
gated the alleged fraud and reasonably believed that a wrong had occurred.44
If the plaintiffs evidence is found wanting, these courts will dismiss the case.
Thus, in some cases the courts may interpret rule 9(b) to forbid suits based on
mere suspicion.
Second, rule 11 provides that by signing a complaint, an attorney certifies
"that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it.''44" Courts have stricken complaints for violation of rule 11, con-
cluding that the rule imposes an affirmative obligation on the attorney to sat-
isfy himself there is a ground for the complaint.446 Recent proposed
amendments to rule 11 emphasize that the lawyer has an independent respon-
sibility to investigate both the law and the facts underlying the claim.44 7 Even
though a plaintiff may be comfortable with filing suit solely on a suspicion,
then, the attorney is under an independent obligation to satisfy himself that the
plaintiff's claim is well-grounded.
The policies of rules 9(b) and 11 are relevant to deciding whether mere sus-
picion should end the tolling period, and some courts have emphasized them.
444. See DuPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 631 (D. Del. 1973). The Second Circuit has energetically
endorsed this view:
Rule 9(b)'s specificity requirement stems. . . from the desire to protect defendants from the
harm that comes to their reputations or their good will when they are charged with serious
wrongdoing: "It is a serious matter to charge a person with fraud and hence no one is permit-
ted to do so unless he is in a position and is willing to put himself on the record as to what the
fraud consists of specifically."
Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTZHOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 302, at 215-16 (C. Wright ed. 1960). For similar reasoning, see Horwitz v.
Sprague, 440 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rule 9(b) mandates particularity in pleading because
allegation of fraud is potent weapon); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. I11.
1976) (rule 9(b) requires pleading with particularity to protect defendants from unjustified injury to
theirreputations and goodwill); Temple v. Haft, 73 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. Del. 1976) (same); Macchiavelli v.
Shearson Hamill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 28 (E.D. Cal. 1974).(same). This approach seems to stretch
rule 9(b) almost to the breaking point because it depends upon a decision on the merits rather than on
issues of fair notice to defendant.
445. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
446. See Gage v. Wexler, 82 F.R.D. 717, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (attorney under professional obliga-
tion not to bring frivolous suit), ajf'dmema, 649 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1100 (1981);
Ferrer Delgado v. Sylvia de Jesus, 440 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D.P.R. 1976) (attorney has responsibility to
ascertain that reasonable basis exists for allegations); Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (attorney has affirmative obligation to satisfy himself that there is good ground to support claim).
But see Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"Problems With Fed A. CP.
P. 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1976) (arguing that it is improper to strike complaint under rule 11
because plaintiff has right to jury trial).
447. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States has proposed that rule 11 be amended to provide
sanctions against a person who signs a pleading without complying with the rule. The Committee's
notes suggest that the lawyer may not even rely on the client with regard to factual matters, but must
investigate them independently. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft ofPro-
posedAmendments to the FederalRules of CivilProcedure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 463, 464 (1981). In addition,
the advisory committee has proposed that rule 7(b) be amended to allow similar sanctions for frivolous
motions. Id at 458-59. The committee has also recommended that rule 1 I's provision for striking
pleadings be deleted. Id at 458-66. For a discussion of the proposed amendments, see Marcus, Reduc.
ing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
CivilProcedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364-65 (1983).
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In a price-fixing suit, for example, the defendants obtained summary judgment
on the limitation issue because the plaintiffs had known about a virtually iden-
tical action, but failed to file suit themselves. 48 Even though the plaintiffs
awareness of complaints of others about the defendant's wrongdoing usually
shows that he is on notice, the Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment
on the theory that mere suspicion produced by complaints of others does not
serve as a substitute for evidence of wrongdoing.449 Because others' lawsuits
may be frivolous or groundless, the court reasoned that they do not necessarily
provide adequate grounds for the plaintiff to bring his own lawsuit.
450 Simi-
larly, in a trade secrets case the First Circuit declined to hold that mere suspi-
cion should have put the plaintiff on notice:
[W]hile [the president of the plaintiff corporation] did indeed have a
"feeling" that the defendant had plagiarized the plaintiffs designs, it
was a feeling based on the gossamer threads of speculation, suspicion
and surmise. Knowledge-in the sense of an awareness of concrete
facts-was conspicuously absent.
451
Although sensitivity to the tension between the interest in encouraging
plaintiffs to bring suit as soon as they have reasonable grounds to suspect
wrongdoing and the interest in avoiding groundless lawsuits is important, it
should not be overemphasized. The plaintiff is not required to file suit imme-
diately simply because the tolling period has ended. Instead, he has the full
period established by the statute of limitations to investigate and satisfy him-
self and his lawyer that there are adequate grounds for suit.452 Ultimately
every plaintiff must decide whether to file suit or risk the bar of limitations.
The fact that concealment has tolled the running of limitations does not for-
ever save the plaintiff from having to make that choice.
h. The value of consistency
The above discussion identifies a number of discrete concerns that are im-
portant in the courts' analysis of diligence. It also shows that the courts have
an eclectic approach in deciding whether a given plaintiff has been diligent.
As a consequence, it appears impossible to reconcile all the cases. Even within
a given circuit there are decisions that appear inconsistent with one another.
Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon emerges from a comparison
of the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Mount Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound
448. In re Beef Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1155 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905
(1980).
449. Id at 1171. The court emphasized the procedural context in which the issue arose: the defend-
ants had relied solely on the plaintiffs' knowledge of the pendency of the other action without proof
that plaintiff had any other information. Id
459. Id
451. Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97, 100 (Ist Cir. 1963); see also Fitzger-
ald v. Seamens, 553 F.2d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discovery standard obviates danger that dismissed
government employees will rush to litigation on bare suspicion that superiors acted in bad faith).
452. Although there is some uncertainty in some cases, the consensus is that the federal tolling doc-
trine allows the plaintiff the full statutory period to bring suit from the date on which the plaintiff was
on notice of the wrong. In Norton-Children's Hospitals, Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d
440 (6th Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit emphatically affirmed that an antitrust plaintiff has the full four
year period allowed by the Clayton Act after the date on which he knew or should have known of the
violation. Id at 445.
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Corp. 4 5 3 and Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. 4 54 In Mount Hood
one panel upheld a jury determination that the plaintiff was not on notice of its
claim despite its repeated formal complaints to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission about Greyhound's routing decisions.455 In Rutledge, decided less than
a year later, another panel held that the plaintiff's complaints to the Justice
Department should have put him on notice even though the Justice Depart-
ment assured him that the defendant had not violated the law.456 Other similar
examples can be cited.457 Consistency is important to the policies underlying
statutes of limitations. This appearance of inconsistency, therefore, is troub-
ling, particularly because the decision to toll apparently turns entirely on the
plaintiff's diligence. Nevertheless, seemingly inconsistent results may be inevi-
table because the diligence standard, like the standard of negligence, is ulti-
mately one of reasonableness.
Faced with a similarly eclectic approach for deciding negligence cases, Jus-
tice Holmes believed that instead of allowing juries to decide apparently simi-
lar cases differently, courts instead should draw on their experience and
identify a number of distinct rules of conduct that could be applied in prefer-
ence to the general reasonable person standard. In a 1927 case Justice Holmes
authored, the Supreme Court adopted this approach and held that a driver
crossing a railroad track must get out of his vehicle to determine whether a
train is coming.458 This approach seemingly obviates the need to decide each
case on its own facts. Seven years later the Court repudiated this approach,
459
and it has been out of favor since. Similar attempts to break down the dili-
gence analysis suffer from the same problem. Some courts have hinted at the
existence of such rules in securities cases, stating that plaintiffs should invaria-
bly be held to be on notice of wrongdoing upon the decline in value of securi-
ties.460 It is not genuinely possible, however, to identify and attach paramount
importance to a few factors at the expense of all others.
Whatever verbal formulation is used to describe the reasonable person test,
apparently inconsistent results are inevitable. Unquestionably the courts
should strive for consistency in deciding issues of diligence. The persistence of
apparent inconsistency, however, does not in itself mandate revision of the
diligence standard. Equitable doctrines such as fraudulent concealment
should not require mathematical precision, even if they could be so refined,
because they rely on a judge's sense of justice to the parties before the court.
Although individualized decisions will not always be easily reconciled with
453. See supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing Mt. Hood Stages).
454. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text (discussing Rutledge).
455. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 697-701 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'don other
grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978).
456. Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978).
457. Compare Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff held
to be on notice even though unable to verify suspicions about defendant's wrongdoing) with In re Beef
Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1171 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff not held to be on notice even when
others had brought lawsuits against same defendants because other lawsuits might be frivolous and,
therefore, no reasonable ground for suspicion).
458. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
459. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934).
460. For discussion of cases adopting such rules, see supra notes 358-59.
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each other, therefore, the key fact is that each represents a judge's effort to
protect the legitimate interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
IV. EARLY DETERMINATION OF TOLLING ISSUES
By its very nature, tolling compromises the policies underlying statutes of
limitations. If a defendant must defend on the merits whenever a plaintiff in-
yokes tolling, the protection of the statute of limitations will be substantially
undermined. A brief review of tolling cases in which the statute of limitations
defense has been sustained before trial on the merits illustrates the problem.
In a civil rights action filed in 1979 to recover for alleged racial discrimination
against singer Bessie Smith between 1923 and 1933, for example, the court
observed that most or all of the people involved in these transactions were long
dead.461 In Moviecolor Ltd v. Eastman Kodak Co. ,462 the plaintiff sought to
resurrect a transaction that occurred nearly thirty years before the suit was
filed.463 In other antitrust cases plaintiffs have sued more than a decade after
the alleged violation.46 In these cases the defendants denied the plaintiffs' sub-
stantive allegations, but to disprove them at best would have required the use
of dim recollections and long forgotten records, and at worst could have neces-
sitated attempts to obtain substitutes for the testimony of the dead and for
records that had been destroyed or lost.
Although antiquated claims often survive to trial,465 the desirability of pre-
trial resolution of tolling questions is obvious. The Manual for Complex Liti-
gation specifically mentions tolling as a matter suitable for early resolution.
466
461. Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 612 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd, 612 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1980) (suit in 1974 for allegedly
discriminatory layoff in 1950).
462. 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). For further discussion of this case, see
supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
463. 1d at 88.
464. See Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 390 (6th Cir. 1975) (13 years);
Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552, 553 (6th Cir. 1974) (14 years); Suckow Borax Mines
Consol. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 185 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1950) (suit in 1947 alleging conspiracy in
1929).
465. For examples in which tolling was sustained despite the passage of many years, see Richards v.
Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (23 years); Briley v. State of California, 564 F.2d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 1977) (13 years); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 698 (9th Cir. 1977)
(damages incurred over twenty-year period), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978); Pollard v.
United States, 384 F. Supp. 304, 308 n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (suits filed in 1973 for claims arising out of
the Tuskeegee Syphilis Study of the 1930's).
466. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (1981) states in part:
In some complex cases it becomes apparent at the preliminary pretrial conference or shortly
thereafter that the determination of a legal question will expedite the dispbsition of the cause.
... For example, in the electrical equipment civil antitrust cases the question whether fraud-
ulent concealment would toll the running of the statute of limitations was one of the most
important questions. It was very desirable to secure a determination of this question as early
as possible, for if the statute was not tolled by fraudulent concealment, the discovery would be
comparatively narrow in scope of time and a summary judgment on some or all issues could
be rendered in many cases.
Id § 1.80.
At least one court has treated the Manual's directive as recommending that the question of tolling
under the circumstances of particular cases be decided as promptly as possible. See In re Beef Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1170 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Manual's suggestion that fraudulent con-
cealment should be determined as early as possible in order to define scope of discovery), cert. denied,
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Responding to such a directive, the courts have, if anything, been too willing to
resolve tolling before trial. If the courts' apparent abandonment of conceal-
ment as an independent requirement for invoking tolling has deprived defend-
ants of some deserved measure of protection, they have overcompensated by
rejecting plaintiffs' claims of due diligence based upon pretrial filings in court.
Because the actual operation of the tolling doctrine depends on the procedural
context, the procedural devices employed to resolve tolling issues before trial
on the merits deserve independent attention.
A. DISMISSAL
In 1849 the Supreme Court announced stringent standards for pleading
fraudulent concealment:
[E]specially must there be distinct averments as to the time when the
fraud, mistake, concealment, or misrepresentation was discovered,
and what the discovery is, so that the court may clearly see, whether,
by the excercise of ordinary diligence, the discovery might not have
been before made.467
These precepts are now embodied in rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that fraud be alleged "with particularity." Courts
regularly hold that rule 9(b) applies to claims of fraudulent concealment 468
and often find that bare allegations of diligence are insufficient to satisfy rule
9(b).469 Because rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead the particular facts of his
diligence, the rule provides a vehicle for the court to determine the plaintiff's
diligence on the complaint alone. This approach, however, appears inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because diligence should be
evaluated with reference to all surrounding circumstances. Even when dili-
gence is pleaded with particularity, additional facts may be necessary to deter-
mine whether a reasonably diligent person would have discovered the claim.
As a number of courts have noted, summary judgment is a more appropriate
procedure for evaluating diligence because it permits consideration of addi-
tional facts.470
449 U.S. 905 (1980). The language of the Manual does not require that result, however. Instead, the
reference in § 1.80 to "the determination of a legal question" may be interpreted to refer to whether
tolling of the statute of limitations is available as a matter of law, but such an interpretation would
unduly narrow the scope of the quoted directive. There is no longer any genuine question, except
perhaps as a result of Johnson and 7omanio, whether tolling on the ground of fraudulent concealment
is at least theoretically available under Holmberg v. Armbrecht. All that remains to be determined in
each case is whether it should be applied in the circumstances before the court. That is the matter
whose early resolution could narrow the issues remaining for trial.
467. Stearns v. Page, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 819, 829 (1849).
468. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978);
Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Magnetic
Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 943 (D.N.J.), rev'don other grounds, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); Brick v.
Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 297-98 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
469. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1978)
(plaintiff failed to plead particular facts of his diligence); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(plaintiff failed to plead particular facts about why defendant's fraudulent scheme was self-concealing
and why detection was impossible for fifty years), aft'd, 612 F.2d 572 (1980). One court, however, has
stated that rule 9(b) requires only "slightly more" than rule 8. Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th
Cir. 1975).
470. Many courts have questioned whether the issue of fraudulent concealment may be decided on
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In spite of the asserted advantage of deciding tolling claims in a summary
judgment procedure, some courts nevertheless have decided the diligence
question on the pleadings. A leading example is Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns &
Co. ,471 a securities action by broker-dealers engaged in the purchase and sale
of securities. 472 According to the complaint, the defendants' representative
proposed that the plaintiffs adopt a new trading strategy and then falsely as-
sured the plaintiffs that the defendants' legal department had determined that
this strategy was proper.473 The plaintiffs alleged that they had acted diligently
in relying upon the alleged conclusion of the defendant's legal department.474
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
ignorance of the law does not toll the statute of limitations. 475 Regardless of
the validity of this principle as a question of law,4 76 the court's opinion does
not explain its holding. Although the court acknowledged that certain inves-
tors could rely on brokerage houses for legal advice, it based its ruling that
plaintiffs could not do so on the ground that "[it is clear from the complaint
...that plaintiffs were professional market traders who surely had ready ac-
cess to legal advice. '477 It is difficult to understand how the court could make
this factual assumption based on the pleadings, and its conclusion is therefore
highly questionable. The results reached by other courts that similarly have
relied on factual determinations to justify rule 12(b)(6) dismissals for lack of
diligence478 likewise must be viewed with skepticism.
the pleadings. In Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court reversed a dismissal
granted to defendants when plaintiff alleged fraudulent concealment, emphasizing,
There is an inherent problem in using a motion to dismiss for purposes of raising a statute of
limitations defense. Although it is true that a complaint sometimes discloses such defects on
its face, it is more likely that the plaintiff can raise factual setoffs to such an affirmative de-
fense. The filing of an answer, raising the statute of limitations, allows both parties to make a
record adequate to measure the applicability of such a defense, to the benefit of both the trial
court and any reviewing tribunal.
Id at 73; see also Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959) (question whether
plaintiff justifiably relied on defendant's agents must be tried on merits); Summer v. Land & Leisure,
Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 970 (5th Cir 1981) (district court erred in dismissing fraudulent concealment claim
since plaintiff made significant allegations supporting due diligence); Jones v. Rogers Memorial Hosp.,
442 F.2d 773, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (statute of limitations may not be decided on motion to dismiss
"unless it appears beyond doubt" that plaintiff can prove no facts to entitle him to relief); Houlihan v.
Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (D.D.C. 1977) (plaintiffs allegation of due diligence
sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss).
Some defendants have attempted to circumvent this issue by styling their motions as motions to
strike under rule 12(f) on the theory that insufficient allegations of concealment are "immaterial." See
Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding
district court's granting of defendant's 12(f) motion to strike fraudulent concealment claim from com-
plaint because plaintiff could have discovered claim by exercising due diligence), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
915 (1976). To decide the issue on a rule 12(f) motion, the court must still pass on the merits of the
plaintiffs diligence. Accordingly, the same problem remains however one labels the motion.
471. 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975).
472. Id at 1266.
473. Id at 1266-67.
474. Id at 1268. The plaintiffs' theory was that the fraud was a continuing one because no reason-
able person, once so defrauded, would have sought other legal advice in the absence of an intervening
event. Id
475. Id at 1268-69.
476. Cf. supra note 356 (discussing distinctions between representations of law and fact).
477. 522 F.2d at 1269.
478. See Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 623 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding dismissal
because no allegation about why plaintiff could not have discovered facts giving rise to his claim in
more timely manner); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding
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By its terms, rule 9(b) applies to the defendant's concealment as well as the
plaintiff's diligence, but its role with regard to this prong of the fraudulent
concealment doctrine is much less important. A plaintiff who has developed
sufficient facts to warrant filing suit may not yet have substantial information
about the stratagems a defendant used to conceal information from him. Un-
like issues of diligence, a court could not purport in any event to pass upon
concealment at the pleading stage. It therefore seems pointless to apply strin-
gent pleading standards. to allegations of concealment.
479
Despite the requirements of rule 9(b), it will be impossible to resolve tolling
issues on the pleadings in many cases. Instead, it appears that the principal
function of rule 9(b) is to require that the specifics of the tolling argument be
spelled out promptly so that the court can reach the merits of tolling at an
early date.
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Once the plaintiff has satisfied rule 9(b) and avoided dismissal, the defend-
ant's attention likely will turn to summary judgment. To put the matter in
context, the lower courts agree that a plaintiff seeking to toll the statute of
limitations faces a heavy burden of proof at trial.480 As one court has stated,
"All presumptions are against him, since his claim to exemption is against the
current of the law and is founded on exceptions. ' 481
dismissal because, based on allegations of complaint, plaintiff should have been aware of her claim
within the statutory period); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248,250 (9th Cir.
1978) (upholding dismissal because plaintiffs' reliance upon defendant's denial of wrongdoing unrea-
sonable when plaintiff had suspicion of and opportunity to discover fraud); Weinberger v. Retail Credit
Co., 498 F.2d 552, 555-56 (4th Cir. 1974) (upholding dismissal because plaintiffs allegation of fraudu-
lent concealment insufficient when defendant's "deceptive practices" effectively concealed very little
from plaintiff); Davis v. Edgemere Fin. Co., 523 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (D. Md. 1981) (granting motion to
dismiss because plaintiffs complaint demonstrated lack of diligence).
479. See Chambers & Barber, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 455, 459 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("to require specificity in a complaint regarding secret techniques of concealment is to
expect more than Rule 9(b) requires").
480. See, e.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1171 (5th Cir. 1979) (ultimate burden
of persuasion on fraudulent concealment issue is heavy), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); Hupp v.
Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff has burden of showing he exercised reasonable care
and diligence); Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1974) (all
presumptions are against party seeking to avoid statute of limitations because claim to exemption is
against current of law) cer. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 461
(2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiff must show due diligence and that affirmative act of fraudulent concealment
frustrated such diligence); Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.) (plaintiffs must be
prepared to adduce sufficient evidence to warrant conclusion that defendants concealed basic facts
disclosing existence of cause of action and that plaintiffs remained ignorant of facts through no fault of
their own), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
In Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981), however, the court took the opposite approach:
When tolling is proper because the defendants have concealed the very cause of action...
they have the burden of coming forward with any facts showing that the plaintiff could have
discovered their involvement or the cause of action if he had excersized due diligence.
Id at 71. In reaching its decision, the court in Richards v. Mileski cited Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 992 (1981). Id Although the court in Smith v. Nixon stated that
"[p]ossibly appellees can offer evidence that the Smiths could have acquired information about the
wiretap but simply failed to take the needed steps," id at 1191, ii clearly did not deviate from the rule
that the burden of proof ultimately is on the plaintiff. Thus Richards v. Mileski ought not presage the
erosion of that principle.
481. Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
997 (1974).
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At the summary judgment stage, however, defendaits confront a heavy bur--
den of their own in contesting the plaintiff s tolling claim.4 82 In this connec-
tion, it should be kept in. mind that the defendants normally have denied the
substantive charges against them as well as having pleaded the statute of limi-
tations defense. Accordingly, defendants may find themselves in the anoma-
lous position of urging that the plaintiff should have discovered sooner the
wrongdoing thatthey deny occurred.
Moreover, some courts have added hurdles for "defendants by indicating that
diligence issues are particularly unsuited to summary judgment.483 One court
has stated:
Inevitably the factual issue of due diligence involves, to some ex-
tent at least, the state of mind of the person whose conduct is to be
measured against this test and it is simply not feasible to resolve such
an issue on motion for summary judgment.
484
Such a sentiment makes the prospect for resolving fraudulent concealment is-
sues before trial appear grim. Reality confounds this expectation, however,
and there are numerous cases in which summary judgments have been entered
against plaintiffs.485
Notwithstanding the factual question whether the plaintiff's state of mind
482. Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant has "extremely diffi-
cult burden to show that there exists no issue of material fact regarding notice").
483. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 1980) (question of due
diligence under doctrine of equitable tolling does not lend itself to determination as matter of law);
Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir. 1979) (summary judgment particularly
inappropriate when sought on basis of inferences which parties seek to have drawn as to questions of
motive, intent, and subjective feelings and reactions); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1974) (issues of due diligence and constructive knowledge require
appraisal of full testimony); Lighting Fixture and Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental, 420 F.2d 1211, 1213
(5th Cir. 1969) (summary judgment may be improper even though basic facts undisputed if parties
disagree regarding material factual inferences that properly may be drawn from facts).
484. Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 10 (5th Cir. 1967).
485. See, e.g., McNutt v. Airco Indus. Gases Div., 687 F.2d 539, 543 (1st Cir. 1982) (affirming sum-
mary judgment on tolling issue); Naxon Telesign Corp., v. Bunker Ramo Corp., 686 F.2d 1258, 1265-66
(7th Cir. 1982) (affirming summary judgment on issue of laches); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 682-
83 (6th Cir. 1981) (affirming summary judgment on issue of when statute of limitations began to run);
Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.) (affirming summary judg-
ment on issue of plaintif's discovery and diligence in securities fraud cases), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895
(1981); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708, 714 (6th Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment on due
diligence issue based on uncontroverted evidence); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977)
(affming summary judgment on ground that securities claim barred), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming summary judgment on issue
of due diligence); Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570, 574 (4th- Cir. 1976)
(same); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); Will-
mar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir. 1975) (same), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1975)
(same); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming summary judgment on tolling issue
in civil rights action).
By way of contrast, it should be noted that in some cases courts have held that tolling may be estab-
lished as a matter of law. For example, in King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d
1147, (10th Cir 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1038 (1982), the court stated that, "It]here is not one bit of
evidence in the record from which the jury could have entertained the thought that the price fixing
conspiracy, if the jury believed that a conspiracy did exist, had not been fraudulently concealed." Id at
1155; see also Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975) (record conclusively establishes that
plaintiffs did not and could not have discovered fraud; court not obliged to submit issue of due dili-
gence to jury).
9.0519831
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could ever be determined on a summary judgment, cases that dispose of fraud-
ulent concealment issues on summary judgment could be explained on the ba-
sis that in each case, no genuine issue of fact existed. The courts have tried to
use such reasoning by asserting variously that the parties do not dispute histor-
ical facts concerning concealment, 486 that the plaintiff failed to present any,
evidence of inquiry,487" or that the courts themselves have accepted the plain-
tiff's factual assertions as true but found them insufficient to warrant tolling.488
In reality, however, it appears that courts do make their own evaluation of
the plaintiffs diligence on summary judgment. When they do so, the subjective
application of the objective test of diligence becomes most apparent. In a re-
cent securities. case, for example, the Eighth Circuit reached a substantive, but
subjective, conclusion about the plaintiffs diligence.489 In this case, the plain-
tiff alleged that she told defendants to invest her money in "no risk" securities,
but that they instead invested in speculative issues. 490 In her deposition, the
plaintiff admitted that she had received monthly account statements that de-
tailed each transaction, but claimed that she did not understand them and had
not asked for an explanation.491 Squarely facing the merits of the diligence
issue, the appellate court upheld summary judgment for the defendants:
It comes down to this: Should a reasonable person in the position of
[plaintiff], upon reasonable inquiry, have discovered the facts consti-
tuting the alleged fraud on or before March 30, 1975?
The answer is yes. The confirmation slips and monthly account
statements which were sent to [plaintiff] were sufficient to require the
initiation of an inquiry. While they are not a model of clarity for the
novice investor, they provide information sufficient to require a rea-
sonable person to ask questions ....
[Plaintiff] simply did not exercise the care and diligence reasonable
under the circumstances to understand what was happening to her
account.492
By focusing on what a reasonable person in plaintiffs position could have dis-
covered, the court implied that it was answering a question upon which rea-
sonable minds could not differ.
Although the Eighth Circuit seems to have concluded that reasonable minds
486. For example, the court in Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1968), stated
that "[s]ince the facts surrounding this concealment claim are undisputed, the trial court was perfectly
correct in deciding on summary judgment whether these facts were sufficient as a matter of law to tol
the three year statute of limitation." Id at 340.
487. See Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1969) (no evidence of any attempt to learn true
facts, although every reason and means to do so).
488. See Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1975) (because basic facts
appear in plaintiffs complaint, appropriate case for summary judgment); Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338,
344 (2d Cir. 1970) (even accepting plaintiffs assertions of due diligence as true, he cannot escape statu-
tory bar); Rickel v. Levy, 370 F. Supp. 751, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiff's own version of facts demon-
strates without doubt that he could have discovered fraud within statutory period with reasonable
diligence).
489. Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 620 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1980).
490. Id at 1343.
491. Id at 1342.
492. Id at 1343-44.
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could not differ on the plaintiffs diligencei other decisions denying summary
judgment on nearly identical facts suggest otherwise. Thus, in Dzenits v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith ,493 the district-court granted sUmmaryjudg-
ment for .the plaintiff on the theory that the plaintiff should have discovered
her securities. claim against the broker defendant .when she received confirma-
tion slips and periodic reports about her account.494 The Tenth Circuit re-.
versed, holding that the determiiation whether the plaintiff should have
discovered her claim depended on questions about which reasonable minds
could differ, such as the plaintiffs knowledge and experience and common
practice among investors.495 In light of the court's reasoning in Dzenits, it is
extremely difficult to accept th6 Eighth Circuit's conclusion on analogous facts
that the undisputed facts left no room for an opposite finding by a jury. To the
contrary, such issues of reasonableness, looking to "the mainsprings of human
conduct [as applied] to the totality of the facts of each case," 496 are.tradition-
ally left to the jury, even when the historical facts are undisputed, on the
ground that twelve jurors can reach a better decision than one judge.497
Although disposing of the diligence issue on summary judgment seems
questionable given the traditional function of the jury, courts have done little
to enunciate a theoretical justification for treating diligence differently from
other issues that depend upon a determination of reasonableness. Addressing
the diligence issue in general, the First Circuit suggested that a judge may
decide the issue on summary judgment because it is a "mixed question of law
and fact."498 A demand for a jury trial, however, may limit a court's latitude in
deciding diligence issues on summary judgment motions.
499
493. 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974); see supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing
Dzenits).
494. Id at 172.
495. Id at 172-73.
496. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
497. The seminal case on the role of the jury in cases in which reasonableness must be determined is
Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873). In that case the Supreme Court held that even when the
historical facts are undisputed, the question of negligence is for the jury to decide because "it is as-
sumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge."Id at 664. For
a recent exposition of this view, see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 450 & n.12 (1976)
(discussing jury's "unique competence" to apply "reasonable man" standard); cf. Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1789-90 (1982) (discussing vexing nature of distinction between questions of fact
and questions of law). Commentators differ on whether the judge or the jury should decide questions
of reasonableness. Compare Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 1867, 1928 (1966) (judge does not possess greater qualifications than jury to decide what is reason-
able because such a question is not technical and legal learning will not assist in answering it); cf.
Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: Caifornia's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68
CALIF. L. Rnv. 106, 117 (1980) (judges and juries excel in deciding whether plaintiff is justifiably igno-
rant of his claim by reason of having exercised reasonable diligence).
498. See Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 697 (lst Cir. 1978). The First Circuit was addressing the
role of an appellate court in a case on appeal not from a summary judgment motion, but from a judge's
decision after trial. In justifying its determination that the-plaintiff had not been diligent, the circuit
court stated:
Although the question of whether reasonable diligence has been exercised is factually based,
we conclude that the actual determination is a sufficiently mixed question of law and fact to
permit an appellate court to resolve the issue at least where the action below was tried to the
court.
Id The court acknowledged that if the diligence issue had been decided by a jury, an appellate court
could not make an independent factual determination of diligence. Id at 697 n.27.
499. Cf. id at 697 n.27 (when issue of diligence arises injury case, jury decides whether due care has
1983]
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A panel of the Tenth'Circuit recently addressed the diligence issue in Ohio v.
Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross,5°° and granted courts unusual latitude
to resolve .questions of equitable tolling.50' The court acknowledged that deci-
sions granting summary judgment on diligence could not be explained under
traditional principles of summary judgment.502 Instead, it premised its deci-
sion in part on an historical analysis 6f the practices of the English courts of
chancery, 50 3 which decided the issue of diligence on written preselatations, "a-
procedure much like our summary judgment." 50 Relying on this insight into
English history, the court explained that its exercise of equitable powers al-
lowed the resolution of the diligence issue on summary judgment. 05
It is refreshing to have a court recognize that tolling decisions do not easily
fit into the traditional summary judgment mold, but the historical analysis the
Tenth Circuit offered does not completely explain why the jury should not
decide the diligence issue. Although the historical analysis probably disposes
of arguments against summary judgment based on" the seventh amendment
right to a jury trial,506 it does not necessarily follow that tolling questions
should be. excluded from the jury. To the contrary, it would seem that the
diligence issue is particularly suited for determination by jurors because it
looks to interpretation of the circumstances of the case under a standard of
reasonableness. 50 7 Although there is cause for concern that juries may not be
properly sympathetic to the societal policies underlying the statute of limita-
tions, and may hesitate to hold for defendants on limitations grounds when
persuaded that the plaintiffs rights were violated, juries nevertheless have the
capacity to decide tolling issues. Juries have indeed been willing to decide
been exercised); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1131 (4th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); United States ex rel. Bagnal Builders v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 411 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.S.C. 1976) (granting summary judgment on equitable estoppel issue; if
either party had demanded jury trial, issue would have to be tried to jury).
500. 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
501. Id at 693. The court seemingly rejected earlier dicta by other panels of the same court. See
Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 1980) (question whether plaintiff
should have discovered claim does not lend itself to determination as matter of law); Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (seldom, if ever,
possible for judge to determine summarily when injured person became fully aware that he or she had
been victimized).
502. 651 F.2d at 693 n.13 (recognizing that such cases "cannot be adequately explained as individual
determinations of law, each on a question of first impression unique to the particular facts of the case").
503. Id
504. Id
505. Id at 692-93.
506. It has long been settled that allowing the judge to grant summary judgment does not violate the
seventh amendment. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1902). Accord-
ingly, at least in the summary judgment context the right to jury trial need not circumscribe the court's
power to decide fraudulent concealment issues on summary judgment. Beyond that, using an historical
analysis confirms that the seventh amendment does not entitle a plaintiff seeking to toll the statute to
have the diligence issue tried before a jury. The exact contours of the seventh amendment remain
uncertain, but the Supreme Court continues to state that the seventh amendment was designed to pre-
serve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). At the time
the amendment was adopted the courts of common law did not allow tolling, which was an equitable
invention of the courts of chancery. The English law courts did not embrace tolling until 1854, Early
American cases held that it was only available in actions at equity, and the distinction between law and
equity limited its application at law in some jurisdictions well into this century. See generally Dawson,
Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 32, at 597-602; 626-36. Thus, tolling issues were not matters for jury
determination in 1791 because they raised questions of historically equitable, not legal rights.
507. See supra notes 496-97 and accompanying text (discussing jury's competence to decide
reasonableness).
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against plaintiffs on limitations grounds.50 8 Moreover, courts may use interrog-
atories, special verdicts, or instructions to the jury to assure that it decides
against the plaintif if it fihds that the plaintiff was not-diligent. Thus, it seems
that courts should continue to submit the diligence issue to the jury in cases
that go to trial.
Perhaps a better explanation than the. purely historical justification for de-
ciding diligence issues on sunimary judgment is that the statute of limitations
defense -is different from other affirmnative defenses and requires greater solici-
tude from the courts. Obviously defendants would argue that summary judg-
ment should be used flexibly to decide any affirmative defense in order to
vindicate their interests in advance of trial. In that context it is odd to contend
that the statute of limitations, which does not go to the merits of the substan-
tive claim, should be accorded greater importance than afflrmative defenses
that do go to the merits of the claim. Although it has been said that the limita-
tions issue lends itself more readily to summary judgment than other afflima-
tive defenses,509 the strictures of rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure still apply, and summary judgment may be granted only when there
is no genuine dispute about any material fact.510 How, then, is limitations dif-
ferent from other defenses?
First, as suggested by the Manualfor Complex Litigation, the early resolu-
tion of limitations often materially streamlines the litigation.51' If limitations is
a complete bar to the claim, it ends the litigation. If limitations bars claims
antedating a certain date, that determination may affect the necessity of dis-
covery for that period. Although these points are legitimate, they are not very
forceful because other defenses can likewise terminate or simplify litigation.
Disposing of punitive damage claims, for example, may substantially affect the
scope of the litigation, but that possibility does not mean that they should be
resolved on summary judgment rather than after trial. Moreover, it will often
be necessary to allow discovery before deciding the summary judgment mo-
tion. 512 Administrative convenience for the courts, therefore, does not force-
fully support treating limitations differently from other defenses.
Second, the limitations defense arguably is different from other defenses in
that forcing defendants to trial on the merits in itself undermines the purpose
of statutes of limitations,513 even if the limitations defense is ultimately sus-
tained. Under some circumstances, the extent to which trial on the merits may
undercut policies behind certain defenses is relevant to a court's decision to
resolve such defenses on summary judgment. For example, one court has sug-
gested that a defense to a defamation action based on the first amendment is
more suitable to disposition on summary judgment because the simple pros-
pect of trial, even assuming defendant's ultimate success at trial, could chill
508. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1322, 1325 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (civil
jury in class action ruled against plaintiffs on fraudulent concealment issue), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2283 (1982); Swietlovich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1161 (3d Cir. 1979) (jury found that police
records fraudulently altered to "cover-up" negligent failure to prevent prisoner's suicide, but that suit
time-barred).
509. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACICE & PROCEDURE § 2734, at 648 (1973).
510. Id § 2728, at 552.
511. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. I, § 1.80 (1981); see supra note 466 (quoting Manual).
512. Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs the court to continue the motion or
deny it when discovery is necessary. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
513. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of statutes of limitations).
.1983]
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free expression.5 14 A similar approach to limitations was adopted in Ohio v.
Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross. 515 There the court premised its flexible
standard for deciding cases on summary judgment on the theory that requiring
a trial in every case in which a jury was demanded would "effectively neutral-
ize" the statute- of limitations, and thereby impinge on the interests of the
courts as well 'as defendants.
5 16
Although the policy considerations behind statutes of limitations are hardly
as compelling as the policies of the first amendment, they do serve to distin-
guish limitations from other defenses. Forcing the defendant to trial to vindi-
cate his limitations defense substantially undermines the utility of the defense,
which allows him to close his books on transactions after a certain time. Per-
haps more significantly, requiring trials of such cases imposes on the courts the
very problems of stale evidence that limitations is designed to avoid. How can
the court protect a defendant against the prejudice caused by the passage of
time? In view of the equitable origins of the tolling doctrine, which assume
active involvement by the court in the decisionmaking, the actual flexibility in
using the summary judgment procedure seems justified. Courts also should
keep in mind, however, that there is no warrant for completely disregarding
the requirements of rule 56.
C. BIFURCATION
When flexible use of summary judgment does not resolve the tolling issue
prior to trial, the court might consider severing the tolling issue or bifurcating
the trial to obtain a resolution on limitations first. This device may be particu-
larly attractive in complex litigation.517 Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows bifurcation "when separate trials will be conducive to
514. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 1011
(1967). The court stated:
Summary judgment serves important functions which would be left undone if courts too re-
strictively viewed their power. Chief among these are avoidance of long and expensive litiga-
tion productive of nothing, and curbing the danger that the threat of such litigation will be
used to harass or to coerce a settlement ....
In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential .... The
threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as
chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit
itself, especially to advocates of unpopular causes. All persons who desire to exercise their
right to criticize public officials are not as well equipped financially as the Post to defend
against a trial on the merits. Unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their
First Amendment rights are assured freedom from the harassment of lawsuits, they will tend
to become self-censors.
id
515. 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
516. Id at 694. The court reasoned:
Not only defendants but also courts have an interest in the timely commencement of actions.
The adjudication process is hampered by stale evidence and absent witnesses; the burden on
court calendars would instantly increase if actions now time-barred were revived by a new
statute or tolling rule.
Any rule which makes the statute of limitations necessarily a jury question defeats the stat-
ute's purpose of preventing trials of stale claims.
517. See Contract Buyers' League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 200, 219 (N.D. Ill. 1969), al'd
sub nonm. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). With
respect to statutes of limitations, the court observed that "considering the scope of the present litigation
and the consequent magnitude of the discovery to be undertaken, it is particularly desirable that there
[Vol. 71:829
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expedition and economy." This rule has been used to sever the limitations is-
sue in several cases, but usually only when each party has agreed to such treat-
ment.518 In addition, courts may limit discovery to limitations issues and, thus,
effectively bifurcate pretrial proceedings.5 19 Both plaintiffs and defendants
may agree to bifurcation when they want to remove the uncertainty about lim-
itations as soon as possible. When they agree on bifurcation, it is of substantial
utility.
It is to be expected, however, that a plaintiff will often oppose severance for
at least two reasons. First, in jury cases plaintiffs-will be concerned that in a
bifurcated trial they may lose the jury sympathy that might exist if they were
able to present their full case of defendant's alleged wrongdoing. Second, when
evidence on the merits is admissible on the limitations issue, it is a proper
subject of discovery and will have to be presented twice if plaintiff prevails on
the limitations issue. Instead of achieving greater efficiency, such duplication
wastes time and effort and undermines the purpose of severance.
Duplication in the presentation of evidence may be necessary to prove both
the defendant's affirmative acts of concealment and the plaintiff's due dili-
gence. In proving affirmative acts of concealment, plaintiffs may need to intro-
duce evidence of the substantive wrong to show that it was part of a scheme to
conceal the wrongdoing. For example, in an antitrust case the plaintiff based
his fraudulent concealment claim on the defendant's submission of prear-
ranged losing bids as a device to give the illusion of competition and to camou-
flage a bid-rigging conspiracy. 520 In such a case, the plaintiff would have to
prove much of his substantive antitrust claim of conspiracy to support his toll-
ing claim. In another case, the plaintiff based his fraudulent concealment
claim on the defendant's use of a "talk" and "no talk" list, which was designed
to identify people with whom the price-fixing could safely be discussed.521 In
that case the acts of concealment were inseparable from the substantive wrong
itself. Even seemingly straightforward acts of concealment, such as destruction
of evidence or alteration of accounting entries, 522 can be understood only
be expeditious definition of the exact limits of the litigation in order to avoid unnecessary complexity
and expense." Id
518. See, e.g., Burnham Chem. Corp. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 170 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1948);
Alabama Bancorporation v. Henley, 465 F. Supp. 648, 651 (N.D. Ala. 1979); Winkler-Koch Eng'g Co.
v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
519. Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 403 n.l (D. Colo. 1979), aft'd,
651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 392 (1981); cf. Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976) (summary judgment for
defendants affirmed although plaintiffs had not yet had any discovery).
520. See Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1334 (E.D. La. 1980). In
refusing to sever the tolling claim from the substantive claim, the court reasoned:
In order to prove their lack of actual or constructive knowledge, plaintiffs will have to
present a substantial amount of evidence relevant to their substantive claims. Indeed, it seems
impossible to delineate any boundary between the evidence relevant to the knowledge issue
and that relevant to the substantive claims. Thus, a separate trial, rather than saving time and
effort, would probably require duplication of both.
Id
521. See King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1155 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1038 (1982).
522. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 587 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980).
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against the background of the alleged wrongdoing. Without that frame of ref-
erence, their importance as concealment is difficult or impossible to assess.
Bifurcation presents less serious duplication problems in connection with
proving due diligence, but may nevertheless be inappropriate. Although evi-
dence concerning the defendant's acts may be less important when external
events, such as the decline in the value of stock, put the plaintiff on notice of
his claim, the due diligence inquiry usually comprehends all circumstances
surrounding the transaction at issue. Also, when a plaintiff relies upon the
defendant's concealment to excuse his failure to discover his claim despite
"storm warnings," proof of the defendant's conduct again becomes important
to the limitations issue.
As a consequence of these problems, it may be that bifurcation is useful
principally in cases in which the tolling issue focuses on a relatively isolated
event separate from the broad sweep of the plaintiff's claim. For example, in
an antitrust case the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had conspired to
drive the plaintiff out of business by filing frivolous patent infringement law-
suits against anyone who bought the plaintiffs product.523 The defendants won
only one of these frivolous infringement suits, a victory they obtained by brib-
ing a Third Circuit judge.524 The tolling question turned on the narrow issue
of when the plaintiff should have learned of the bribery, and litigation of the
underlying conspiracy issues was deferred by agreement of the parties pending
resolution of the limitations defenses.525 When such isolated events may be
extracted from the mosaic of facts, separate resolution of tolling issues is prob-
ably appropriate. In more complicated situations, however, bifurcation has
limited utility.
CONCLUSION
It is inequitable to allow a defendant who has concealed his wrongdoing to
hide behind limitations when his misdeeds are eventually discovered. The
fraudulent concealment doctrine is thus necessary to add a human element to
the application of limitations, but it introduces uncertainty into an otherwise
arithmetic inquiry. This uncertainty has been compounded by the application
of inconsistent rules to tolling, causing disparity of outcomes without further-
ing any legitimate interest. Because the doctrine is being invoked with increas-
ing frequency in federal courts, the need to establish a consistent set of rules
for tolling decisions has become particularly acute. This article has identified
a number of principles that should promote consistency and has suggested the
direction for future analysis.
Certain principles have emerged clearly. First, despite possible implications
to the contrary in Johnson and Tomanio, tolling issues should be determined
by federal principles, not state law, whenever a federal claim is involved. Sec-
ond, proof of diligence should be required of all plaintiffs whether or not there
has been active concealment. The notion that tolling runs until "actual discov-
523. Winder-Koch Eng'g Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
524. Id at 24.
525. Id at 20-21.
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ery" in certain cases should be rejected. Third, although diligence should be
measured by an objective reasonable person standard, sophisticated plaintiffs
should be held to a higher standard of expertise. Fourth, courts should en-
courage early resolution of diligence issues through flexible and appropriate
use of summary judgment, but should be wary of attempting to decide such
issues on the pleadings. Uniform acceptance of these principles would sub-
stantially reduce existing disparities in tolling decisions.
There is no magic formula that will make the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine function with arithmetic precison, however. It could be argued that the
diligence standard itself should be revised to yield more consistent results. Al-
though consistency is important, it seems impractical and undesirable to insist
on consistency as an end in itself. No precise definition of diligence is possible
and efforts to atomize the standard into subrules that can be applied mechani-
cally are unwarranted. Accordingly, although courts should give some thought
to uniformity in applying this standard, tinkering with the concept of diligence
is unlikely to further the goals of uniform treatment. Ultimately the decisions
are not so much inconsistent in theory as individual in application.
The tolling issue that requires further attention is the proper role of conceal-
ment. By its very name, the fraudulent concealment doctrine depends on con-
cealment. The presence of concealment provided the initial justification for
disregarding the policies of the statute of limitations in tolling cases. Recently,
however, it seems that concealment has been demoted to the status of a factor
in the diligence analysis. This development has resulted in part from the ad-
mittedly difficult problem of identifying the quantum of proof of a defendant's
misconduct needed to satisfy the concealment requirement. Nevertheless, to
abandon concealment as an independent requirement undercuts the policies
underlying the statute of limititations. Unless the plaintiff alleges something
more against the defendant than the commission of the substantive wrong, the
defendant should not be deprived of the protections of limitations and the
courts should not be required to resolve ancient claims. It seems that some
lower courts view this position as unduly draconian, and they accordingly re-
lieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving concealment, but camouflage their
reasoning behind such labels as "constructive fraud." The debate about
whether tolling should occur in the absence of concealment is thus largely un-
spoken, which hardly assists in reasoned analysis. In the future, courts should
openly confront and resolve the tension between the policy of repose and the
reluctance to bar diligent plaintiffs.
Unhappily, a careful review of the tolling decisions leaves unanswered this
article's initial question-whether the present trend toward more disparate re-
sults will continue. The trend should be avoidable, but it may be necessary
that the stimulus for change come from the Supreme Court. Rather than pro-
viding guidance and direction, however, the Court has added to the confusion
with its opinions in Johnson and Tomanio. Although the effect of those cases
on the fraudulent concealment doctrine appears to have been unintentional,
the Court has indicated no interest in deciding whether the federal fraudulent
concealment doctrine should continue to be applied when limitations periods
19831
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are borrowed from a state.526 Indeed, last term the Court denied certiorari in a
case that presented several issues this article discusses.5 27 Until the Supreme
Court acts, it is likely that lower courts and litigants will confront conflicting
applications of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, and disparity in the reso-
lution of fraudulent concealment cases will continue.
526. The Court has, however, addressed tolling issues in another context. See G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Cohn, 102 S. Ct. 1137, 1143 (1982) (New Jersey statute tolling limitations period as against foreign
corporation that has no officer on whom service may be made does not violate equal protection clause).
527. The Court denied certiorari in Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 440
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). See supra notes 500-15 and accompanying text (discuss-
in& case). The petition to the Court presented the questions (1) whether summary judgment was appro-
priate for determination of tolling issues; (2) whether active concealment tolls the statutory period until
actual discovery; and (3) whether Tomanio requires application of state tolling principles to an action
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when the limitations period was borrowed. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). The Court also denied certiorari in Summer v.
Land & Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3485 (1982). Although the
petitioner defendants asserted that the case raised important issues regarding application of the equita-
ble tolling doctrine, a review of the Fifth Circuit's opinion demonstrates that the court simply decided
that the'issue of plaintifis diligence could not be decided on a rule 12(b) motion. Id at 971. Thus, all
issues were left open for later resolution.
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APPENDIX
NUMBER OF CASES INVOLVING FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
REPORTED ON LEXIS
In order to verify that the tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment has
been used more frequently in recent years, the author used LEXIS computer-
ized research to determine the number of reported cases in which the doctrine
was invoked during various time periods. The library used was General Fed-
eral Cases, and the file was Cases, which includes officially and unofficially
reported federal cases. The initial search was "fraudulent w/5 concealment"
and yielded 921 cases. A second level of search was added to improve the
selection: "and statute w/5 limitations." The second level search yielded 540
cases, which formed the sample. Unavoidably, there are reported cases that
are relevant but are not included among these 540 cases, and there are irrele-
vant cases that are included. Moreover, state law diversity cases are included,
so these 540 cases are not limited to the cases involving the federal doctrine.
Nevertheless, the appearance of more state law cases also indicates the grow-
ing popularity of the doctrine. An inspection of portions of the list indicates
that it includes a substantial proportion of tolling cases and thus provides some
measure of the frequency of assertion of fraudulent concealment.
The results of the LEXIS search confirm that the fraudulent concealment
doctrine is being used with growing frequency:
Time Period
Jan. 1, 1980 to D
Jan. 1, 1975 to D
Jan. 1, 1970 to D
Jan. 1, 1965 to D
Jan. 1, 1960 to D
Jan. 1, 1955 to D
Jan. 1, 1950 to D
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